

R ESEARCH REPORT

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES
AND REAL HOUSING PRICES
IN CANADA

HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY
AND FINANCE
SERIES



HOME TO CANADIANS
Canada

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***Demographic Changes
and Real Housing Prices
in Canada***

***Report prepared for
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation***

***By
Mario Fortin
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October 1999

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SUMMARY

With the aging of the baby-boom generation, the number of young households is falling in Canada. Foot and Stoffman recently suggested that in a population with fewer young generations, the number of homebuyers is bound to decrease, which will cause the prices of residential real estate to drop. This document attempts to verify the validity of this contention.

To this end, in chapter 2 the current real housing price determination model is reviewed, i.e. a demand equation and a stock variation equation. We show among other things that the demographic composition does in fact constitute a potential determinant of the aggregate housing demand. However, housing use costs, real household income and housing stock constitute other variables likely to influence housing prices. The model also shows that the long-term price reaction differs substantially from that of the short term because the long-term supply is elastic.

In chapter 3 the historical evolution of real housing prices in Canada at both the national and provincial levels is studied. The first part of this chapter evaluates the quality of the data available on housing prices. The conclusion is that the best source of comparable data at the provincial level and available for a long enough time period, i.e. since 1957, is the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) average sales price. The comparison with other price data, and especially the New Housing Price Index and the implicit housing activity deflator index, does lead to the belief that the MLS price overestimates the rise in the constant quality price because no adjustment related to the underlying growth in housing quality is made. The historical data confirm that real housing prices experienced strong growth in 1973 and 1974 and then again between 1985 and 1988. On the other hand, real housing prices decreased in 1981-82 and in the early '90s. These movements are seen in all of the price measurements considered except those indicating the sale price of homes insured under the *National Housing Act*, which does not capture the price increase in 1973 and 1974. This can probably be explained by the rules for eligibility to the insurance program.

To complete the historical overview, the evolution in the factors likely to influence housing prices is reviewed. To do this, the growth of the adult population is examined. Population was chosen over the number of households because the rate of household formation is not housing price independent. The growth in real income, with emphasis on identifying the periods of recession and expansion is studied, as well as the two main determinants of the housing use cost, namely the interest rate and the inflation rate. Lastly, this historical overview is completed by indicating the rate of growth in the number of dwellings.

Chapter 4 focuses on the debate arising from the publication in general interest magazines of Foot and Stoffman's findings. After presenting the authors' arguments, we look at the way they were received by real estate market analysts and generalists. It is easy to see the difference between the two audiences. While Foot and Stoffman's contention was well received in the press, the specialists almost unanimously stressed the importance of the other factors listed in chapter 2.

Chapter 5 presents a detailed review of the empirical studies on the relation between demographic changes and housing prices. The fundamental article is that by Mankiw and Weil (1989). The exceptional interest of their study is based on their sensational prediction that between 1990 and 2010, real housing prices would decrease by 47% because of population aging. This stems from the fact that housing consumption reaches a peak at age 40 and decreases thereafter. The drop in price will stem from the fact that the number of households over age 40 will increase while the number of those under age 40 will decrease. A series of subsequent articles, however, deflated this prediction. Several aspects of their methodology were criticized. Three key points in these reactions are worth pointing out. First of all, their methodology is incomplete in such a way that the omission of certain variables and one supply equation can explain the importance of the demographic variable. Next, their result seems specific to the United States since the same demographic importance cannot be identified in other countries. Lastly, the relationship they estimate between household age and housing demand is incorrect because one is confusing age effect and cohort effect. Far from reaching a peak at age 40, housing consumption seems to remain high right up to about age 70. Aging will therefore not reduce the housing demand.

In chapter 6, an empirical model containing a price equation and a housing stock equation is specified. This model is first estimated using Canadian data and then using provincial data. There is a significant effect from the growth in the population aged 25-54 on real housing prices. However, the adjustment dynamics indicate that this effect is temporary and that, in the long term, the stock variation allows for amortization of the price change. Furthermore, these dynamics are similar in the different provinces, even though the estimated adjustment speed and the value of certain coefficients vary somewhat. The main factor that determines the long-term change in real housing prices is the real income of the adult population. In fact, findings indicate that these two variables are co-integrated, which implies that they share the same stochastic shocks.

Finally, in the last chapter, an empirical model is used to evaluate the impact of demographics and the economic conditions on the change in housing prices during the 1956-1997 period, and to establish the housing price outlook for the 1956-2016 period. These forecasts consider three demographic growth scenarios and two economic growth scenarios to extract a set of 6 housing price and stock forecasts for the 1998-2016 period. This analysis shows that it is not very likely that the real price will experience a decline during this period. Weak economic growth would have to be combined with the low fertility and immigration scenario for prices to decline across Canada. In this case, the decrease would be small. It is more plausible to contemplate a modest rise in prices. However, the contention of declining prices becomes conceivable in the provinces or regions that will experience population shrinkage in the course of the next 20 years. Lastly, the model can easily be modified to make forecasts of different prices, according to other economic or demographic hypotheses.



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1. INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, most of the Western countries experienced a resurgence in the number of births attributable to an increase in fertility rates. This phenomenon, called the "baby boom", was more noticeable in North America than in Europe. As shown in Figure 1, it is between 1955 and 1965 that the phenomenon reached its peak when more than 4.6 million births were registered in the country. However, this strong contingent was followed by a decline in fertility that was particularly rapid in the early '60s. Hence, between 1970 and 1980, only 3.6 million births occurred in the country, a drop of 22% in fifteen years. This low birth rate was the result of a low fertility index at the time when the number of women in their optimum child-bearing years was relatively low. This came to be known as the "baby bust".

When the baby boom cohort arrived at their maximum fertility years at the end of the '80s, we witnessed a temporary recovery in births, even though this generation's fertility was almost half that of the previous generation. This brief recovery in births was called the "demographic


echo". In *Boom, Bust & Echo: How to Profit from the Coming Demographic Shift*, D. Foot and D. Stoffman analyze the repercussions of the aging population and the passage of the demographic wave on several aspects of Canadian society. It is mostly this impact on housing demand that draws our attention.

The Foot and Stoffman analysis is based on the typical profile of housing services consumption that can be illustrated as follows. From their early twenties, and for about a decade, young adults are, generally speaking, tenants in a multiple-unit residential building. This period allows them to finish their studies, form a union and save the downpayment required to buy a home. In their early thirties, households become first-time buyers. The exact age at which they will do this varies in the different regions, primarily because of the differences in housing prices. In the regions where prices for homes are higher, households buy their first home at a later age because they need to save more capital to cover the downpayment. The first home will typically be a single-family dwelling with several bedrooms to house the

children. Over the next 20 years, housing needs vary little. However, as the household's income gradually rises and it accumulates more wealth, the "forty-something" household may look for a more spacious or better situated residence that will be more expensive than the first. Those who are more well-off may even look at acquiring a secondary home. Finally, when the household reaches retirement, we witness a return to the multiple-unit residential buildings.

This profile implies that the demographic wave first unfurled on the multiple-unit residential rental market in the '70s, with a maximum effect near 1980. The wave then pursued its course and reached its full effect on the homeowner housing

Figure 1
Births in Canada, 1946-1996



market towards 1990. The surf from this wave reached its trough fifteen years after its crest, when the baby-bust generation reached age 30. Hence, between 1990 and 2005, there is a decline of approximately 20% in the number of new households likely to become first-time homebuyers. Further into the future, around 2030, it is anticipated that a record number of households may wish to dispose of a single-family dwelling.

Foot and Stoffman base a real estate investment strategy on this scenario. They document the fact that the demographic movements are the key predictable changes. They then maintain that the housing price will react strongly to these demographic movements. More precisely, they foresee that when the baby-bust generation reaches the first-time homebuyer age, the real price of low-end suburban single family homes will be weaker. On the other hand, it must be anticipated that at the same time, the more luxurious homes will be much sought after and their price will be higher. These are the same homes that will be put on the market en masse when the baby-boom generation reaches retirement age.

In order to establish the plausibility of this scenario, the next chapter discusses the main factors that determine housing prices:

- price concepts (occupation versus purchase and the relationship between the two);
- role of real estate investment and long-term determination; and
- factors that determine the demand (real income, real interest rate, inflation rate, taxation).

Therefore, the real housing price determination model is presented first. In the following chapter, the historical evolution of the real housing price in Canada at both the national and provincial levels is presented. This chapter will be used to compare the data available on housing prices. Chapter 4 focuses on the debate kindled by the publication of the Foot and Stoffman text in general interest magazines. After presenting the authors' arguments, reaction to them by real estate market analysts and generalists will be evident. The next chapter presents a detailed review of the empirical studies on the relationship between demographics and housing prices. In the sixth chapter, the empirical model and interpretation of the national and provincial results are specified. Finally, in the last chapter, the empirical model is used to evaluate the comparative impact of demographics and the economic conditions on the evolution of housing prices during the 1956-1997 period and to establish projections for real estate prices, nationally and provincially, for the 1998-2016 period.

2. REAL HOUSING PRICE DETERMINATION MODEL

2.1 Housing Demand

The housing price is determined by market conditions. In a competitive market, these push the housing price to a level where the quantity in demand matches the quantity supplied. When demand is strong, the housing price rises, while it tends to shrink during periods of low demand. The equilibrium price will also react to changes in the supply and especially the construction costs.

For a competitive market to exist, the goods transacted in it must be perfectly comparable and mobile. Yet, dwellings are not totally comparable amongst each other. Some of their characteristics are intrinsic to the dwelling, especially the habitable floor space, the materials used, the interior divisions or the type of housing (single or multiple, single-storey or multi-storey). Others are environmental variables such as proximity to services and through streets, the type of neighbourhood or the terrain contours, to name a few. Since these environmental variables always differ from one dwelling to another, there are no two completely identical dwellings. The hedonistic approach circumvents the difficulties raised by the heterogeneity of the housing stock. The price a buyer is willing to pay for a dwelling is the result of the value he or she attributes to its characteristics.

Furthermore, the markets are incomplete.¹ This makes certain decisions inseparable that are at first glance independent. For example, because of the absence of an organized single-dwelling rental market, the decision to occupy such a dwelling implies the dwelling's purchase by the occupant. Yet, when the occupant is also the owner, he or she must consider the dual nature of the dwelling, which is both a consumer good and an investment good. This duality forces one to make the distinction between two price types, i.e. the price of the good, also called the acquisition cost, and the cost of the housing services. Since the latter measures how much it costs to occupy a dwelling for a certain time, it is also called the occupancy cost.

In this document, the focus is on the acquisition cost. However, the occupancy price and the acquisition price are interrelated by a ratio called the housing use cost. Several elements interact to determine the cost of use. To understand how they interact, it is useful to formalize without actually introducing a complicated algebra equation.

2.1.1 Housing Use Cost

The housing use cost U is the ratio between the cost of the housing services and the acquisition price. The cost of the services corresponds to the occupancy costs which the owner of the dwelling must assume during a given period. Among these components we find the maintenance expenses that include heating, electricity, municipal taxes, insurance, the physical upkeep and depreciation of the building. This group of expenses will be called Z . As a first approximation, it is more plausible to infer that these expenses are proportional to the value of the building P .² We can then write $Z=zP$, where z is a constant fraction.

In addition to the maintenance expenses, the occupancy cost depends on the cost of credit, which interacts in two ways. First of all, there are the mortgage loan interest expenses. If θ represents the ratio between the mortgage debt and the value of the dwelling, the mortgage debt is then θP . With a nominal interest rate i , the total interest paid becomes $i\theta P$. As for the owner's equity invested in the dwelling, an amount of $(1-\theta)P$, the owner is trying to earn a satisfactory return considering the risk. On first estimate, it can be inferred that a before-tax return comparable to the mortgage interest rate i is sufficient. The return desired on the equity is $i(1-\theta)P$. Generally speaking however, the literature admits that since the return on equity would be taxable if it were invested in other investments, the owner is satisfied with a return equal to the after-tax yield he or she may have made. If a marginal tax rate of τ is assumed, the satisfactory return on the owner's equity is then $i(1-\tau)(1-\theta)P$.

Finally, the owner deducts from these costs the anticipated capital gain on the dwelling ΔP . Since the capital gain on a principal residence is not taxable, this is an after-tax gain. By dividing all of these values by the asset price, we obtain equation 1, which gives the housing use cost in Canada:

$$\begin{aligned} U &= z + i(1-\theta) + i(1-\tau)(1-\theta) - \Delta P/P \\ &= z + i - i\theta(1-\theta) - \Delta P/P \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Equation 1 is subject to some individual variations. It actually shows that the cost of use decreases when the investment income tax rate is high. Because of the progressive tax rates, the high-income households therefore have a lower cost of use. The latter also decreases when the housing fraction financed by owner equity is greater, which is beneficial to households with greater financial wealth.

The housing use cost is likely to experience large annual variations. This variability is not primarily due to the maintenance expenses because the latter represent a fairly stable fraction. It is the macroeconomic instability that is the cause, due to the variations in interest rates and the inflation rate. Interest rates were particularly variable during the '80s. As for the inflation rate, it saw its strongest surges in 1973 and 1979 while it dropped rapidly in the years following the brutal recessions of 1981-82 and 1990-92. In addition to these macroeconomic fluctuations, sudden reversals in capital gains expectations also led to fluctuations in the cost of use. For example, if households anticipate that the recent price movements will continue, the expectations are such that they provoke speculative bubbles. The mechanism that produces them is now well known. An unexpected exogenous shock pushes the housing price upward significantly and households begin to expect that the movement will carry on at least for a certain time. This anticipation then reduces the cost of use, which further stimulates the housing demand and perpetuates the price increase that had been expected. Such a speculative movement is of relatively short duration since the buyers' ability to pay is not unlimited. Levin and Wright (1996) nevertheless show that it feeds price instability.

Lastly, although it does not appear explicitly in equation 1, the inflation rate can strongly influence the capital cost of use. In fact, changes in the inflation rate have an almost unitary repercussion on interest rates. This means that when the inflation rate rises by 1%, nominal interest rates also have a tendency to rise by one percentage point. Furthermore, a rise in the inflation rate should also raise the anticipated housing price appreciation rate by one percentage point. Under these two hypotheses, a rise of one percentage point in the anticipated inflation rate reduces the housing use cost by $\tau(1-\theta)$.³ Inflation has no effect only if the owner invests no equity in the dwelling or if his or her interest income is not taxed.

2.1.2 Headship Rate and the Aggregate Housing Demand

Housing demand varies according to age, type of household (family as compared to non-family), number of persons per household as well as other characteristics.⁴ The housing demand of a household belonging to demographic group i in time t can thus be written $d_{it}(X_t, P_t, U_t)$. Here, U_t represents the housing use cost, P_t is the capital cost of the dwelling while X_t represents an exogenous variables vector. These variables capture the effect of the economic conditions beyond the changes in the housing use cost. In a later chapter, we will specify the list of the relevant variables.

The transition to the aggregate demand for demographic group i is obtained by multiplying $d_{it}(X_t, P_t, U_t)$ by the number of households found in this group in time t . This number can be expressed as the product of N_{it} , the total population of the group, and the headship rate in this group, that we note as m_{it} . A household being by definition the persons occupying the same dwelling, the headship rate indicates the propensity of a population to form sub-groups sharing the same dwelling. As Skaburskis (1997) recently showed, the household headship rate varies according to age, type of household, income, gender, the presence of children and the price of the dwelling. The headship rate is therefore a function of the

same variables as those which determine a household's housing demand so that we can write $m_{it}(X_t, P_t, U_t)$. Consequently, the total housing demand for group i in time t can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} D_{it} &= N_{it} \times m_{it}(X_t, P_t, U_{it}) \times d_{it}(X_t, P_t, U_t) \\ &= N_{it} \times h_{it}(X_t, P_t, U_t) \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $h_{it}(X_t, P_t, U_t)$ is a convolution of the decision to form a household and of the housing demand by household. Conceptually, the difference between the two is that d_{it} is the housing demand per household of group i while h_{it} is the demand per individual in this same group. In order to circumvent certain problems raised by the endogeneity of the decision to form a household, it is more practical to refer to h_{it} rather than to d_{it} to speak of the individual demand.

The aggregate housing demand in time t , D_t , is simply the sum of the demand of n different demographic groups, or:

$$D_t = \sum_{i=1}^n D_{it} = \sum_{i=1}^n N_{it} h_{it}(X_t, P_t, U_t) = H_t(N_t, X_t, P_t, U_t) \quad (3)$$

The aggregate demand function thus depends positively on the size of the different demographic groups N_{it} and negatively on the real price P_t and cost of use U_t . The sign of the partial effects of the exogenous variables depends, for its part, on the variables selected in vector X_t and will be clarified later.

2.2 Housing Supply

The housing supply is a simple function. The assumption is that new housing construction C_t depends on the housing price P_t and on a variables vector W_t affecting the supply. Among the variables entering into W_t is the price of the resources used in construction, i.e. the vacant land, materials and labour. If the price of these inputs rises, housing activity becomes less profitable so that construction activity decreases. Since the contractor must finance the units he or she builds in the short term, we also expect the short-term interest rates to have a negative impact on construction. Lastly, some indicators of the ease of disposing of housing on the market can be

included in W_t . For example, DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) used the mean time necessary for selling a new dwelling and showed that this variable had a negative impact on construction. One substitute could be the housing vacancy rate which has an anticipated positive effect on construction.

If the assumption is that the housing stock depreciates at a constant rate δ , the supply equation can be written as follows:

$$\Delta S_t = C_t(W_t, P_t) - \delta S_{t-1} \quad (4)$$

Equation 4 can also be presented in the form:

$$S_t = C_t(W_t, P_t) + (1-\delta)S_{t-1} \quad (4')$$

The important characteristic of such a supply equation is that it implies a very different reaction in the short term than in the long term. Housing starts represent a very small fraction of the housing stock. Consequently, the short-term supply, in a one-year outlook for example, is relatively inflexible. However, since the housing supply does not require the use of resources specific to the industry, elasticity of supply is very great in the long term. The only element likely to prevent the housing supply from being perfectly elastic over a long period is the cost of land. It is the spatial theory that determines what the long-term housing equilibrium price will be.

To illustrate how the spatial theory analyzes the long-term impacts on the price of land, assume that an increased housing demand forces the conversion of part of the farmland into urban land. The reduction in the cultivated area leads to a reduction in the supply of agricultural products and an increase in real food prices. This rise in food prices, increasing the profitability of agricultural production, will lead to keener competition for buying arable land, which will raise the price. To justify an urban vocation for lands whose agricultural profitability is greater, the real price of urban land must also rise, which increases the real housing price in the long-term. Demographic growth therefore creates an upward trend in the real housing price. Empirically,

however, this trend can be countered by an inverse effect. Indeed, there is an underlying growth in agricultural productivity. Because it reduces the real food prices, this productivity growth reduces the real land price.⁵ This lowers the housing activity costs and promotes a greater spatial dispersion in cities.

2.3 Market Equilibrium

If we assume that the housing price is flexible enough to ensure stock equilibrium between supply and demand, we can write:

$$H_t(N_t, X_t, P_t, U_t) = C_t(W_t, P_t) + (1-\delta)S_{t-1} \quad (5)$$


Recently, DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) suggested that the housing price did not reach its equilibrium value instantaneously so that the stock equilibrium condition was not met in the short term. They empirically support this conclusion by showing that the lagged real housing price substantially improves the forecasts in a model for price and housing starts in the United States. We will attempt later to verify whether it proves appropriate to assume that the price adjustment is gradual.⁶

Equation 5 clarifies the variables that modify the real housing price. This equation shows that on impact, a stronger growth in the size of one of the demographic groups tends to raise the real price. However, the effect on the price tends to wane as soon as it reaches the date $t+1$. In fact, the price increase in time t accelerates housing activity such that the housing capital stock at time $t+1$ is higher. If the speed at which the housing capital stock adjusts is rapid, the price quickly returns to its long-term equilibrium value. Conversely, if the stock

adjusts slowly, the price will take longer to return to its long-term value. Appendix 1 shows the algebraic adjustment in more detail.

Figure 2 shows, in a graphic presentation, the dynamic adjustment resulting from a permanent increase in the housing demand from D^0 to D^1 . Initially, the market is in long-term equilibrium. At the time of the increase in demand, the price rises along the short-term supply curve S_t , moving from the initial equilibrium A to the new temporary equilibrium B. Since at this price level housing activity is very profitable, this accelerates the rate of housing starts. Hence, at date $t+1$, the housing supply is displaced from S_t to S_{t+1} so that the market equilibrium, one period after the rise in demand, is situated at point C. Since the price is still higher than that on the long-term supply curve, the rate of activity remains steady, which again displaces the supply to the right. The final equilibrium is located at point F when the demand crosses the short-term and long-term supply at the same point. In such a situation, the housing stock remains stable because housing activity is no longer generating abnormally high returns.⁷

Figure 2 Real Housing Price Determination



What characterizes the final equilibrium as compared to the initial situation is the weak price reaction. This is explained by the fact that, in the figure, the long-term supply curve has a very slight positive slope. This reflects the presumed effect of a persistent weak growth in the real price of land. Such a result must be qualified. If the rise in demand is located in a region where undeveloped land is rare, the long-term supply curve will have a more pronounced slope. If, on

the other hand, land is abundant, the long-term supply curve will be virtually horizontal. The increase in demand would then have no lasting effect on the housing price.

Although simple, this model contains all of the elements necessary for analyzing the evolution of the real housing price in Canada. It will be used as a guide for the next chapter.

3. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF REAL HOUSING PRICES IN CANADA

3.1 Data Available on Housing Price

There are several different sources for Canadian data on housing price. The most extensive series is the average sales price as compiled by the Canadian Real Estate Association. Statistics Canada publishes three indices related to housing price, namely, the New Housing Price Index, the Residential Building Construction Price Index¹ and the housing cost components in the Consumer Price Index. The third source of information is from Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, which, from the early '50s until 1985, published the average sales price of housing financed under the *National Housing Act*. This price will be designated by the NHA. The Royal LePage index provides an estimate for the sales price of bungalows. Lastly, for the purposes of the study, we have developed another housing price measurement by dividing the total housing value in the Statistics Canada National Balance Sheet Accounts by the total number of dwellings in Canada. The following sub-sections explain the advantages and drawbacks of these different price measurements.

3.1.1 Multiple Listing Service (MLS) Price

The MLS price is based on a record of the real estate transactions conducted in the nation's different cities. The Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA) has been collecting this data since 1956. The record contains information on the price and number of transactions.

Approximately 90% of the properties sold are residences. In addition to the data on the overall transactions, CREA has been publishing separate residential data since 1975. The first is called the Total MLS while the second is called the residential MLS. However, because of the preponderance of residential transactions, the behaviour of the residential MLS does not differ significantly from the Total MLS.

The longest continuous historical series of housing prices that can be obtained is the Total MLS price for Canada. This series has been available on an uninterrupted basis since 1956. We can also obtain data dating back to 1960 for the Atlantic Provinces, as well as for the six other provinces, namely Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. The provincial data breakdown for the Atlantic Provinces has only been available since 1971. The residential MLS price became available on a provincial basis beginning in 1975.

The MLS data are the only ones that offer such long historical continuity while also being available on a regional basis. On the other hand, they present two main drawbacks. First of all, they do not allow any differentiation between the unit price variations and those stemming from the improvement of housing quality or size. Since the progressive improvement of real income allows Canadian households to occupy better housing, the average quality of the residential housing stock tends to improve. The evolution of the MLS price is therefore going to overestimate the average increase in the real housing price. Furthermore, the transactions deal just as much with single-unit as with multiple-unit residential buildings. The average transaction price therefore overestimates the average price per dwelling unit because of the transactions on the multiple-unit residential buildings.

3.1.2 New Housing Price Index

Statistics Canada has published a New Housing Price Index since 1971. This index is constructed by calculating, on a monthly basis, the rate of change in the sales price of the same model of house newly built in the same neighbourhood. The average rate of change is obtained by taking the average of the rates of change seen in different house models. When a model is no longer sold, it is replaced in the index by an equivalent model.

Statistics Canada has published the results of two different New Housing Price Index surveys. The first series was published for the period from 1971 to 1990, while the current active series begins in 1981. From 1971 to 1974, the survey covered only six metropolitan municipalities, namely Montreal, Ottawa-Hull, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary and Edmonton. In 1975, the survey was expanded to cover the metropolitan regions of Halifax, St. Catharines/Niagara, Kitchener, London, Regina and Saskatoon. Since 1976, the cities of St. John's, St. John, Moncton, Québec, Hamilton, Windsor, Sudbury, Thunder Bay, Vancouver and Victoria have been included. Currently, there are 20 metropolitan municipalities covered by this survey. In addition, the New Housing Price Index is available in three forms, namely, separate data on the building and the land, or the total of the two.

The main advantage of these data compared to the MLS data is that the changes in quality do not influence the price variations. A second, less important advantage is that it offers the possibility of making a distinction between the land and the structures. Lastly, these indices are available separately for approximately twenty metropolitan municipalities. On the other hand, there are two principal drawbacks in these indices. The first is that they cover only new housing. It is therefore dangerous to extrapolate the movements to the existing residential housing stock as a whole. The second drawback is common to any index number, which is being arbitrarily standardized in comparison with a base year. The index therefore does not provide information on the housing price level, but only on its variations.

Two other pieces of information associated with the housing price are published by Statistics Canada. The Residential Building Construction Price Index has been available quarterly since 1971. This index is a deflator used to estimate the real value of housing activity in national income accounting. This index is not a direct measurement of the housing sales price but rather an indicator of the construction input costs. Its movements are expected to be strongly related to

new housing prices. On the one hand, because changes in housing prices are often reflected in the input prices and, conversely, because the contractors will try to pass on the changes in construction costs to homebuyers.⁹ Lastly, different housing cost measurements enter into the Consumer Price Index but their relationship to the housing price is fairly vague. In fact, the housing component of the CPI measures the housing services cost, which, as indicated in the previous chapter, is related to the price of the dwelling by its cost of use. Since the latter can fluctuate rapidly, the cost of providing services can sometimes evolve in the opposite direction from the housing price. For example, a drop in interest rates reduces the cost of use which lowers the housing services cost. Since the drop in costs encourages households to consume more housing services, this increases the housing demand and pushes their price upwards. There is then simultaneously a decline in the housing cost index in the CPI and a rise in the housing price.

3.1.3 Price of Housing Financed Under the *National Housing Act*

From the early '50s until 1985, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation published the price of new homes financed under the *National Housing Act*. Compared to the New Housing Price Index, CMHC price data contain no adjustment for quality. There is, however, information on habitable floor space. On the other hand, these data are not merely indices because they indicate the average price level. Their main defect is that the series ceased more than ten years ago.

3.1.4 National Balance Sheet Accounts Data

Since 1960, the Statistics Canada National Accounts Division has been publishing an annual estimate for the national balance sheet accounts and the major Canadian economic sectors. The balance sheet data are completely integrated into the national revenues and expenditures accounts. To obtain the value of the assets and liabilities, Statistics Canada estimates the unit market value of the assets whose quantity is established by

using a perpetual stock methodology.

In order to estimate the average value of new and resale housing, the estimated value of the sum of the residential buildings is divided by the number of units. The main advantage of this method is that it provides a direct estimate of the average price of the housing stock, contrary to the other methods that indicate either the average new housing price or only the average price of new or resale buildings that exchanged hands during the year. Another advantage of this measurement is that it provides data on a continuous basis since 1960. The drawbacks are that no quality adjustment is made, no regional breakdown is available and the market value is roughly estimated.

3.1.5 Comparisons of these Data With a Constant Quality Index

To ideally analyze the real housing price, it would be necessary to have housing price data that are adjusted to eliminate the effect of the variations in housing quality and size. One method that initially allows for controlling these effects is that of repeat sales. To build such an index, only units that have been sold more than once are used. The main limitation of this method is that it provides a very low sampling rate since only a very small portion of the housing stock is sold several times. Furthermore, it is likely that the homes subject to more frequent sale are not entirely representative of housing as a whole.

Recently, Goy and Steele (1994) were able to use an extensive database on the city of Kitchener to develop some constant quality price indices. Their building method is based on the estimate of hedonistic regressions on 9,856 first-time starter-home transactions carried out from 1988 to 1990. Such a method makes it possible to calculate the price variations of the characteristics and then to reconstruct the price changes for a house with certain specific characteristics based, in this case, on quasi Fisher, quasi Laspeyres and quasi Paasche¹⁰ chain indices.

However, the principal interest of this study for this topic is that, after having developed a constant

quality index, the authors compare it with the data usually used to measure price variations. They were thus able to evaluate the relative performance of the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) price, the average price of homes insured under the *National Housing Act* (NHA), the Royal LePage index and the New Housing Price Index (NHPI). This allows them to conclude that the MLS price is astonishingly similar to the quasi-Fisher index. The average NHA price itself shows a delayed peak even if the level is very similar to that of the MLS. As for the rate of the NHPI increase, it is substantially lower than the rate of increase suggested by the quasi-Fisher index applied to new homes, as well as to that of the constant quality homes for first-time buyers.

These observations are a bit surprising. In actual fact, of these three price measurements, only the NHPI makes an adjustment for quality. One would therefore expect that the two other series overestimate the true price increases. The NHPI itself should provide an unbiased estimate of the price increase in constant quality homes. Yet, we see instead that the NHPI underestimates the true constant quality price increases. Goy and Steele provide an explanation for this NHPI bias. The new housing models marketed would be more in demand because they suit the tastes of the times. They would thus be initially sold at a premium. The price would decline however as the end of this model's production approached. Since the NHPI measures the price change in the same model, it captures this real price decline resulting from the product's cycle and interprets it as a price decrease stemming from market conditions.

This comparison therefore suggests that the MLS data offer good quality for estimating price variations over a short period. Since they are also those with the greatest availability both historically and regionally, they thus constitute a first choice for analyzing the housing price in Canada. However, the conclusions on the long-term evolution in the housing price will have to be weighted by judging the possible impact of the qualitative improvement in housing over the course of the period under study, and of the possible NHPI bias.

3.2 Historical Evolution of Real Housing Prices in Canada

3.2.1 Price Level Evolution

The evolution of real housing prices in Canada revolves around two aspects that have separate causes, namely, the long-term trend and the short-term variability. Attention will focus firstly on the trend by studying different price level measurements. So as to eliminate the effect of inflation, all of the price series have been converted into real 1986 dollars by dividing them by the Consumer Price Index that has a value of 100 in 1986. As for the indexed series, they are standardized to have a value of 100 in 1986. Because of its lengthy availability, the MLS series will be used as a reference point for the price measurements.

Figure 3 shows the average MLS price on the left scale, while the New Home Price Index is measured on the right scale. These two series show that the real housing price is subject to strong annual fluctuations. Hence, between 1972 and 1974 and again between 1985 and 1989, the real housing price rose by approximately 25%. On the other hand, the real price posted a decline between 1981 and 1985. The broad trend also shows a decline throughout the '90s.


Furthermore, the two series do not identify exactly the same peaks. In fact, between 1975 and 1976 the real MLS price continued to advance by nearly 10% while the NHPI declined.

The most striking aspect of this comparison is that, even if both measurements capture similar short-term movements, they provide diametrically opposed information on the long-term price trend. The average real MLS sales price displays a definite upward trend while the real NHPI tends to decrease. Hence, between 1971 and 1997, the real MLS price went from \$77,116 to \$113,593, or an increase of 47% in 25 years

compatible with an annual compound rate of 1.5%. For its part, the real NHPI went from an index value of 113.3 in 1971 to 96.6 in 1997, or an average annual decrease of 0.6% for 25 years. The average annual growth rate of the NHPI is therefore 2.1% weaker than that of the real MLS price.

A previous section indicated two reasons why these price measurements may poorly monitor the evolution of the real price of constant quality housing. We know that the MLS price makes no adjustment for quality. We suspect the NHPI, on the other hand, of systematically underestimating the true rise in the cost of new housing. Initially, any combination of these two explanations compatible with an annual absolute difference of 2.1% would be equally valid. We can, for example, suggest that the NHPI actually does adequately measure the real price of constant quality housing. The data would then indicate that the real housing price has indeed decreased an average of 0.6% per year. This would equally imply that the average quality of the units recorded in the MLS transaction records rose by 2.1% per year. We can, on the other hand, believe instead that the real price was stable. This would imply that the NHPI underestimates the price increase by 0.6% per year and that the average annual increase in housing quality grew by only 1.5%

Figure 3:
The MLS Price and the NHPI



per year. In order to put forward a more plausible interpretation, we focus our attention on some other price series.

Figure 4 compares the real MLS price with that of new homes insured under the *National Housing Act* (NHA) and the average housing value according to the National Balance Sheet Accounts (NBSA). The NHA price has a value very similar to that of the MLS transactions until the middle of the '60s. Since that date however, the MLS price has experienced much more pronounced fluctuations than the NHA price. The behaviour divergence is particularly acute between 1972 and 1976 when the NHA price advanced by only 20.3% as compared with a gain of 35.9% for the MLS price. However, there are some valid reasons for believing that the NHA price underestimated the true price rise during this period. Laycock (1978)¹¹ reminds us that one of the NHA loan eligibility criteria is the price of the unit. But, the maximum value of units eligible for NHA loans was not adjusted quickly enough to the unexpected increase in the housing price in the early '70s. The consequence of this was to reduce the range of housing that was eligible for NHA loans, thereby introducing a serious quality bias into NHA prices at that time.

As for the series of prices estimated according to the National Balance Sheet Accounts (NBSA), its average level is at only 45% of that of the MLS price.

However, even though this series is a bit smoother, its annual movements nevertheless quite faithfully copy those of the MLS price series. Furthermore, between 1971 and 1997 the active NBSA price went from \$36,035 to \$50,690, an increase of 40.7%. Such an increase is similar to the one measured by the real MLS price.

The MLS weights the different regions of the country according to the number of transactions.

Figure 4:
The NHA Price and the NBSA Price





Figure 5:
British Columbia's Weighting in the MLS Price



Although these refer just as much to resale homes as new homes, all the new homes are the subject of a transaction while only a small portion of the resale homes is transacted every year. Hence, the weighting attributed to the different regions in calculating the national MLS price reflects more the proportion of housing starts than that of the housing stock. The result of this is that the provinces of British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta, which are experiencing higher demographic


growth than the national average, receive disproportionate weighting in the national MLS price. Thus, between 1960 and 1997, Ontario's weight in the average MLS price was 56% while this province has only 42% of the number of units.¹² Similarly, British Columbia receives an average weighting of 20% while its average share of the housing stock is only 11%. Conversely, the Atlantic Provinces and Quebec are greatly under-weighted, receiving a share of only 12% of the transactions while they account for nearly 35% of the nation's housing. Furthermore, since the cyclical fluctuations in real estate transactions are not perfectly synchronized, the different regions' shares in the number of transactions experience significant annual variations. If the prices differ from one region to another, these weighting changes cause price variations that do not match the value of the housing stock.

To illustrate the regional weighting disequilibrium as well as their significant annual variability in the MLS price calculation, Figure 5 compares British Columbia's share of the transactions and the housing stock. Since the prices in this region are higher than the national average, this province's heavy weighting tends to unduly inflate the national price. Part of the increase seen at the national level at the end of the '80s therefore results solely from the exaggerated increase in British Columbia's weighting.

These drawbacks in the Canadian MLS price can be corrected by weighting the provincial MLS sales prices by each province's share of the housing stock. To obtain a real value, this price was further divided by the CPI to obtain the real weighted MLS price. Figure 6 shows weaker underlying growth than that of the average MLS price between 1960 and 1997, or an average annual growth of only 1.15% as compared with 1.73% for the average MLS price.

These four series constitute the only direct measurements of the housing price. However, the underlying behaviour of the price can be inferred by studying the Construction Costs Index in real

Figure 6
Average MLS Price and Price Weighted by Housing Stocks



terms (CCI). The Residential Building Construction Price Index is constructed in the same manner as the other deflators in the gross domestic expenditures. Since these deflators are not known to be biased, it is probable that the CCI adequately measures the building cost of a constant quality dwelling. Furthermore, only a change in the contractors' profit margin can cause the change in the CCI to differ from that of the NHPI. We know that the profits are very sensitive to economic fluctuations. Consequently, we can expect the cyclical sensitivity of the NHPI to be higher than that of the CCI. However, it is difficult for the movements underlying both series to evolve very differently because the profit share tends to remain constant in the long term. This is reinforced by the fact that a considerable erosion of the margin is necessary for the sale price to drop significantly as compared to the building costs.¹³

Figure 7 compares the NHPI and CCI evolution in real terms. The fluctuations of both real series follow very similar short-term movements. However, the CCI does not show the downward trend of the NHPI, having gone from 104.5 in 1971 to 102.3 in 1997, or an annual average decrease of less than 0.1%. If we accept the preceding argument, we can conclude that the most plausible hypothesis is that the price of

constant quality housing was situated at nearly the same level in 1997 as in 1971.

To verify whether this is really an underlying discrepancy and not a discrepancy linked to less favourable conjunctural circumstances in 1997 than in 1971, estimations were made using a linear regression, whether a trend explains the movement divergence between the two series. Over the period from 1971 to 1997, it was found that the relative NHPI decrease results from a trend.¹⁴ This estimate confirms that the underlying rate of increase of the NHPI is half a percentage point less than that of the CCI, that the NHPI therefore has an average bias of -0.5% per year. As a consequence, this also implies that the MLS price and the NBSA price capture an average improvement in housing quality of approximately 1.5% per year. This improvement, which could be the result of the gradual increase in real income, will be analyzed in a later chapter.

3.2.2 Rate of Change in Real Housing Prices

Even if the trends differ between the indices, their annual movements are, generally speaking, very similar. Table 1 shows the simple correlations between the rate of growth of the four housing price measurements, as well as with the CCI. These correlations are calculated for the 1972-1997 period, except for the NHA price, which is only available until 1985. These correlations are very strong between the MLS, NHPI and CCI prices and even reach 0.93 between the latter two. On the other hand, the NHA price is less strongly correlated than the other measurements. This is due to the fact that the NHA does not capture the strong price increase between 1972 and 1975.¹⁵

Figure 7: The CCI as Compared to the NHPI




Table 1: Price Growth Rate Correlation (1972-1997)

	MLS	NHPI	NBSA	CCI	NHA (72-85)
MLS	1.00	0.82	0.73	0.91	0.78
NHPI	0.82	1.00	0.75	0.93	0.59
NBSA	0.73	0.75	1.00	0.83	0.41
CCI	0.91	0.93	0.83	1.00	0.60
NHA (72-85)	0.78	0.59	0.41	0.60	1.00

Table 2: Price Growth Rate Volatility and Autocorrelation (1972-1997)

	MLS	NHPI	NBSA	CCI
Average	0.015	-0.006	0.0131	-0.001
Standard Deviation	0.072	0.067	0.036	0.041
Maximum	0.136	0.145	0.109	0.087
Minimum	-0.186	-0.126	-0.053	-0.085
Autocorrelation	0.355	0.498	0.694	0.473

Table 2 compares the volatility of the series. There is a fairly strong difference since the NBSA growth rate has a dispersion around its average similar to that of the CCI growth rate but twice as weak as that of the MLS and NHPI growth rates. Irrespective of the measurement selected however, what stands out is that there is great volatility in the housing price. Since demographic movements are a very slow phenomenon, it is obvious that the origin of these short-term price fluctuations is not demographic. It is the NBSA growth rate which shows the strongest autocorrelation of the first order, since it reaches 0.7 versus approximately 0.5 for NHPI and CCI and only 0.36 for MLS.

Figures 8 and 9 show the comparative evolution of the growth rate of the MLS, NBSA and NHPI measurements, the NHA price being excluded because of its lack of reliability and limited availability. There is an extremely coherent picture of the housing price movements in Canada since the early '70s. The prices made strong progress in real terms during two episodes, namely, those from 1972-75 and from 1985-88. On the other hand, the prices plunged dramatically in 1982 and a little less in 1990-1991. In the next section, we will review certain factors possibly having exerted an effect on the housing price, i.e. demographics, the economic conditions, the housing use cost and housing starts.

3.3 Evolution of the Factors Influencing Prices

3.3.1 Demographic Changes

It is not clear how to measure the demographic pressures on the housing price. If we accept the Foot and Stoffman contention, it is the growth in the contingents of young adults that constitutes the best measurement. This perception is founded on

Figure 8:
MLS and NBSA Variation Rates





Figure 9:
MLS and NHPI Variation Rates



the hypothesis that housing demand reaches a peak at a young age. It is in fact possible that, since the housing demand depends on the household's permanent income, it is, instead constant with age.

In such a case, it would be the growth of the adult population that would be important. To consider

these two possibilities, Figure 10 shows the evolution of two groups, the population aged 25-34 and that aged 25 and over.¹⁶

We observe that the demographic pressures differ a great deal according to the two measurements. Hence, after being negative in the early '60s, the 25-34 population growth accelerated rapidly to reach a growth rate of more than 5% in 1972. It subsequently slowed until the beginning of the '80s to stabilize at 2% until about 1989. It then experienced another decline in the early '90s, this time so rapid that the population in this age group decreased by nearly 2% per year thereafter. According to this measurement, it is in the early '70s that the upward demographic pressure on the prices would have been strongest and the downward pressures would begin to show in the '90s. On the other hand, the growth of the population aged 25 and over, measured on the right-hand scale, experienced a less erratic and lagging evolution than the 25-34 age group. After declining in the early '60s, the population's growth rate accelerated slightly until 1972. It then remained fairly stable at approximately 2.5% per year until 1990. Since then, the growth rate has started to decline again and was at 1.5% in 1997.

The two preceding measurements are based on population. Yet the unit requesting housing is the household. If household size varies in time, population growth will provide a skewed picture of the growth in the number of dwelling units required to house the population. This is the reason why several demand forecast models instead target the growth in the number of households to measure the demographic impact.¹⁷

Figure 11 presents the growth observed in the number of households. However, even if household growth is conceptually superior, as explained in section 2.1.2, the headship rate reacts endogenously to the real price of housing

Figure 10:
Population Growth





Figure 11:
Growth in the Number of Households



services. The result of this is that the historical growth in the number of households constitutes a biased measurement of demographic pressures.

One way of getting around this difficulty consists of calculating the growth in the number of households that would have been observed if the headship rate had remained constant. Using data from a census, the headship rate for each age group is established, which is then multiplied by the matching population cohorts. In this manner,


we obtain the number of households that would have been observed if the headship rate had been that of the selected census year. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) proceed in this way to obtain what they call "*the age-expected household formation*". Since the year chosen for establishing the headship rate is arbitrary, this study chose 1991 and used the headship rate for each 5-year age group. Figure 11 also contains the growth in the number of households that would have been observed if the headship rate were still that of 1991.

Because of the underlying decline in the size of households, we see that until the late '70s, the growth observed surpasses that calculated at a constant headship rate. We also notice that household growth slowed significantly, changing from more than 3% in the early '70s to a little more than 1% recently. The deceleration was especially rapid at the beginning of the '80s. By comparison, the growth with a constant headship rate displays smoother behaviour since its decline is more gradual. We also see that demographic growth was relatively weak in the early '60s but accelerated strongly at the beginning of the '70s. The growth schematic for the number of households at a constant headship rate is in fact similar to that of the population aged 25 and over, which confirms the 0.73 correlation between the two variables.

3.3.2 Macroeconomic Conditions

The real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) constitutes the least controversial measurement of the state of the economy. By definition, the total GDP is the product of the population and the gross-domestic product per capita. Since population growth has been already measured, we will use the GDP growth divided by the adult population as a conjunctural measurement in order to avoid counting the population effect twice. Figure 12 confirms the importance of the two major recessions, that of 1981-82 and that of 1990-92. The 1962-66 and 1984-88 periods stand out as being those that experienced the greatest real income growth per person.

Figure 12: Real GDP Growth Per Adult



3.3.3 Housing Use Cost

As shown in 2.1.1, the cost of use depends on four factors, namely, the expected rate of appreciation in housing value, the nominal interest rate, the marginal investment income tax rate and the ratio of housing indebtedness. The first two variables are contingent upon individual circumstances and the individual changes are much more important than the temporal fluctuations that could be constructed at the aggregate level. Since these are not the variables that have changed the housing use cost the most over time, attention will be focused solely on the first two variables.

It is extremely difficult to measure the anticipated housing appreciation rate because it requires specifying how households formulate their expectations. If we assume they are formulated rationally, we need to have a complete model of the housing market that enables us to find the desired future price, conditional on the model's forecasts. Under a hypothesis of adjustable expectations, the anticipated growth depends on the recently observed price growth rates. Conversely, the speculative bubbles are often explained by the fact that households extrapolate the recent price movements."

In the face of this range of choices, a simple formulation will be selected by assuming that the

real housing price expectations are not sensitive to the inflation rate. This implies that the anticipations for housing price variations react in a one-to-one ratio to the changes in the inflation rate. Consequently, the changes in the expectations for housing price growth will be directly related to variations in the CPI growth rate. We will use the interest rate on the 5-year mortgages. The cost of use was calculated on the assumption that the operating costs represent 6% of the value of the dwelling, that the marginal investment income tax rate is 50% and that the value of the mortgage is half the value of the dwelling. The 6% attributed to operating costs was established from data contained in the Statistics Canada publication Family Expenditure in Canada 1996, Cat. 62-555-XPB. The ratio was obtained by dividing the average expenses, excluding mortgage interest, by the average housing value in 1996 according to MLS data. It should be stressed that a change in one of these hypotheses affects the cost of use but insignificantly alters the changes it has undergone over time.

Figure 13 shows the evolution of the cost of use and the two macroeconomic variables. The inflation rate was low until the early '70s. It accelerated dramatically between 1971 and 1974 to remain at a high level until 1981 before dropping rapidly between 1982 and 1984.

Thereafter, inflation remained stable until 1991 when it again declined and stabilized at approximately 2%. The interest rate evolved on a parallel except that it grew less than the inflation rate in the mid-'70s. Consequently, the housing use cost declined at the time when Canada was experiencing the inflationary trend of the '70s.


3.3.4 Housing Activity

A last factor likely to act on prices is the housing supply. Ideally, it would be desirable to have data

Figure 13: Housing Use Cost



Figure 14: Housing Stock Variation



capable of measuring some exogenous changes in building costs. Unfortunately, the research did not indicate any.¹⁹ The evolution in the quantity of new housing supplied can be directly studied. Different sources can be used to measure construction volume. For reasons of historical continuity, the housing stock evolution published in the Statistics Canada CANSIM database, Matrix 4079 were selected.

Figure 14 shows the change in the number of housing units. The number of new units is


indicated by the lower curve, measured on the left-hand scale, while the percentage change is measured on the right-hand scale. The fastest growth rate was observed in the mid-'70s. Residential housing activity declined by half in the early '80s, at the time of the 1981-82 recession and record interest rates. After that, building resumed vigorously and the number of new units surpassed 230,000 in 1987 and 1988, activity levels similar to those observed in the mid-'70s. As a percentage, however, the rate of change reached only 2.5%, or one percentage point lower than the 3.5% growth observed in 1973.

It is interesting to compare the evolution of housing activity with that of the prices and the number of households. Indeed, the theory presented in chapter 2 suggests that construction reacts to the real housing price, which is influenced by the rate of household formation. By comparing the housing stock variation presented in Figure 14 and that of the number of households provided in Figure 11, we observe a very great similarity. However, this is difficult to interpret since the number of households is measured by the number of dwellings occupied. The difference between the stock and the number of households is therefore, by definition, attributable only to the change in vacant housing units. On the other hand, the comparison of the stock variation with that of the number of households at a constant headship rate is, itself, very important. It reveals that the housing activity trend faithfully follows that of the formation of new households.

This is compatible with very great long-term housing supply elasticity.

The price comparison shows that construction volume is subject to short-term variations similar to those of the prices. In fact, if we disregard the growing trend in prices and the declining trend in new housing, we can identify the same approximate episodes in both series: valley in the early '60s, peak in 73-75, valley in 82-85, peak at the end of the '80s and valley in 95. Such a positive correlation strongly suggests that, in the short term, price and construction movements are

Figure 15: Construction and Price: Canada and Provinces



above all dictated by changes in the housing demand. The supply shocks, if they had any effect, played only a secondary role.

3.4 Regional Housing Price Evolution

The importance of local conditions in determining the housing price is major. The national conditions can mask large regional price and building variations. To see whether the consistencies observed at the Canadian level can also be found at a more broken-down level, we studied how the real price and the construction of new housing units evolved in the Atlantic Provinces and in Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. The prices are those of the Multiple Listing Service while the housing stock data come from CANSIM.

Figure 15 shows the comparative evolution of these series. In all of the provinces there is a positive short-term correlation between the construction of new housing units and the real housing price. This consistency appears in spite of the fact that the regional cycles were very different. Hence, all of the Eastern and Central provinces experienced a sharp decline in price and construction during the 1981-82 recession. This contraction, although also observable in the other provinces, was less pronounced there. The first oil shock generated strong residential construction activity in Saskatchewan, while the trend was especially strong in Alberta at the end of the '70s. In both cases, the real price rose parallel to the construction booms. The Atlantic Provinces, Quebec and Manitoba experienced their activity peak in 1973 and subsequently showed a definite downward trend in construction. We also see that Quebec shows a more pronounced downward price trend than in the other provinces, which is explained above all by the very high transaction prices at the beginning of the '60s.²⁰

Ontario and British Columbia stand out from the other provinces for the high price in the '90s. Although the housing price has declined in Ontario after peaking in 1989, it continued to grow in British Columbia during the '90s. Furthermore, British Columbia is the only province whose housing stock growth rate still surpasses 2% annually. We do,

however, see that the recent construction evolution was highly erratic, with a concomitant sporadic price and building surge in 1981 and high construction variations in 1991 and 1996.

3.5 Analytical Summary of Price Evolution

This review of the historical housing price evolution allows us to bring out the following findings. The New Housing Price Index probably underestimates the price growth of constant quality housing by approximately 0.5% per year. This price would be nearly stable in the long term if we judged it by the housing activity deflator. The price of housing financed under the *National Housing Act* is affected by sporadic biases stemming from the eligibility criteria based on property value. The most convenient housing price measurement is the Multiple Listing Service average sales price, called the MLS price, which has been available on a national basis since 1956 and on a provincial basis since 1960. This price shows a growth trend that is probably the result of an average annual housing quality improvement of approximately 1%.

Nationally, the real housing price experienced two major upward episodes, namely, in 1973-75 and at the end of the '80s. The periods in which the prices were high are furthermore systematically accompanied by an acceleration in new housing construction. A positive correlation between the real price and construction suggests that the demand shocks above all would be responsible for the price changes. Moreover, this national price avoids a wide provincial variability in the growth episodes, but the positive correlation between construction and price is nevertheless also found provincially. The similarity between housing stock growth and that of the number of constant headship rate households is compatible with strong long-term supply elasticity. This would mean that price increases would undoubtedly not be permanent. As seen in chapter 5, the econometric analysis will enable us to confirm this interpretation.

4. DEMOGRAPHICS AND HOUSING IN GENERAL INTEREST MAGAZINES

4.1 Foot and Stoffman: Two-Thirds of Everything

The subtitle of the introduction to the best seller that economist and demographer David Foot wrote in collaboration with Daniel Stoffman, *Boom, Bust & Echo: How to Profit From the Coming Demographic Shift* is a true promotional slogan. To state that two-thirds of the long-term economic phenomena can be explained by demographics is sufficiently catchy to attract the attention of the general public. The Foot and Stoffman text was, moreover, a resounding success. Written in a journalistic style, the thematic articles are based on examples meticulously selected to support the authors' point of view. Thus, it reads like a novel. But can their arguments stand up to close analysis? No scientific study is cited, no bibliography is provided.²¹ Before presenting the reception the Foot and Stoffman contention garnered from Canadian real estate market specialists, let us look at the logic of their argument.

After drawing up a broad profile of the trends in commercial real estate, the authors state that the same reality applies to residential real estate. "During these two crucial decades—from 1967 to 1986—, approximately 9 million Canadians left their parents' home to set up residence in their own home. This inevitably created a phenomenal boom in the residential real estate market. It was just as inevitable that once the baby-boomers were housed, it would be the end of the boom [tr.]" (1997, 41). This valley was to last from 1988 until the end of the '90s "because the baby-bust generation that followed is 45% smaller than the baby-boom cohort [tr.]. Subsequently, "the baby-boom echo, which starts in 1980, will enter the housing market around the year 2000 [tr.]" (1997, 43). The echo households will first exert pressures on the apartment prices and once the transition age to ownership is reached, i.e. between ages 30 and 35, the construction of residential buildings in Canada will be re-launched. This recovery will be concentrated in the regions of the country "that actually have an echo generation",

i.e. Ontario, the West and perhaps Halifax. "Other parts of Canada experienced an exodus of baby boomers and thus there will not be many baby-boomer children who will need apartments [tr.]" (1997, 43). But since the housing stock is large, "it is only in the second decade of the 21st century... that prices will increase again [tr.]" (1997, 45).

The other aspect of the Foot and Stoffman contention deals with the evolution of the dominant cohorts' needs and their impact on the changes in the composition of the demand. Hence, as the baby-boom generation ages, new needs emerge. Two examples are offered. First, in the mid-'90s, the echo generation is a generation of adolescents. They need space and a fair number of families have the means to offer it to them. Large homes will then be in high demand. Secondly, "at the same time as the children of the baby boomers are entering adolescence, their parents' desire to own a quiet place in the country is growing stronger [tr.]" (1997, 50). These buyers of recreational property situated at a reasonable distance from the large cities, "will be numerous enough to exert considerable pressure on the recreational property price". While only 8% of Canadian families currently own a vacation home, this percentage will increase significantly in the coming years.

The businesses that understood this trend have, according to Foot and Stoffman (1997, 51), hit the jackpot. The Vancouver firm Intrawest is the business cited as the example. The other big winners are the small resort towns such as Saint-Jérôme, situated close to metropolitan areas. These financially well-heeled baby boomers will even go as far as preferring to have a small city property that they use as a place to sleep during the week and a spacious home in the country from which they can only truly benefit during leisure time.

The essence of the Foot contention had already received some press and general interest magazine coverage. Magill (1993) quotes a text published in

the *Toronto Star* in 1986, in which Foot parallels the housing shortage in the major urban centres and the arrival of the baby boomers on the rental market. At that time he predicted that, "a dramatic increase in the demand for single-family homes will take the place of the rental crisis... If we do not prepare ourselves as quickly as possible for this reversal, the dream of having a house of one's own is likely to turn into a nightmare [tr.]" (1993, 87).

Can we say that this contention was original at the time of the publication of the book's English version, i.e. in 1996? In actual fact, several American authors had published similar texts in general interest magazines starting back in the early '70s.

4.2 A Trend Rising From the South

In 1988, similar arguments could already be found in certain American periodicals. The Miller text (1988) is a good example to mention. He maintains that: "... in the long term, there is a demographic foundation to the explanation of residential construction activities. The pace of housing activities reflects the growth in the number of households because most of the new housing units are built to meet the needs of new households, either directly or indirectly [tr.]" (1988, 35). In the short term, several variables can influence housing activity. Miller mentions the availability and cost of mortgage credit, the building costs, the price of the homes, the income and the wealth of the households that occupy the homes, as well as fiscal policy.

When he applies this logic to the American demographic trends, Miller foresees a decline in housing activity investments in the United States for the period from 1986 to 2000. In fact, by using the Bureau of Labor Statistics demographic projections, he estimates that the real residential investment will grow by 0.4% per year for this period, which is substantially lower than the 1.3% recorded from 1972 to 1986. In 2000, housing activity will represent 3.9% of the GNP as compared to 5.3% in 1986 and 6.2% in 1972. Thus, "the decline in household growth should

almost certainly be reflected in the residential construction activities [tr.]" (1988, 48).

Hill and Peterson (1994) reiterate the argument in a text published in the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank's Economic Review. In this text, the authors attempt to evaluate the impacts of the projected demographic growth changes and the distribution by age group of the American population on the investments in housing activity until 2010. They maintain that the effects of the levelling off in the demographic growth have had a negative impact on this industry, causing a 17% decline in net housing activity investments from the end of the '80s to the mid-1990s.

The demographic phenomena should cause another investment decline in the range of 22% from 1995 to 2005 before experiencing growth after this date. Hill and Peterson (1994) discuss some implications of these trends on construction jobs and the price of homes. Hence, the job share related to housing activity compared to total employment should decrease by one third. As for the prices, they should not record a dramatic decline. However, some major price adjustments in the relative home price should occur between the different types of homes.

Some more detailed analyses of the contribution of demographic phenomena to the housing demand, the revisions of the demographic projections to take into account the effect of an increase in immigration and the addition of cyclical variable predictions to the models called into question the results of the partial analyses based only on the growth in the number of households. For example, Filardo (1996) shows that the demographic contribution must take three trends into consideration: population growth, the household formation rate and the structure of the population by age groups. He also shows the importance of the conjunctural factors to the explanation of residential housing activities. In his model, he includes variables to account for economic growth, interest rates and the consumer confidence level. He then obtains results opposed to those of Hill and Peterson (1994) regarding the evolution of activities in the residential construction industry.

4.3 A Positive Reception from Generalists

What kind of a reception did the Canadian general interest periodicals give the Foot contention? Among the generalists, the reception was actually very positive. A few examples illustrate the treatment received by *Boom, Bust & Echo*.²²

Jean-Marc Léger (1997), from the survey firm Léger et Léger, mentioned the following subtitle: "In less than a year, David Foot, a professor at the University of Toronto, has become the most popular guru in Canada by stating that every year we get older [tr.]" Léger writes that, "this simplistic theory demolished the major analyses by futurologists Faith Popcorn, John Nesbitt or Alvin Toffler". Léger says he is "two-thirds" in agreement with Foot's argument holding that the aging of the population explains, in large measure, the major trends and major transformations in Canadian and Quebec societies. He maintains that the baby-boom generation has marked the social trends as it aged: hippies in the '60s, yuppies in the '70s or dinks [double income, no kids] in the '80s. Therefore, "a generation so numerous that it created the nature and the movements our society has been living for nearly 50 years". He concludes that the markets will have no other choice but "to adapt to an aging clientele".

Séguin's conclusion (1997) is just as eloquent: "Boom, Bust & Echo, a must read... and reflect!" The Canadian population is aging and its choices, habits and needs are changing. According to Séguin, this phenomenon must be considered for two reasons. First because "David Foot's study is the first to establish forecasts by associating demographics and statistics with the personal consumption profile. Hence, age will be the factor with the greatest influence on personal choices and habits". Then, because these demographic trends will have major repercussions on tax revenues.

Foot's arguments also receive support in the English Canadian press. Following the publication of his book, and even before, he was frequently

interviewed to comment on the housing market evolution and especially on the prices. For example, a text published in the *Financial Post Daily* in February 1995 allowed Foot to explain the price trends in single-family homes. He maintained in it that, "without a large influx of immigrants, there will simply not be enough new buyers for the homes that the retired boomers will want to sell. In each of the lower age groups, there are 20% fewer people than boomers." Hence, the housing market "will be mushy over the course of the next 20 years". The analysts quoted support Foot's point of view saying that investment in a home will not be very profitable.

Certain provincial publications applied Foot's contention to the analysis of real estate market trends in a specific province. This is the case for the Kershaw article (1996) for British Columbia. Thus, to understand why housing activity flourished so much in this province in the early '80s, it is necessary to go back twenty or thirty years and verify the number of births.

The temptation to compare David Foot to other authors, who took an interest in the heavy social trends, fuelled a comment by Shannon Kari (1996) in the *Financial Post*. Foot's reputation and talents for popularizing serve him well. The use of the demographic phenomena to explain the long-term trends pleases the reader because it is a simple argument that can be supported by examples that affect the reader. Kari uses the housing case to justify her positive assessment of Foot's process.

Other readers allow themselves to be caught up in the two-thirds of everything game. This is the case, for example of Patricia Chisholm (1996) in *Maclean's*. Even if, at the outset, she writes "that too many factors are overlooked: the effect of science, policies and globalization", she manages to conclude that "nearly everyone who is concerned by the future will be able to learn from this new approach, even if it is sometimes restrictive, applied to many of the most pressing questions for Canada".

Lastly, certain analysts have used Foot's logic to show that housing needs would evolve. This is the

case for Rick Winchell, Executive Director of the Ontario Residential Care Association, who, being interviewed for an article in the *Financial Post Daily* (FPD, 1996), maintains that, "in the residential services sector, businesses will have to be more innovative in their responses to consumers' demands and needs". The aging of the population creates new needs for residential services, needs which are determined by age.

4.4 Exit Footmania

In the general interest press, the Foot contention was rapidly deflated by real estate market specialists. A short article published by Ross Laver (1996) in *Maclean's* is a good illustration of this rather cold reception. This author criticizes Foot for having overlooked the influence of several other variables on the real estate market: the fluctuations in economic activity, interest rates, changes in disposable income, zoning bylaws, the availability of land for residential neighbourhood development, etc. In actual fact, Foot and Stoffman (1996, 43) had acknowledged that factors other than demographics had an effect on the housing demand; however, these factors only "delay the inevitable".

The most virulent attack came from Frank Clayton, a real estate market consultant. In an interview granted to Laver, he maintains that Foot's analysis is simplistic and dangerous and that he "confuses a decline in the housing demand growth rate with a decline in total demand". By placing emphasis on only one of the structural factors that affect the housing demand, population growth, Foot overlooks other just as important structural factors and the cyclical factors such as the vigour of the regional economies. In the new edition of their book, Foot and Stoffman (1999, 55) respond to this criticism but by maintaining the demographic logic. They maintain in effect that, "just as some not insignificant demographic differences exist from one region to another, so the real estate market differs from one region to another".

Among the basic structural factors that Foot overlooks, Clayton mentions the changes in the household composition. Not everything has to do with demographic growth. The changing number of

households and the emergence of non-traditional households must also be considered: adults living alone, single persons and couples without children.

But the principal weakness of the Foot and Stoffman analysis is, according to Clayton, having forgotten the contribution of supply. In the long term, the housing stock is not fixed and adjusts to the demand. This adjustment reduces the downward pressures on the price of homes. And Clayton concludes by stating that, in the future, "the rise in home prices might be more modest than in the past, but there is no reason to panic".

Others have attacked Foot's analysis in his own field, i.e., that of the demographic projections. This is the case with Baxter (1997) of the Urban Futures Institute of Vancouver. Baxter does not call into question past demographic data but instead disputes the implication of this data on the future housing demand. He accepts that the number of persons in the 25 to 34-year age group will decrease by 345,000 from 1996 to 2006. However, he stresses that the number of persons aged 15 to 24 years will increase by 350,000, that the number of those aged 35 to 44 years will increase by 100,000 and, above all, that the number of persons aged 45 to 64 years will increase by 2.5 million. The latter is the age group in which we find those who have the best possibilities of owning a home.

In the long term, according to Baxter, Foot is mistaken when he maintains that the baby-bust generation will have to buy the homes of the baby-boom generation because the latter will live in their homes longer. When they die, their children will already be at retirement age. Hence, the demand reduction that will accompany the baby-bust generation will be more than compensated by the growth in the younger and older age groups. "Assuming that the current immigration level is maintained between 210,000 and 215,000 immigrants per year, there will be no reduction in housing demand in Canada between now and 2095. There should be no periods during which supply exceeds demand, during which the market will collapse, during which, for demographic reasons, people would have to

withdraw from the housing trade. [tr.]” According to Baxter, between now and 2010, if economic growth holds steady, Canada should produce approximately 135,000 homes and 45,000 rental units per year. We are far from the chaos foreseen by Foot.

Foot’s predictions also have trouble standing up to the facts. We saw above that, according to him, Canada was to experience a very calm housing market up to the end of the ‘90s. Yet Canada’s economic performance revitalized the housing activity market. This is what Schofield (1998) maintains in *Maclean’s*. Furthermore, Foot is quoted in this text. He defends his contention by maintaining that this good performance is attributable to generation X, i.e. Canadians between the ages of 32 and 38 who represent the tail end of the baby boom. The other analysts do not share this point of view. According to them, it is more a matter of a phenomenon basically related to the economic conditions: low interest rates, declining unemployment rate, increase in wealth transfers through inheritances and increasing consumer confidence.

Some other examples of incorrect predictions have been documented in the publications aimed at the general public. As a last example, we use the case of the most dynamic housing activity period Canada has experienced in the past 30 years. If we rely on Foot’s contention, the number of inhabitants and their age should determine the housing demand. That being the case, when the oldest of the baby boomers reach the average age

for buying a first home, i.e. 33 years, we should have seen the beginning of the most prosperous housing activity period in Canada. According to Taylor (1997, 97), Foot maintains that this is in fact the case and states that, “if we identify the steadiest strong housing activity period, we select the mid-‘80s”. This statement is, however, false. Taylor recalls that the most prosperous five-year period for the residential construction industry is that from 1972 to 1976. At that time, the oldest of the baby boomers were barely 29. Faced with this result, Foot defends himself by stressing that number of births had increased dramatically in Canada during the ‘40s and that builders had invested too much in housing activity in the ‘70s not being sufficiently aware of the demographic realities! He convinced no one however. Asked to comment on this result, Clayton replies that, “demographics are very important, but that the world is more complex than what one simple theory can explain” (Taylor, 1997, 97).

Hence, as Leckie (1998) reports, the importance of demographics appears to be largely overestimated. “Employment, interest rates and the general health of the economy have more of an effect on household spending than their age.” And to conclude, Clayton: “Three factors must to be considered in the analysis of any housing market segment: the demographic and economic analysis, and the preferences”. (Taylor, 1997, 97) The question is therefore to know what the real contribution of these different factors is. What does the specialized literature on this subject teach us? This is the theme of the next chapter.

5. EMPIRICAL DEMOGRAPHIC STUDIES ON HOUSING PRICES

5.1 The Laycock Study

Although demographics have long been recognized as a major determinant for housing starts, the literature says less regarding their impact on the housing price. The first study to detect and quantify such an impact in Canada is the one by Laycock (1978).²³ Commissioned by the Anti-Inflation Board to explain the high housing price increase between 1972 and 1974, this study attempts to establish whether this hitherto unprecedented increase in the housing price resulted from a new paradigm or whether it was the continuation of a same structural relationship. To do this, Laycock developed an econometric model tying the MLS price changes to a set of independent variables. The variables that he chose to explain the nominal housing prices were the real disposable income, the inflation rate measured by the growth rate of the Consumer Price Index, the real cost of credit, which he measured by the real interest rate on government bonds minus the inflation rate, housing stock and the population aged between 25 and 55 years. This model was a first difference estimate on the annual data covering the 1955-76 period.

Laycock describes the demographic influence on the housing demand in the following manner:

"Demographic factors are widely accepted as one of the most important influences on long-run demand. In the simplest terms, more people require more housing units. However, the situation is complicated somewhat by the fact that certain age groups of the population seem to prefer different types of accommodation. The rationale behind this implied link between age and type of housing is based on the "life cycle" theory which hypothesizes that the young household first occupies an apartment and then desires a moderately priced single-family home or townhouse as the family head nears the age of 30. As affluence increases in middle age, the family is likely to upgrade its housing consumption. Finally, the household

*may move into a smaller retirement home or apartment as its members liquidate savings in later life."*²⁴

Laycock therefore accepts that the demographic composition has some complex effects. In addition to the changes in population size that affect the total housing demand, the distribution of the different demographic groups can cause the demand to evolve differently for specific types of housing. However, given the inability to obtain price measurements for housing categories, Laycock limits himself to studying the general housing price level and therefore concentrating on a single population size measurement, i.e. those aged between 25 to 55 years.

After having restricted the effect of inflation on the housing price to being unitary,²⁵ Laycock shows that the most important influence is that of real disposable income. The elasticity of the price to income ratio reaches 1.60 and this coefficient is highly significant. He also finds an expected negative effect of the real interest rate and the housing stock. These two variables are also statistically different from zero. However, even though the effect of demographics on the price is positive, Laycock cannot reject at the usual confidence level, the hypothesis that the effect of this variable is statistically null.

5.2 The Mankiw and Weil (MW) Study

The Mankiw and Weil article (1989) was the first published in an arbitrator journal to present some empirical results making it possible to consider that the changes in demographic composition were going to cause the real housing price to decrease significantly. Based on American data, the principal forecast in their study is the following:

"If the historical relation between demand and prices continues to hold, it appears that the real price of housing will fall about 3 percent a year. More formal forecasting using the

regressions yields the same answer. The regression in the first column of table 2 implies that real housing prices will fall by a total of 47% by the year 2007."²⁶

The repercussions of this study were enormous. The written press echoed these forecasts widely. The scientific community also reacted strongly since Regional Science and Urban Economics simultaneously published five critiques in 1991. Later, at least five more articles were published that use or criticize the Mankiw and Weil approach (henceforth called MW). In order to understand this important contribution, we will first review the approach they adopted, which will make it easier to understand the criticisms.

The MW conclusions are based on the analysis of the relation between a demographic index (D_t) for the housing demand and its real price. This index is obtained by multiplying the population age structure by a coefficient measuring the intensity of the housing demand for a given age α_i . More precisely, this index is formulated in the following manner:

$$D_t = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i N(i, t) \quad (6)$$

where $N(i, t)$ is the number of persons aged i at the date t . The α_i estimate was made based on a sample from the 1970 United States census and formed of 203,190 persons grouped in 74,565 households. A regression is performed for the purpose of explaining the value of the dwelling occupied by the people's age.²⁷ To do this, MW construct 99 dummy variables called $DUMMY_i$ that assume the value 1 if age is i or otherwise zero. The parameter associated with $DUMMY_i$ is α_i and it indicates the estimated impact of a person's age on the value of a dwelling.


To understand the approach properly, certain points must be clarified. First, MW make no correction for the income or household structure modifications that occur when age changes. On the contrary, their variable captures the impact of age, as well as the effect on housing demand of all the variables

that change with age. The following quote allows us to understand their position.

*"Looking across individuals, the quantity of housing demanded is a function of age, income, and a variety of other household characteristics. Yet here we use data on only the first of these attributes: age. Our ultimate goal is to construct a variable on the aggregate demand for housing using information only on the age composition of the population. We are therefore not interested in the value of the true coefficient on age in a multiple regression. Instead, we are interested in the best predictor of a household's quantity of housing given information only age of its members. Any correlation of age with income and other household characteristics does not pose a problem - indeed, multicollinearity may be a strength, for it acts to eliminate any worry over the role of omitted variables."*²⁸

Figure 16 presents the estimated values of α_i in 1970 dollars. The housing demand rises rapidly in the early twenties, reaches a maximum at the end of the thirties to then decline gradually by approximately 1% per year after the age of 40. MW attribute this decline to the fact that older cohorts have earned a lower income during their life than

Figure 16:
Housing Demand by Age Estimated by
Mankiw and Weil



that of the younger cohorts. To illustrate the importance of the increase in the housing demand for the younger cohorts, MW compare the profile of this housing demand life cycle with that obtained by estimating in a similar manner based on data from the 1980 census. Although the 1980 profile has the same broad shape as that of 1970, the real housing consumption in it is stronger for all the ages.

Having estimated the profile of the housing demand life cycle, MW then calculate D_t from 1940 on, by using the number of people of a given age. They make the calculation based on the 1970 profile and compare it with that of 1980. Even if the latter has a much higher level than the former, with a progression capable of reaching up to 50% for young households, the growth rate of D_t is very similar for both measurements. The maximum demographic effect on the housing demand occurred in 1977, at a time when demand was increasing by nearly 1.8% per year. The growth in demand subsequently declined rapidly however and is no more than 0.6% per year after 1997, the lowest rate observed since the Second World War.

In the next step, they estimate what the impact of D_t is on the housing stock and on the price. Their conclusions are diametrically opposed. While they find a negligible effect on the stock, they estimate an effect on the price that is statistically very significant and quantitatively large. This leads them to conclude that the price elasticity of both housing supply and demand are relatively weak. In essence, their result is based on the fact that at the end of the '70s, at the same time when the demographic variable was at its strongest, the real housing price reached its peak. By applying the model's estimated coefficients to the demographic forecasts of the United States, they anticipate that the real housing price will decline at an average rate of 3% per year between 1987 and 2007.

5.3 1991 Criticisms of the MW Model

A series of criticisms of the MW article was published in 1991 in *Regional Science and Urban*

Economics, preceded by a presentation of the different aspects of these criticisms by Woodward (1991).²⁹ The following sections review these criticisms.

5.3.1 Engelhardt and Poterba: Analysis of Canadian Data

Engelhardt and Poterba (1991) copied the MW methodology with Canadian data. Since both countries experienced a baby boom of a comparable size at the same time, the demographic composition of these two countries is quite similar. The initial expectation is therefore that if demographics are the principal source of the movements in housing prices, we should find an influence on prices that is similar in both countries.

Engelhardt and Poterba thus estimate the α_i coefficients based on 12,734 households from the 1977 Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances. They observe that the Canadian profile grows less rapidly than that of the United States between ages 20 and 40 and that the housing demand reaches its peak at a later age, or between 40 and 45 years.³⁰ After that, housing consumption decreases at a rate similar to that observed in the United States. Having then specified a more complete model including the real GDP and the cost of use, they compare identical equations for explaining the housing price in Canada and in the United States. The demographic effect is radically different in the two countries. While they confirm the strong positive effect observed by MW in the United States, they obtain a negative effect for this same variable in Canada. This is explained by the fact that the real housing price evolved in a very different manner in the two countries, Canadian prices having experienced strong growth in the early '70s while the peak was reached near 1980 in the United States. In conclusion, Engelhardt and Poterba suggest that since the MW methodology does not manage to explain the prices in Canada, care must be taken before extrapolating the American price movements to future years.

5.3.2 Hamilton and the Price of Housing Services

Hamilton (1991) brings three contributions. First of all, he points out that in the MW equation, demographics will make the housing demand rise for at least the next thirty years. The forecast of a decline in real price made by MW does not therefore stem from an absolute decrease in housing demand. Instead, it is a trend in the equation that implies an average annual price decrease of 8.1% per year. Just to counterbalance the deflationary effect of this trend, the population must grow by 1.5% per year. To illustrate the absurdity of the extrapolations we can derive from such an equation, Hamilton points out that if the population suddenly became stationary, the real housing price would decrease by 97% over the course of the next 40 years.

Hamilton then stresses that if the price movements stem from shocks on the housing demand, the housing price should evolve in the same direction as the rental price. Yet, the movements of these two prices evolved in opposite directions during the '70s. A more plausible interpretation of these movements is the decrease in housing use cost resulting from the acceleration of inflation. This would be the decrease that would have been the principal cause of the strong growth in the housing demand observed in the '70s. To better support his argument, he shows that the MW demographic variable has a negative effect on the rental price.

Lastly, he remarks that when MW compared the 1970 and 1980 profiles, they stressed that the real housing consumption had grown considerably during that decade. Hamilton maintains that with some plausible values for housing demand income elasticity, the growth in real income in the '70s is not enough to explain this increase in consumption. The households in fact reacted as if they perceived a reduction in the cost of housing services during the '70s, which contradicts the contention holding that the rise in price stems from demographic pressures.³¹

5.3.3 Hendershott: The MW Equation has a Poor Forecasting Performance

Hendershott (1991) also criticizes the crucial and poorly explained role of the underlying variable included in the MW model. He takes his investigation further by analyzing the temporal stability of the MW equation. By breaking down the sample into two sub-periods, he obtains separate estimates for the periods from 1948-1969 and 1970-1987. This enables them to show first that the outside-sample forecasting performance of the MW equation is very poor. In fact, the estimates obtained for the 1948-69 period are unable to forecast the price movements of the '70s and '80s. While the model forecasts a 41% real price growth between 1970 and 1983, the growth observed was only 10%. Furthermore, during the second sub-period, the demographic variable has a much weaker and insignificant effect than in the first sub-period. Lastly, they add a capital cost measurement, as well as the real income, to the equation to study different forecasting scenarios up to 2007. They thus show that the equation can forecast a rise in price, rather than a decline, if a strong enough growth in real household income is projected.

5.3.4 Holland: Non-stationarity and Co-integration between Demand and Stock

Holland (1991) focuses his attention on the non-stationarity of the variables studied by MW. Granger and Newbold (1974) showed that the regression with non-stationary variables often produces spurious correlations. The MW results could be subject to this problem since they did not perform the tests for ensuring the stationarity of the variables. Holland therefore submits the growth rate of the housing demand and stock, as well as the level of the prices to the augmented Dickey-Fuller test.

Furthermore, to better circumscribe what might cause the variables' non-stationarity, he verifies whether these same variables are co-integrated. Co-integration is a property linking non-stationary variables. Some non-stationary variables are said to be co-integrated if there is a linear combination

of these variables that is stationary. This property is very important. It appears especially when the level of several variables obeys a correction process for imbalances. In the case of the housing market, if the supply reacts gradually to the demand so as to eventually make up for the imbalance the demand shocks may have created, the housing stock and demand will be co-integrated.³² If this property is verified, these two variables are subjected to common stochastic shocks. This would tend to support the hypothesis that the demographic shocks are responsible for fluctuations in housing starts. If on the other hand we find that the prices and the demand changes are co-integrated, this would be indicative that the demographic shocks have long-lasting effects on the housing prices.

Holland first verifies that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for each of the three variables. Subsequently, neither can he reject the null hypothesis that the variations in the housing demand and stock are co-integrated whereas he rejects it between the variations in the housing demand and the real price. He thereby concludes:

*"Thus, the growth of housing demand caused by the Baby-Boom appears to be the major factor behind increased real residential investment, but does not appear to be the major factor behind increased real housing prices."*³³

He reinforces this opinion in a last section in which he once again studies the relation between the price and the change in demand. However, to avoid the spurious correlations, he uses the logarithmic variation of the prices, stationary series, which he explains by the second derivative of the demand logarithm and by the rate of change in the capital use cost. In this formulation, only the cost use appears significant. He concludes from this, like Hamilton, that the rise in housing prices in the '70s would be easier to explain by the rise in the inflation rate than by the rise in demand caused by the baby boom.

5.3.5 The Mankiw and Weil Response

Mankiw and Weil (1992) attempt to respond to the 1991 critics but add nothing new. They begin by stressing that their initial estimates were taken too literally. The last section of their study, containing a more complete model, suggests a more moderate price decrease in the range of 22%. However, their reply to the more specific comments is disappointing. They maintain that the reduction in housing rental prices in the '70s, raised by Hamilton and Hendershott, is so mysterious that it is the reason why they omitted this information in their first study.

*"In our original work, however, we avoided using the CPI for rent because of the measurement problems with this series. The decline in measured rents over a period when all price indices rose dramatically is a mystery that needs to be explained".*³⁴

In response to the remark that the downward trend of -8% per year they estimate is not plausible, they argue rhetorically that not including the trend is even less attractive. As for Hendershott, they would have preferred he extend the series rather than break into two a sample that is already short. However, they do not in any way discuss the instability of their estimates. In response to Holland's results, they say that they are happy that their demographic variable is correlated with the housing stock. However, they say that they are sceptical of the approach chosen by Holland to counter the spurious correlation problem between the price and the change in housing demand. As for the Engelhardt and Poterba text, they believe that he supports their work because the Canadian demographic variable is similar to the one they estimated for the United States. Even if they claim that they are disappointed to find the absence of relations between this variable and the prices for Canada, the strong drop in housing prices observed in the late '70s in Canada confirms that a 50% price decline is possible.

5.4 Later Criticisms of the MW Model

5.4.1 Poterba: The Importance of Local Markets

Poterba (1991) attempts to make a distinction between the different hypotheses likely to explain the real appreciation of housing in the United States in the '70s. What distinguishes this study from Engelhardt and Poterba (1991) is the attention that is focused on the local data in order to better identify the impact of demographics. He also tries to see if the prices are determined consistently with the efficient market hypothesis.

In spite of the efforts and the care taken to show this data, the scope of the results he presents is a bit disappointing. Since several lagged variables can be used to explain the housing price, he strongly rejects the efficient market hypothesis. The local data show a strong impact on the price, income and building costs but no statistical demographic influence.³⁵ The disappointing aspect of this study is its difficulty explaining the behaviour at the beginning of the '80s, when housing demand remained strong in spite of the rise in the capital use cost. Poterba thinks that the buyers extrapolated the past trends in such a way that the anticipation of capital gains probably sustained the demand.

5.4.2 Swan: The MW Model is Incomplete

Swan (1995) substantially revises the MW estimate by interpreting it as an incomplete demand equation. To complete the MW formulation, the following must be added, at a minimum: the real income per capita, a measurement for the housing use cost, as well as for its relative price. Initially, for the 1947-1987 period, he presents the simple correlation between certain measurements of the MW population, the housing stock and the demographic variable. From this initial comparison, he infers that the demographic variable constitutes an approximation of the total adult population, the correlation between these two variables being higher than 0.99.

After this, Swan develops the complete model. His principal equation expresses the per capita

housing stock as a simple function of the per capita income and the relative housing price. He disputes the interpretation that MW give to the GDP in their equation. First of all, including the total GDP as MW did is the same as counting the population twice. Furthermore, the GDP plays a role in the housing demand through the permanent household income. It is therefore not just a measurement of the economic conditions as MW contend.³⁶

To confirm that the variable D_t plays the same role as the adult population, he initially includes the two variables in an equation aimed at explaining the housing stock. In such a case, the total population variable is not significant. Subsequently excluding it, he cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of D_t is unitary; the housing demand would therefore be proportional to this variable, just as if it were a per capita measurement. Furthermore, contrary to what MW find, it is highly significant in the housing stock equation. Swan moreover points out that the cross section used by MW presents a peak housing consumption at a relatively young age in comparison with the income peak, which is instead situated close to age fifty. When we combine this observation with the strong rise in housing demand in the '70s, this means that the variable D_t must be used with caution in the context of a chronological series.

Swan suggests another interpretation for the real price movements observed in the United States. He first notes the very strong correlation between the housing price and that of construction building materials. Two interpretations of this correlation are possible. The first is that the housing demand shocks modify the housing price and the derived demand for construction building materials. The elasticity of the housing supply price would thus be relatively low. The second inverts the causality. Shocks on the supply of materials would have influenced the housing building cost. With a relatively elastic housing supply, this substantially reduces housing prices. The correlation between the prices and the housing starts helps clarify the most plausible interpretation. The first interpretation in fact implies a positive correlation between price and housing quantities while this correlation

would be negative in the second case. Since he obtains a correlation of -0.374 in the United States between the volume of housing activity and the price of the materials, he concludes from this that the second interpretation is the most plausible.³⁷ Swan therefore concludes that the drop in price forecasted by MW has little chance of occurring without some substantial changes in costs.

5.4.3 Pitkin and Myers: The Confusion Between Age and Cohort

All of the preceding critics focused on different aspects of the model estimated by MW but do consider that their variable well captures the effect of the demographic composition on the housing demand. Pitkin and Myers (1994) criticize the use that MW make of their demographic variable. They recall that there is a potential bias in using longitudinal data to infer the results of chronological series. This bias is especially well known in the studies focusing on the life cycle since the main source of equity demand variation with age is the change in permanent income. The cross section data then give the impression that age contributes to a declining consumption profile, while in fact it is simply the effect of the lower permanent income of the older generations. To verify if the decline in housing consumption after age 40 is a phenomenon of aging or really a consequence of the lower permanent income of the older persons, Pitkin and Myers use cohort-linked cross section or CLCS data that make it possible to study a population's housing consumption profile over 30 years with the American 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1989 census data.

The crucial point of their analysis is the following. The consumption profile of a same cohort is radically different from that inferred from a cross section. Just like MW, they find that the housing demand increases rapidly with age between 20 and 40 years. However, contrary to MW, they show that far from declining after age 40, the housing demand continues to progress up to age 70. Even though the progression is less rapid after age 40, it nevertheless remains that the aging of the present generations beyond 40 years in no way leads to anticipating a decline in the housing demand.

*"A pure cross-sectional estimate for 1980, the year used by Mankiw-Weil, overstates the 1990-2010 decline in the growth of aggregate housing demand by 45% in comparison with the three-decade average of the CLCS estimates."*³⁸

5.4.4 Green and Hendershott: The MW Variable Challenged

Green and Hendershott (1996) challenge this variable and maintain that it is the partial age effect that properly measures the impact of aging while MW use the total effect. MW had already differentiated the two concepts but maintained that the total age effect measured the impact of aging more adequately because the characteristics of the household systematically evolve with age. Green and Hendershott take an inverse position and maintain that the total age effect is not an appropriate measurement.

They use the data from the 1980 American census to study a sample of 65,622 households. The value of the dwelling is initially explained by a hedonistic regression aimed at estimating the value of the characteristics of each dwelling. After that, the demand for the various characteristics of the dwelling is explained by age, education, income, household size, marital status and race. Furthermore, the regression takes into consideration the dwelling's cost of use to the owners. This cost varies according to the household's marginal tax rate, which is calculated according to the tables in effect in 1980.

These estimates allow them to compare the total and the partial age effect. They choose a given type of house by selecting a set of characteristics in order to calculate how the willingness to pay for a constant quality house varies with age. If no correction is made for the characteristics of the household, this willingness to pay declines from the beginning of the forties, according to the profile estimated by MW. However, if a constant composition is maintained of the characteristics that do not vary with age, like the level of education especially, the willingness to pay increases slightly with age. The principal cause

for this behaviour difference is that in the 1980 sample, seniors citizens are much less educated than the middle-aged persons.³⁹ With a lower lifetime income, they cannot pay as much for housing.

The essential point of this exercise is that when the generations who are currently middle-aged get older, they will be prepared to pay just as much as they do now for their housing because their level of education and their life cycle income will not decrease. It is therefore incorrect to project that the aging of the baby boom generation will cause the housing demand to decline in the coming years. Green and Hendershott do the exercise to calculate by how much demographics have modified the housing demand over the various decades since the war and how much it will vary until the 2020-2030 decade. They show that during the '70s, demand grew by nearly 40%, or more than double the growth observed in the course of the earlier decades. For each of the decades from 1990 to 2030, the growth in the demand will be stable at close to 10% per year. Consequently, the aging of the baby boom will not produce a decline in housing demand.

5.4.5 DiPasquale and Wheaton: Housing Price Dynamics

DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) also maintain that the specification of the housing market must be complete to study the evolution of the prices. They develop a structural model of the homeowner housing market that contains a price determination equation and one for quantity. The demographic component is constructed from the number of households that form each year. Furthermore, because of the endogenous reaction of the headship rate to the housing cost and to the economic conditions, they construct another demographic variable in which the headship rate is forced to remain constant. Since they restrict themselves to only individual owner-occupied housing, these demographic variables are adjusted to take into account the ownership rate by age. The price equation also includes the housing rental price while the salary is included to measure household income. In order to capture the

downward pressures on the prices that result from a surplus supply, they also add the ratio of the housing stock to the number of households.

Lastly, they discuss at length the fact that the price adjustment towards equilibrium is not instantaneous.⁴⁰ The importance of introducing this hypothesis is empirical. DiPasquale and Wheaton ascertain that when they add the lagged price for a period as an explanatory variable, this allows for a great improvement in the forecasting quality of the housing price equation. Such an observation indicates that housing does not behave like the efficient market theory anticipates.

To complete this model, they also estimate a housing stock determination equation. This is a partial long-term equilibrium adjustment equation in which the construction of new housing units reacts positively to the price and negatively to the number of units in the preceding period.⁴¹ They also include some variables measuring the building cost and the land cost. Since such an equation has a relatively low explanatory power, they add two additional variables, namely the occupancy rate of the adult population and the average time required to sell a dwelling. The first of these variables constitutes a conjunctural indicator while the second measures the cost anticipated by the promoter for financing new housing.⁴² Both these variables considerably improve the housing start forecasting quality.

The dynamic model is then used to simulate the effect of the American demographic projections on the housing market. The strong point of their analysis is the integration of the supply. When a demographic shock occurs, the reaction is initially felt on the price. However, a higher price stimulates the production of new housing which, in the long term, dissipates the impact on the price. The American demographic forecasts show that even if the rate of new household formation is going to slow down, the number of households will continue to rise. Their simulation confirms that, in spite of everything, the slowing will be enough to exert weak downward pressures on the prices during the '90s.

*"The combination of slower household formation and an aging population will, on net, act as a negative shock to housing demand in the 1990s. The magnitude of the shock, however, is relatively small. Furthermore, the long run supply of housing is quite price elastic and this plays an important role in mitigating the effect of any negative shocks to the demand side of the market."*⁴³

5.4.6 Ohtake and Shintani: The Japanese Housing Market

To better grasp how population aging will influence the Japanese housing market, Ohtake and Shintani (1996) analyze how the variable D_t influences real prices in Japan. However, their study focuses attention on two elements missing from the MW study. They make a distinction between the short-term and the long-term effects and take into consideration the cohort effect in addition to the age effect. The first element therefore answers the Holland arguments, while the second is closely akin to the arguments raised by Green and Hendershott.

After estimating the variable D_t , they find that this variable has a positive and significant effect on the housing stock but that its impact on the price is negative and insignificant. This second result is similar to what Engelhardt and Poterba found for Canada. Ohtake and Shintani conclude from this first exercise that the long-term supply elasticity seems fairly large.

They find some additional results reinforcing this conclusion through the co-integration analysis. Having first of all found that the D_t logarithms for the housing stock and the housing price are not stationary, they then show that D_t and the stock are co-integrated. As Holland explains it, this means that the housing stock is dictated by the same movements as D_t . The plausible interpretation of this result is that, in the long term, the housing stock is very elastic in the long term. Furthermore, Ohtake and Shintani note that the real price is not co-integrated with D_t , which reinforces the absence of a permanent demographic impact on the housing price.

Having found a co-integration relation between the housing stock and D_t implies that there is evidence of error correction in a model containing the real housing price as an endogenous variable.⁴⁴ One of the elements determining price change is thus the short-term disequilibrium between demand and the housing stock. Ohtake and Shintani estimate such a model and find that it explains well the price movements observed in Japan.⁴⁵

Lastly, a final and very interesting element in their study is that they explicitly estimate the cohort effect and the age effect. Like Pitkin and Myers, as well as Green and Hendershott before them, they ask if the decline in housing consumption with age might not be due to the fact that the seniors would have had a lower income during their life. They therefore estimate the cohort effect by simultaneously processing the data from 1984 and 1989. Once the cohort effect [is] corrected, they conclude that the housing demand grows continuously with age in Japan. Far from reducing the housing demand, the population aging should on the contrary cause it to increase.

5.5 Other Studies on the Relationship Between Demographics and the Housing Market

5.5.1 Fair and Dominguez: Demographics and Macroeconomic Equations

Fair and Dominguez (1991) study the effect of the population's composition on the large macroeconomic functions. One of the equations studied is the housing investment equation. Even though it is not directly a study on the housing price, it nevertheless estimates the impact of aging on the housing demand. It is therefore worthwhile looking at it.

The approach used by Fair and Dominguez presents some similarity with that developed by MW. They develop variables measuring the proportion of the population belonging to age group i . They then test whether the coefficients of these proportions exert a significant effect on the American macroeconomic equations. The main

difference from MW is that the estimate is made in chronological series rather than in cross sections. Furthermore, since they must estimate the coefficients pertaining to 55 separate age groups with fewer than 55 observations, they force the coefficients of the age variables to follow a quadratic age function.

Their study concludes that age influences most of the macroeconomic functions in a very significant manner. Its estimated effect on housing investment however takes the shape of a U so that the housing demand would be minimal at age 40. This shape is the complete opposite to that estimated by MW. Fair and Dominguez explain this difference in the following manner:

*"Recall that the results presented in this paper suggest that prime-age people consume less housing relative to their income than do those older or younger. Therefore, the combined results indicate that prime-age people earn significantly more than those older and younger." (Emphasis placed by the authors)**

Thus we again encounter the argument already used by Pitkin and Myers, by Ohtake and Shintani, as well as by Green and Hendershott: the age effect in the MW cross section poorly captures the real effect of aging on the housing demand. Contrary to the MW results, aging is therefore likely to raise the housing demand.

5.5.2 Ermisch and the Housing Demand in Great Britain

Ermisch (1996) uses a sample of 4,769 households in Great Britain having bought a home during the 1983-88 period to estimate the impact of age on the housing demand. This is a very instructive sample since it contains a great deal of information on the housing quality and the household characteristics, including of course age, income and the number of persons. This makes it possible to develop a very good real housing consumption index. Rather than being content with a quadratic age form as in Fair and Dominguez, Ermisch tests several functional forms. Invariably, the various

specifications conclude that, even in controlling for income, age has a positive effect on real housing consumption. His preferred specification implies a ratio of real housing consumption elasticity to age of 0.0286. Although low, such elasticity implies that real consumption at age 70 is nearly three times higher than the consumption observed at age 20.

He then shows how the aging of the baby boom generation is going to influence the growth in the number of households in Great Britain. The current rate of net household formation, approximately 60,000 in 1999, is close to a minimum of approximately 40,000 for 2002. Thereafter, the rate of net household formation rises again until 2012 before experiencing a new downturn period. Starting in 2025, the total number of households will begin to decline permanently.

He obtains a temporal series on the housing demand by applying the estimated effect of age and income to the future cohorts and by maintaining the headship rate constant by age. His model implies two aging effects that work in opposite directions. Aging increases the housing demand because of a pure age effect. On the other hand, the rate of new household formation decelerates. By assuming an average annual GDP growth of 1% per capita and an income elasticity of 0.5 in the housing demand, the simulations he produces show that the second effect dominates the first. The growth of the housing demand will therefore start to decline, the shape of this growth copying fairly accurately the forecasted rate of household formation. By 2025, the model allows for anticipating an annual demand growth of approximately 0.1% per year, as compared with nearly 0.5% at present. Ermisch concludes by stressing that it would be necessary to make a model of the housing supply to extract forecasts on the evolution of the prices.

5.5.3 Holly and Jones: Co-Integration between Housing Price and Real Income

Using some very long series starting in 1939 and ending in 1994, Holly and Jones (1997) study the long-term determinants of the real housing price.

The first part presents the evolution of the real housing price in Great Britain from 1939 to 1994. Then they formulate a model in which the real price is explained by the average real household income, by the housing stock, the ratio between loan values and income, interest rate and demographics. As a demographic measurement, they select the proportion of population aged 20 to 29 in order to measure the importance of the group buying housing for the first time.

The first aspect of their analysis is that of the co-integration between the real housing price and real income. They show in fact that these two variables are co-integrated. As explained earlier, co-integration implies that the shocks that permanently affect the real housing price and real household income are the same. However, the co-integration vector they estimate implies a long-term elasticity in the value of the dwelling as compared with real income of only 0.14, which is extremely low in comparison with the values usually found. Holly and Jones are moreover aware of this fact. Nevertheless, they estimate an error correction model for the real housing price.

Their equation illustrates that the following variables explain the change in real price. First of all, disequilibrium in the housing market significantly influences its real price. The adjustment speed towards equilibrium that they estimate is -0.11. This implies a rather slow return to equilibrium, since such a coefficient means that only 11% of the discrepancy with the equilibrium price disappears each year.⁴⁷ Among the other results to note, we stress the negative and significant impact of the real interest rate and the change in housing activity, as well as the positive and significant effect of demographics and the loan-value-to-income ratio. Holly and Jones complete their study by showing that the speed of return to equilibrium is asymmetrical, the return being more rapid when they are too high than when they are too low.⁴⁸

5.6 Synthesis of the Results

The diversity of the approaches and the countries studied makes a synthesis of the results difficult. We nevertheless accept certain aspects that the

literature has identified. The future housing demand will be subjected to three main influences, namely the evolution in the number of households, aging and the growth in real income. Apart from the normal uncertainties of economic or demographic projections, the principal point of disagreement is that we do not know whether population aging will increase or decrease the housing demand. While MW and Engelhardt and Poterba establish that housing consumption peaks at approximately age 40 to then gradually decline, the studies that have made a distinction between age and cohort effects find instead that household housing consumption continues to rise well beyond that age. As long as this issue is not clarified, it cannot be concluded that aging constitutes a negative factor on the aggregate housing demand. Only the MW study concludes that population aging will strongly reduce the real housing price over the course of the coming decades. Engelhardt and Poterba (1991) cannot support this conclusion for Canada.

The co-integration studies cause other results to emerge concerning the long-term determination of housing prices and stock. Hence, Ohtake and Shintani (1996), as well as Holly and Jones (1997), find that the housing price and real income per capita are co-integrated which implies that real income plays a critical role in the long-term determination of the real housing value. For Holland (1991), who showed the co-integration between the housing demand and stock, the demographic movements would have a long-term effect on the quantity of housing and not on their price. On the whole, this scientific literature tends to show that even if demographics can lead to a reaction in the housing price, this impact would be temporary because the future evolution of the real price will be dictated above all by the growth in the standard of living. The studies by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994), Swan (1995) and Ermisch (1996) recall for their part that the price forecasts require a modelling of the housing demand and the supply.

6. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL

6.1 Specification of the Empirical Model

This section uses the lessons from the studies to specify a model of the Canadian housing market that comes to terms with the absence of consensus regarding the effect of age on the housing demand. In the second section, we presented a model of the housing market containing a demand equation and a supply equation. In chapter 3, we saw the principal measurements of the housing price, as well as the factors likely to influence housing demand and price. In this section, we present and estimate a complete econometric model of the housing market. This model is a system of two equations that endogenously explain the evolution of the real price and the number of housing units. The approach is similar to the one selected by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994).

A structural model of the housing market presents several advantages as compared with the MW approach. First of all, it avoids the confusion between the age effect and the cohort effect. As we have seen, this distinction can completely alter the effect of age on the housing demand. Secondly, the structural model is capable of reproducing the estimated dynamics of the housing market while the MW model overlooks this effect. Thirdly, since the model is estimated on real data, we can be certain it is automatically calibrated to available data.

The accepted basic specification is the supply and demand system formed of equations 3 and 4', which we recall:

$$D_t = \sum_{i=1}^n D_{it} = \sum_{i=1}^n N_{it} h_i(X_t, P_t, U_t) = H(N_t, X_t, P_t, U_t) \quad (3)$$

$$S_t = C(W_t, P_t) + (1-\delta)S_{t-1} \quad (4')$$

To apply this model, the real price measurement must be specified in what manner the

demographic changes will be measured and choose the variables entering into the exogenous variable vectors X_t and W_t . A convenient way of presenting the model consists, as in DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994), of making P_t of equation 3 explicit so that we obtain one price and one stock equation.

Choosing the real price variable is actually quite easy. As it has been available on a continuous basis nationally since 1956 and for seven Canadian regions since 1960, we select the real MLS price. However, we will have a brief discussion on the changes that occur when other price measurements are used. For its part, the housing stock is measured by the net housing stock estimated by Statistics Canada.⁴⁹

Choosing the method of measuring the demographics is the most problematic aspect of the specification. To prevent the impact of the housing price on the household headship rate from lowering the estimated effect of demographics on the real housing price, a demographic variable must be chosen that does not react endogenously to the price. This therefore prohibits using the number of households because the headship rate is endogenous. However, it would be possible to use the number of constant headship rate households, such as that presented in Figure 11.

However, a more flexible approach was preferred. The effect of a population's size on the housing demand depends on the headship rate as well as the group's average income. In fact, if we increase the size of a population that has a low income, the impact on the housing demand will be less significant than if it is the size of a high income group that increases. When the number of constant headship rate households is used, we attribute a weighting of the different age groups proportional to the headship rate but that disregards the average income. To mitigate this last constraint, population growth for six age groups were selected, namely, the 15-24 years, 25-34 years, 35-44 years, 45-54 years, 55-64 years and 65 years and over. This approach makes

it possible to test the impact of the population growth in different age groups on the price. Hence, it is not assumed, as in MW, that the age effect is measured by a cross-section estimate that does not differentiate cohort effect and age effect. Neither do we stipulate, as in Holly and Jones (1997), that only one segment of the population is enough to measure the effect of demographic change. It will be seen shortly, however, that some tests of hypotheses for verifying the different groups' contribution to the demand make it possible to simplify the formulation of the demographic variables.

While the theoretical model in chapter 2 links demographics to the number of people present in each age group, we instead select the logarithmic difference of the number of people in the empirical model. Empirical reasons are what justify our choice. We will present the results to justify our decision. In none of the formulations explored does the size of the populations exert an impact on the price or housing starts.³⁰ On the other hand, population growth has shown itself to be a highly important variable for prices. The simple interpretation we give to this result is the following. The housing needs of a numerous but stable population are easily satisfied at a normal price because the housing stock has had time to adjust to the size of the population. It is only when disequilibrium exists between the population and the housing stock that an effect on the prices emerges. A high price must accompany rapid population growth in order to increase residential housing activity, while low population growth produces a low price that limits the housing starts.

Like most of the empirical studies, and especially Laycock (1978) in Canada, we include in the specification as an element of X_t the real GDP per adult. Furthermore, we add the nominal interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages in order to take into account the effect of the amount of income devoted to mortgage payments. We anticipate that the effect of the GDP per adult is positive while that of the interest rate is negative. As for the cost of use, we select the measurement we presented in chapter 3. Furthermore, given the results of DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) and Ohtake and

Shintani (1996), we do not initially force the adjustment of the prices to conform to the efficient market hypothesis and we include the real price of the preceding period in the specification. Just as they had observed with the American data, this variable considerably improves the real price equation by allowing a gradual price adjustment. Furthermore, to allow the shrinking of the housing market to exert an effect on the real price, we include the housing vacancy rate. With regards to the specification of equation 4', it contains only the real price, the lagged stock, the vacancy rate and the rate of use of the construction sector capacities. This last variable is aimed at measuring the effect of cost shocks on the housing price.

The equations that we estimate are thus in the form of:

$$\Delta S_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_t + \beta_2 S_{t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta Y_t + \beta_4 V_t + \beta_5 TUC_t + u_t \quad (7)$$

$$P_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 P_{t-1} + \gamma_2 R_t + \gamma_3 Y_t + \gamma_{41} \Delta N(15,24)_t + \gamma_{42} \Delta N(25,34)_t + \gamma_{43} \Delta N(35,44)_t + \gamma_{44} \Delta N(45,54)_t + \gamma_{45} \Delta N(55,64)_t + \gamma_{46} \Delta N65_t + \gamma_5 S_{t-1} + \gamma_6 V_t + \gamma_7 U_t + v_t \quad (8)$$

where:

P_t is the MLS price logarithm divided by the Consumer Price Index,

S_t is the net housing stock logarithm,

Y_t is the logarithm of the ratio of the Gross Domestic Product to the population aged 15 and over,

V_t is the logarithm of the vacant proportion of the net housing stock,

TUC_t is the rate of use of the productive capacities in the construction industry,

R_t is the interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages,

$\Delta N(A,B)_t$ is the rate of change in the number of people between age A and age B, and

ΔN_{65} , is rate of change in the number of people aged 65 years or over.

We have constructed series for all of these variables since 1956, except for the rate of use of the construction industry capacities that is only available from 1962 onward. To determine if this model must be a level or first-difference estimate, it is necessary to verify whether the variables are stationary and if not, whether some co-integration relations exist.

6.2 Stationarity and Co-integration Tests

The presence of non-stationary variables or co-integrated variables has a great deal of importance in the selection of the estimating method because non-stationarity and co-integration influence the variance properties of the estimators. If we estimate the impact of a non-stationary variable on a dependent variable that is also non-stationary, the level of correlation between these variables can be spurious.³¹ The correction that is then suggested consists of estimating the model on data differentiated with reference to time a sufficient number of times for the differentiated series to be stationary.

The spurious correlation problem occurs because these two variables tend to diverge persistently from their mean level. We identify three situations that make it possible to avoid the spurious correlation problem. The first is for the explanatory and dependent variables to be stationary. In such a case actually, the variables tend to return to their average level so that the deviation from average is not persistent. The second is for the dependent variable to be co-integrated with one or several explanatory variables. In such a situation, even if the variable's deviation around its average is persistent, it is caused by a shock that is shared with the one affecting the variable with which it is co-integrated.³² Finally, the last situation that allows avoiding the spurious correlation problem occurs when the lagged value of the dependent variable emerges as an explanatory variable.³³

Let us first see in which case the price equation is situated. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) applied to variable P_t requires including a deterministic trend and a lag in order to capture the dynamics. The value calculated is -2.507 while the MacKinnon critical value at 5% is -3.525. Since we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the real housing price contains a unitary root, the ADF test therefore confirms that variable P_t is not stationary.³⁴ In spite of everything, the problem of spurious correlation does not arise for two reasons. First of all, the lagged price appears in the list of explanatory variables. In addition, the ADF test with a lag and without a deterministic trend confirms that variable Y_t is non-stationary, the calculated value being -1.738 while the MacKinnon critical value at 5% is -2.936. However, the Johansen test between P_t and Y_t confirms that these two variables are co-integrated.³⁵ Hence, the shocks that make the real housing price rise tendentially are the same as those that create the upward trend in real income per capita. The relation of standardized co-integration with reference to price is $P_t - 1.058 \times Y_t - 8.166$. This means that in the long term, a 1% rise in real income is accompanied by a 0.945% increase in the real housing price. This therefore suggests a long-term income housing demand elasticity slightly lower than one.

The housing stock determination equation does not pose a spurious correlation problem either. In this case, the ADF test requires a deterministic trend and a lag to capture the dynamics of ΔS_t . This test does not allow rejecting the presence of a unitary root, which implies that the logarithmic change in the housing stock is not stationary.³⁶ In this case, the inclusion of the lagged stock value is not enough to eliminate the potential fictitious correlation problem because ΔS_{t-1} would have to be introduced instead. However, the co-integration test between ΔS_t and ΔY_t confirms that these two variables are co-integrated.³⁷ The level estimate can therefore be performed without encountering the spurious correlation problem. Contrary to Holland, we reject the existence of a co-integrating relation between housing stock and the adult population. This indicates that the persistent

shocks on the headship rate have made these two variables deviate from each other.

In summary, this analysis confirms that the shocks that have a long-term influence on the real housing price are common to those that cause the real income per adult to change. Although the statistical analysis does not allow for clarifying the causal relation, economic logic suggests that it is the underlying increase in real income that makes the real housing price rise. The system's two equations can be level-estimated without the estimators being subject to the problem of spurious correlation. The next section shows the results from the equation system.

6.3 Estimate Results

Equations 7 and 8 constitute a system of equations that must be estimated simultaneously. Since the real price is endogenous and emerges as an explanatory variable in 7, the ordinary least squares estimate does not allow for reaching estimates without biases. This problem must be mitigated by using an instrumental variable estimation technique. Furthermore, more effective estimators are obtained by taking into account the correlation between the error terms of the two equations. The system's three-step least squares estimate allows both problems to be taken into account.⁵⁸ The list of instruments must then include all the model's exogenous variables. Furthermore, a first estimate revealed that the residuals from equation 7 have a positive first order autocorrelation. Therefore a coefficient is included to account for the first order random error autocorrelation and add to the instrument list all of the lagged exogenous variables in equation 7, as well as the lagged value P_t .⁵⁹ The model is estimated on the annual data from 1963 to 1997, i.e. 35 observations.

This first estimate allows clarification of which are the significant variables and which can be eliminated from the specification. It is possible to simply the model in the following way. The χ^2 joint hypotheses test $\beta_4=0$, $\beta_5=0$, $\gamma_{41}=0$, $\gamma_{42}=\gamma_{43}$, $\gamma_{42}=\gamma_{44}$, $\gamma_{45}=0$, $\gamma_{46}=0$, $\gamma_6=0$ and $\gamma_7=0$ has a value of 15.56 and a marginal level of 0.07. This means that three variables can be omitted from the

model, namely the vacancy rate, the capacities usage rate and the cost of use. Furthermore, the population growth in the 15-25 and 55 and over age groups has no measurable effect on the housing price while the effect of population growth in the 25-34 age group is identical to that of the groups aged 35-44 and 45-54. Consequently, the model can be summarized in equations 9 and 10.⁶⁰

$$\Delta S_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_t + \beta_2 S_{t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta Y_t + u_t \quad (9)$$

$$P_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 P_{t-1} + \gamma_2 R_t + \gamma_3 Y_t + \gamma_4 N(25,54)_t + \gamma_5 S_{t-1} + v_t \quad (10)$$

where $N(25,54)$ is the population growth of the group aged 25-54. The results estimated for the period from 1958 to 1997 are presented in Table 3. The variable D represents the first order random error autocorrelation coefficient.

These two equations underwent thorough investigation to verify the quality of the specification. The Lagrange multiplier test does not allow for rejecting the hypothesis that the successive residuals are independent. The stability of the parameters was also verified. Only the Chow-Fisher test with a sample interruption date in 1977 proves significant. However, the problem seems very time-related because if the interruption date is varied by two years more or less, the stability of the equation's parameters cannot be rejected. In addition, the CUSUM test, as well as the CUSUM squared, does not detect significant instability at that date. It can be concluded from this that the system is well specified. Furthermore, the Jarque-Bera test applied to the residuals from equations (9) and (10) has a calculated value of 0.68 for the first and 0.24 for the second. Since their marginal levels are situated at 0.71 and 0.88 respectively, we cannot reject the normality of residuals hypothesis so that the three-step least squares estimate is asymptotically efficient.

Figure 17, which compares the values observed and obtained, shows that the model reproduces the movements of the endogenous variables very well. We further verified the soundness of the results to a change in price measurement. To do

this, we also estimated the equation system in the same period by using the real price weighted by the WEIG.MLS inventories. This does not change the sign of any explanatory variable and the estimated coefficients change little.

The one that reacted the most to this change in variable is γ_4 , since the estimated impact of population growth is cut in half to 2.25. The housing stock price therefore reacts less than the average real estate transaction price to demographic shocks. It is further noted that since the estimated standard deviation of the coefficient remains similar, the reduction of the coefficient acts in such a way that the marginal level of the variable's significance then reaches 20%.


The system with the real new housing price NHPI was estimated. Due to the more limited availability of this series, the estimate focuses on the 1971-1997 period. Again, all of the variables remain the same sign and significant. The demographic effect is thus almost identical to that estimated with the real MLS price, namely 4.76 and the variable is therefore highly significant. On the other hand, the effect of the price on the stock

change, just as the effect of the lagged stock on the price, is greater. This suggests that the new housing price adjustment dynamics are faster than those of the sales price.

Table 3:
Results of the Equation System
(Three-step least squares)

Estimated Equation: $\Delta S_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_t + \beta_2 S_{t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta Y_t + u_t$			
	Coefficient	Standard Deviation	Student's <i>t</i>
β_0	0.283697	0.050321	5.637729
β_1	0.041919	0.007662	5.470800
β_2	-0.046651	0.006487	-7.191881
β_3	0.058849	0.016036	3.669680
P	0.587959	0.121218	4.850422
$R^2 = 0.864$		Standard Deviation = 0.0025	
Estimated Equation: $P_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 P_{t-1} + \gamma_2 R_t + \gamma_3 Y_t + \gamma_4 N(25,54)_t + \gamma_5 S_{t-1} + v_t$			
	Coefficient	Standard Deviation	Student's <i>t</i>
γ_0	6.308495	1.236329	5.102602
γ_1	0.764720	0.062205	12.29352
γ_2	-1.190580	0.284833	-4.179916
γ_3	0.841898	0.167641	5.022045
γ_4	4.741296	1.516625	3.126215
γ_5	-0.389039	0.118534	-3.282077
$R^2 = 0.976$		Standard Deviation = 0.0417	

Figure 17:
Comparison of Values Obtained and Forecasted



6.4 Interpretation of Results

6.4.1 Statistical Impact of Shocks

The explanatory power of these two equations is very high. The market adjustment dynamics arising from them are completely in accordance with the theoretical model in chapter 2 drawn from DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994). In the absence of significant supply shock variables, the price reacts above all to demand shocks. The nominal interest rate has a very marked negative effect. A one percentage point increase in interest rates reduces the real price by 1.19%. On the other hand, a 1% increase in real income raises the price by 0.84%. Acceleration in the growth of the population aged 25 to 54 has a very significant positive effect on the real price since a 1 percentage point increase in this age group's population growth rate causes the real price to rise by 4.74%. Lastly, the coefficient associated with the price in the preceding period is 0.76. Since the real price is not independent from the preceding price, this initially undermines the efficient market hypothesis. We recall however, that since the price data make no adjustment for housing quality, we cannot make a direct conclusion as to the rejection of the efficient market hypothesis because the price persistence may be the result of the persistence of a shock on quality.

6.4.2 Dynamic Impact of Shocks

The adjustment dynamics of the model are relatively complex. First of all, the stock variation equation has a positive autoregressive root, which in itself introduces a persistent ΔS_t reaction. Similarly, P_{t-1} appears in the P_t equation so that the shocks on the prices are themselves persistent. Hence, any shock that alters the price produces a long housing starts reaction, which in turn forces the price's gradual return to its equilibrium value.

However, even if the shocks on prices tend to last for a certain amount of time, they do not last forever. This stems from the fact that γ_1 , the coefficient associated with P_{t-1} , is less than one. In such a case, the price naturally tends to return

to the long-term value dictated by the co-integration relation with real income. Furthermore, the stock adjustment dynamics help to somewhat accelerate the return to the price's long-term value. In fact, a 1% increase in S_t lowers the real price by 0.39% in period $t+1$. Yet, the ΔS_t equation shows that a 1% drop in the real price slows housing stock growth by 0.042%. Hence, from the direct coefficient of P_{t-1} , which is 0.7647, we remove 0.0163, i.e., is the product of -0.39 and 0.042. This means, therefore, that any shock on demand that initially raises the real housing price has, as the theory suggests, the effect of increasing the level of housing starts, which in turn reduces the housing price. It is further stressed that this equilibrium value is not fixed. The real price is subjected to ongoing shocks common to those on the real income per capita and therefore follows a stochastic upward trend.

To better grasp the prices' speed of adjustment to exogenous shocks and the importance of the dynamics, we simulated the model's reaction to different shocks. To do this, we defined a baseline scenario and then calculated how the price differs from this scenario after the shock.⁶¹ Figure 18 compares the reaction to two types of demographic shocks. In the first, the growth rate increases by 1% in only one year. As previously indicated, the price initially rises by close to 5%. It is then subjected to downward pressures but remains higher than in the baseline scenario until the eighth year. Starting in the ninth year, the price becomes slightly weaker than in the baseline scenario before gradually returning to the same equilibrium value. The second type of shock is a permanent increase of 1 percentage point in the population growth rate. In this case, the price increases continually the first eight years and surpasses the baseline scenario price by 16%. Afterwards, the price begins to decline again but permanently remains at a real price 8.5% higher than that of the baseline scenario. This higher price is necessary to ensure a faster new housing construction rate than in the baseline scenario. We stress that since the price influences the ΔS_t equation, the rate of new housing construction reacts to demographic changes. Hence, even if no demographic variable appears in this equation, it

confirms that the growth in the number of households is, as in Lewis (1997), an important determinant of construction activity. It will be shown, however, that this impact is necessarily affected by a change in the real housing price, therefore in the profitability of investments in this sector.

The price reaction to a shock on real income was simulated by making a distinction between two types of shocks, namely, a temporary increase and a permanent increase of 1% in real income per capita. Figure 19 shows that the dynamic reaction of the housing price to these two shocks is similar to that resulting from demographic shocks. If it is a permanent shock, the increase in the housing price grows until it reaches 2.7% after 8 years but the permanent effect is only 1.5%. In the case of a temporary income shock on the other hand, the effect of the price increase diminishes rapidly and becomes negative beginning in the ninth year. Therefore we find no permanent effect on the price.

6.5 Provincial Estimates

Since the data are also available provincially for Canada, some separate provincial models were estimated. There are however two limitations. First of all, due to the absence of separate housing price data for each of the Atlantic Provinces, these four provinces must be grouped into a single region. Furthermore, the model's provincial estimates cover the period from 1962 to 1997, or six years less than for the Canadian model. The same estimate methodology is used, namely the three-step least squares, to obtain the results displayed in Table 4.

Generally speaking, the provincial housing activity equations are similar to the Canadian equation. In fact, the parameters have the expected sign and are, for the most part, significant. Hence, the lagged housing stock for one period has a

Figure 18:
Dynamic Price Reaction to Demographic Shocks





Figure 19:
Dynamic Price Reaction to Real Income Shocks



negative effect on the housing stock variation and on prices. It is noted, however, that in the three Prairie Provinces, the change in real income does not have a statistically significant effect on construction, which indicates a lower conjunctural sensitivity in housing construction. Furthermore, the stock equation for British Columbia does not succeed in accounting for three important changes

Table 4:
Results for the Provinces
 (co-efficients followed by the standard deviation in parentheses)

	Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Manitoba	Sask.	Alberta	B. C.
Estimated Equation: $\Delta S_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_t + \beta_2 S_{t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta Y_t + u_t$							
β_0	-0.2969 (0.3266)	0.1445 (0.3226)	0.3342 (0.0534)	0.2444 (0.1892)	-0.1002 (0.0780)	-0.1246 (0.0810)	0.3636 (0.0582)
β_1	0.0526 (0.0208)	0.0324 (0.0158)	0.0410 (0.0196)	0.0348 (0.0116)	0.0443 (0.0047)	0.0607 (0.0068)	0.0377 (0.0086)
β_2	-0.0202 (0.0112)	-0.0333 (0.0156)	-0.0526 (0.0054)	-0.0481 (0.0137)	-0.0295 (0.0059)	-0.0401 (0.0054)	-0.0558 (0.0096)
β_3	0.0371 (0.0179)	0.0788 (0.0216)	0.0489 (0.0196)	0.0306* (0.0205)	-0.0142* (0.0101)	0.0209* (0.0269)	0.0117 (0.0405)
ρ	0.7330 (0.1906)	0.7847 (0.1043)	0.3982 (0.1506)	0.6933 (0.1212)	0.1226 (0.1282)	0.4451 (0.1297)	0.0213 (0.1617)
R^2	0.7695	0.8680	0.8738	0.7393	0.7514	0.8886	0.5211
Std. Dev.	0.0031	0.0032	0.0033	0.0038	0.0046	0.0055	0.0074
Estimated Equation: $P_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 P_{t-1} + \gamma_2 R_t + \gamma_3 Y_t + \gamma_4 N(25.54)_t + \gamma_5 S_{t-1} + v_t$							
γ_0	5.5806 (0.9398)	2.2499 (0.9896)	-3.7997 (0.8091)	2.4831 (0.6981)	7.0095 (1.3499)	-0.7773 (0.0802)	-5.2561 (2.3218)
γ_1	0.4878 (0.0848)	0.6715 (0.0684)	0.7017 (0.0469)	0.9496 (0.0645)	0.7342 (0.0735)	0.7719 (0.0802)	0.7910 (0.0985)
γ_2	-0.0075 (0.0025)	-0.0117 (0.0027)	-0.0077 (0.0024)	-0.0122 (0.0033)	-0.0076 (0.0040)	-0.0105 (0.0042)	-0.0094 (0.0059)
γ_3	0.3541 (0.1853)	0.7095 (0.2231)	1.4945 (0.2152)	0.6074 (0.1954)	0.4482 (0.1348)	0.8998 (0.1718)	1.0416 (0.4743)
γ_4	4.1358 (1.1028)	2.7772* (1.5544)	1.6018* (1.2035)	2.9344 (1.0933)	4.3532 (0.7944)	2.3806* (1.2710)	5.5448 (2.0027)
γ_5	-0.2431 (0.1232)	-0.3697 (0.1303)	-0.5100 (0.0977)	-0.6072 (0.1576)	-0.6640 (0.1647)	-0.4298 (0.1023)	-0.1951 (0.2284)
R^2	0.8160	0.8503	0.9778	0.9362	0.9287	0.9698	0.9609
Std. Dev.	0.0377	0.0382	0.0397	0.0406	0.0564	0.0514	0.0816
The asterisk * indicates that the variable is not different from zero at a marginal level of 5%.							

in housing activity that occurred in 1991, 1992 and 1996 in this province⁴², which significantly reduces the multiple determination coefficient. The addition of mute variables to react to the movements of these three years allows raising the model's R^2 to the same level as in the other provinces, but their presence considerably lessens β_3 . In the absence of clear indications that the

movements of these three years are attributable to exceptional events, basic model is not modified for this province.

The price equations too are, generally speaking, in accordance with the Canadian estimate. In all of the provinces, demographics have an estimated positive effect on the price but the coefficient is

not statistically different from zero in three provinces, namely Quebec, Ontario and Alberta. The nominal interest rate has a negative effect on the price in all of the provinces. Furthermore, the coefficient associated with P_{t-1} is statistically lower than one in each of the systems except in Manitoba. In this latter case, the coefficient of 0.94 is not different from 1 at the normal confidence level so that the price equation can produce explosive answers. It is also necessary to stress that the coefficient associated with income in Ontario is 1.49, which is exceptionally high. Such a value seems a little implausible to us, in view of the values estimated in the other provinces. It is probable that the model associated with the growth in real income during the '80s reflects the housing price increase that would have resulted from real estate speculation in this province during that same period. Similarly, it would be associated with the drop in income during the 1990-92

recession, the real estate deflation observed when the speculative bubble burst.

In summary, the structural model suitably reflects the data at both the Canadian and provincial levels and makes it possible to analyze the dynamic housing price and stock reaction to shocks. However, it is probable that the Ontario model presents an overly high real income coefficient and that the one for Manitoba creates unusually large and persistent price responses. Nevertheless, since these models faithfully reflect the historical behaviour of the prices, they can be used first of all to measure the contribution of demographic shocks and then to make price projections according to various scenarios.

7. HOUSING PRICE PROJECTIONS

7.1 Analysis for the 1956-1997 Period

We first use the model to better understand the impact of the shocks on the evolution of the real price during the period from 1956 to 1997. We are trying to clarify two points. First of all, to measure the contribution of the demographic wave associated with the baby boom, we calculate how the real housing price would have evolved if the population growth rate had always stayed at its average level of 1.95% per year. Then we want to know whether the demographic shock was a more important source of housing price disruption than the economic fluctuations or whether, conversely, the latter were dominant. To do this, we calculate the price evolution if the real income per capita had risen steadily by 1.58% per year, i.e. its average level for the period.


7.1.1 Demographic Impact

Figure 20 compares the model's projections according to the historical values of the exogenous variables with those obtained by assuming a constant population growth rate. This comparison allows three phases to be identified. The first, starting in 1959 and ending in 1971, is characterized by slow growth in the population aged 25-54. During this entire period, demographics contribute to lowering the real housing price with a maximum effect in 1965, when the price is 14% lower than what would have been observed if population growth had been constant. The acceleration of demographic growth starting in 1966 contributes to correcting the housing price, which enters a second phase in 1971. This phase, which will last until 1992, was characterized by an approximately 8% higher real price according to the historical values than in a scenario of constant population growth. The maximum demographic effect occurred in 1989 when the price had been pushed up 12.3% by demographic pressures. Beginning in

1990, population growth rapidly diminishes so that in 1993, we enter a third phase of weakened real prices. The impact on the real price does not stop strengthening until 1997, when the real price is 8.4% lower than what we would observe if demographic growth had always remained at 1.95%.

The model therefore indicates that, because of purely demographic factors, the real price rose 25% between 1965 and 1975, then decreased 20% between 1989 and 1997. The model shows that even with a constant population growth, the real price would have experienced a significant drop between 1980 and 1982 due to the rise in interest rates and the rapid and marked decrease in real income. This decline would have been followed by a rapid rise in the real price between 1983 and 1989 owing to the relaxing of the interest rates and the strong growth in real income. The 1990-92 recession however, would have put the brakes on real estate inflation. Furthermore, because of the weakness of the economic renewal between 1993-95, the real price would only have experienced significant growth beginning in 1996. The net result for 1997 is that the average real MLS price would have been \$120,812 instead of the

Figure 20:
Baby Boom Impact on Real Housing Price




\$110,668 price projected by the model. It is further stressed that the model forecasts that with constant demographic growth, the construction of new housing units would still have experienced wide fluctuations associated with the economic conditions. However, the housing stock growth would have been 2.1% in 1997 instead of 1.3%. This confirms the importance of demographic factors in the reduction of housing starts in the '90s.

7.1.2 Impact of Economic Conditions

We now simulate the real-term path of the housing price if the real GDP per capita had experienced constant 1.58% growth per year between 1956 and 1997. Figure 21 shows that due to the strong growth in real income from 1963 until the end of the '70s, the real housing price was 36% higher in 1979 than the value it would have had if economic growth had been evenly distributed across all of the years. In 1989, this price discrepancy was still more than 23%. However, the economic situation was so bad after 1990 that in 1997, the real price was 8% below the value that would have been observed if economic growth had remained constant, i.e. \$110,668 instead of \$119,915. The decrease in real income therefore contributed to lowering the real housing price by more than 31% between 1989 and 1997 because, instead of the 14.7% decrease observed, the real price would have grown 15.8% during this period.

It is interesting to further note that the price fluctuations caused by the shocks on real income quite closely coincide with those stemming from the demographic changes. Hence, because of the two types of shocks, it is between the mid-'70s and the end of the '80s that the economic conditions and demographics made the greatest contribution to maintaining high prices, while it is in the '90s that the downward pressures were felt the most. This implies that if we neglect to take the economic conditions into account, it is easy to attribute an unduly large share of the housing price fluctuations to demographics.

Figure 21:
Impact of Real Income Growth



7.2 Projections for the 1998-2016 Period

The estimated model is now used for forecasting the evolution of the real price in order to verify whether the predictable demographic and economic changes are likely to significantly alter the real price. To complete this exercise, we first of all establish in the first section some scenarios dealing with the future evolution of three exogenous variables, namely, population growth, real income growth per adult and the future level of interest rates on residential mortgages. Afterwards, the next section shows the forecasts until 2016 according to various scenarios. Finally, the last section presents the projections drawn from the provincial models and compares them to that obtained by the Canadian model.

7.2.1 Demographic and Economic Projections

Three exogenous variables condition the model's behaviour, namely, interest rates, population and real income. For all of the projections, the assumption is made that the interest rate on residential mortgages will remain at 7.5% over the course of the next 20 years. This assumption

seems realistic to us and reflects the average of the interest rates observed in the past two years and used to estimate the model, that is 1996 and 1997.⁶³

The demographic projections are based on three scenarios established by Statistics Canada in 1993, namely those of weak, medium and strong population growth. These projections share three common hypotheses on the subject of emigration (5-year average of the emigration rates by age and gender), of transient residents (from 1995, constant total number of 149,600) and of Canadians who return to the country (obtained by taking 50% of the projected emigrants over a decade) and are differentiated by the assumptions on fertility, life expectancy, immigration and internal migration. Table 5 presents the assumptions associated with each of the projections.⁶⁴

Figure 22 shows the growth rate observed for the population aged 25-54 between 1956 and 1997 and that projected starting in 1998 according to the three scenarios. The figure demonstrates eloquently that, even in the strong growth scenario, the 25-54 age group population will increase more slowly than it has for the past 40 years. The declining growth being particularly rapid between 2000 and 2002, this is the period during which maximum downward pressures on the

price must be contemplated. However, it is also necessary to note that even if the population growth rate is weaker, the decline in the growth rate will never be as pronounced and dramatic as between 1989 and 1995. This leads us to foresee that the demographic pressures will be on the decline in the course of the next 20 years, but that the impact on the price will not reach that observed since 1990. Lastly, we note that only if the weak growth scenario occurs might the population in this age group decline, and after 2009.

Since the real price and the real per capita income are co-integrated, the projected growth in real

Figure 22:
Population Growth Projection for the 25-54 Age Group




Table 5:
Hypotheses for the Demographic Projections

DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS SCENARIOS	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE IN 2016	LIFE EXPECTANCY BY GENDER IN 2016	IMMIGRATION LEVEL IN 2016	INTERNAL MIGRATION TRENDS
1. Weak growth	1.5	Women: 83.0 Men: 77.0	150,000	Favouring Central Canada
2. Medium growth	1.7	Women: 84.0 Men: 78.5	250,000	Average
3. Strong growth	1.9	Women: 86.0 Men: 81.0	330,000	Favouring Western Canada

income will be the critical element in the underlying future evolution of the real price. Given the inability to forecast the dates of economic fluctuations, the most realistic method for constructing an income projection consists of extending the past trends. During the 1956-97 period, the real GDP per adult grew an average of 1.58% per year. However, growth was more rapid until the mid- '70s and much slower thereafter. Hence, the average real GDP growth rate during the period from 1978 to 1997 was only 1.01% per year. Since we do not know whether future growth will follow the average of the last 40 years or that of the last 20, both possibilities have been contemplated. In the medium economic growth scenario, the average annual income growth per adult is 1.58%, while in the weak growth scenario it is 1%. The hypothesis of a weak per adult GDP growth is deemed more plausible, the "Glorious Thirties" probably constituting a time-related event with little chance of being repeated in the future.

The combination of the three demographic growth hypotheses and two economic growth scenarios form six scenarios described in Table 6. In the first, called low-weak, economic growth is 1% per year and the population experiences weak growth. In the low-average scenario, economic growth is still 1% per year while the population follows the average scenario of Statistics Canada. The low-strong scenario for its part combines weak real GDP growth with strong population growth. The average-weak, average-average and average-strong use the same economic growth assumptions but combine them with a 1.58% growth in real GDP per adult.


7.2.2 Real Price Projections for Canada

The Canadian model forecasts for the 1998-2016 period are presented in the grey section of Figure 23. The data are available in an appendix.⁶⁵ The principal elements of these projections are the following.

Table 6:
Description of the Scenarios

$\Delta\%$ GDP/ Adult	Demographic Growth	Name of Scenario	Scenario Number
1.00%	Weak	Low-weak	1
1.00%	Average	Low-average	2
1.00%	Strong	Low-strong	3
1.58%	Weak	Average-weak	4
1.58%	Average	Average-average	5
1.58%	Strong	Average-strong	6

Figure 23:
Price Projections



First of all, the model confirms that due to the co-integration relation, the price trend is conditioned by that of income. Consequently, in the scenarios numbered 4, 5 and 6, the price increases more rapidly than in scenarios 1, 2 and 3. Hence, if real income grows by 1.58% per year, the real price in 2016 would range between a minimum value of \$150,290 and a maximum of \$163,962. On the other hand, if we assume that income will grow by only 1% per year in the future, the price will range between \$115,627 (low-weak) and \$126,145 (low-strong). Since the real price for 1997 is \$113,593, the model therefore allows for anticipating that the real price in 2016 will be between 1.8%

and 44.3% higher than that of 1997. Even the most pessimistic scenarios therefore allow for anticipating that the real price in 2016 will not be lower than in 1997. We point out that the uncertainty about the price stems above all from that of the income growth projections. In fact, the price discrepancy is only 9% by the year 2016 between the weak and strong demographic growth scenarios, while that between the weak and average income growth is approximately 30%.


On the other hand, even if the model does not project that the price in 2016 is lower than that of 1997, it allows for anticipating downward pressures on the prices in the first half of the next decade due to demographic changes. These pressures are enough in the low-weak and low-average scenarios for the real price in the middle of the next decade to be lower than that of 1997. The lowest projected value is in 2004 in the low-weak scenario, with a price of only \$105,325, which is 7.3% lower than the 1997 price. The price recovers, however, in the next ten years.

Furthermore, section 3.2.1 allowed the conclusions that the real MLS price probably has a bias that overestimates the price growth of constant quality housing. The comparison of different price measurements would suggest that the average annual improvement in quality was 1.5%. This gradual qualitative housing improvement appears to be the result of the underlying growth in real income. Since the model is estimated on biased real prices, its projections also have a bias. This can be estimated at 1.5% per year if real income grows at the same rate as during the 1956-1997 period. Hence, in the scenarios where real income increases by 1.58% per year, the projected real price would comprise an average annual qualitative improvement of 1.5% per year. On the other hand, if we assume that real income will grow only 1% per year, the quality of housing will increase less rapidly in the future than it has historically. It is speculative to presume what would then be the average quality increase. If

we assume that the growth in quality is proportional to that of real income, the bias in scenarios 1, 2 and 3 would then be only 1% per year.

Figure 24 shows the price adjusted for quality and standardized in relation to the 1986 price. The quality improvement between 1986 and 1997 reduces the 1997 real price by 17.8% so that the 1997 constant quality price is only \$96,432 instead of \$113,952. In the average income growth scenarios, the real constant quality price in 2004 would then range between \$91,190 and \$97,538. If we assume low income growth, the 2004 constant quality price would be between \$83,397 and \$89,243. For the next five years, the model therefore allows for anticipating at best stagnation in the real constant quality price and perhaps a decline capable of reaching 13.5% between now and 2004. By 2016, however, the real price will range between \$105,608 and \$115,248 in the average income growth scenarios, thereby showing a progression in the constant quality price between 2004 and 2016. Conversely, if we assume weak growth in real income, the adjusted price would continue to decline during this period to bring it to between \$81,250 and \$88,680.

Figure 24:
Constant Quality Price Projections



In summary, the average housing sales price, expressed in constant 1986 dollars, should at worst remain at about the same level as in 1997, and at best, increase by close to 30% in the course of the next twenty years. During the next five years, demographic pressures will, however, contribute to lowering the real price, which could temporarily reduce the real price insignificantly. On the other hand, if we consider that the average quality of housing will probably continue to grow, the real constant quality price stands a good chance of decreasing between now and 2016, the decrease potentially reaching 15.6% if the low demographic growth scenario is combined with slow growth in real income.

7.2.3 Real Price Forecasts for the Provinces

The provincial projections differ from the Canadian projections for three reasons. The first is the difference in their future demographic evolution. The second comes from the differences in the provincial economic conditions. Lastly, the third is that the estimated models do not have the same coefficients. We have already presented the provincial models. Here we present the provincial differences in the average demographic forecast scenario. By concentrating on this scenario, we avoid the fastidious process of repeating a similar exercise for the weak and strong scenarios that present basically the same provincial differences. Attention will also focus on the recent economic evolution in the provinces.

All of the provinces will experience slower demographic growth in the next twenty years than during the period from 1956 to 1997. Three provinces, namely Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta will experience greater demographic vitality than the Canadian average while the situation will be reversed for the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. The average scenario allows for anticipating that the Atlantic Provinces will suffer a decline in the population aged 25-54 from 2002 onwards. This region's demographic decline will accelerate continuously so that after 2012, this population will decrease by more than 1% per year. These provinces are followed on the path to decline by Saskatchewan, which will see its population aged 25-54 remain stable between

2002 and 2006 to then begin to decline. The population growth rate will decrease more slowly in Quebec and it is not until 2008 that the population in the same age group will begin to decrease. Manitoba will suffer a significant slowing in growth in 2002 but will maintain positive population growth until 2008, the decline beginning in 2009, or one year later than in Quebec.

It is British Columbia that will have the most rapid population growth until 2001, i.e. between 1.5% and 2% per year. From 2002, the growth rate declines rapidly to find itself at approximately 1% until 2005 before slowing slightly thereafter. A less pronounced slow-down in Ontario will allow this province to experience more rapid growth than British Columbia after 2005, both provinces having an identical 1.06% growth rate in 2004. Alberta will follow a demographic evolution modelled on that of British Columbia, but with approximately one half of a percentage point lower growth rate per year. These three provinces will still experience positive growth in 2016.⁴⁶

The behaviour of the prices in the coming years also depends on the recent shocks on real income. The strongest shocks occurred in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, which have both experienced exceptional growth in real income per capita since 1994. It has in fact experienced a cumulative increase of more than 9% in three years in these two provinces. Alberta profited from a 5% increase in real income in 1997. Quebec, Ontario and the Atlantic Provinces benefited in 1997 from a normal increase in real income after it had stagnated or declined for the major part of the decade. Lastly, British Columbia recently experienced weak growth in real income per capita.


Figure 25 shows the real price projections by province for the low-average scenario, namely, the one in which real income growth is 1% and demographic growth is average. The upper part of the figure presents the provinces with weak demographic growth, while the lower figure shows the price for the provinces with strong demographic vitality.

Generally speaking, the provincial models project stronger real price growth than the Canadian model. All of the provinces should experience real price growth until 2000. However, the increase will be very weak in the Atlantic Provinces since they will then be set at \$70,357 as compared with \$68,227 in 1997. From 2001 onwards, the prices will begin to decrease in the Atlantic Provinces until they reach \$63,926 in 2012, when they will thereafter remain fairly stable. The prices in Saskatchewan will also show a declining slope from 2003 after having reached a \$75,480 peak in 2001. The decline will be more marked than in the Atlantic region so that in 2016, the prices will be no more than \$62,383. The anticipated weakness in the growth of prices in these provinces comes from the low coefficient associated with income, the result of which is that income growth cannot compensate the deflationary impact of the population decrease.

The model forecasts that the prices in Quebec should experience a significant recovery in the course of the coming years, going from \$74,754 in 1997 to \$100,251 in 2007. Afterwards, the prices should remain relatively stable. Manitoba presents a peculiar situation. While the prices there are among the lowest in Canada, the model forecasts that they will experience strong growth over the course of the next ten years to reach \$128,371 in 2009 before decreasing to \$115,239. This strong price response stems from the shock on real income associated with the quasi-unitary price root in the system's second equation.

The three provinces with strong demographics, namely Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta, should all experience a fairly significant growth in prices. The model forecasts an especially marked rise in Ontario and in Alberta. The upward price trend in Ontario stems in large part from the strong estimated income coefficient, which would take the real price to more than \$200,000 in 2016. If, as suspected, the income coefficient is

Figure 25:
Price Projections by Province



overestimated in this province, the price increase there will be lower than that projected by the model. The prices in Alberta will reach a peak of \$160,679 in 2004, as a reaction to the large real income growth recently observed. These prices should, however, decrease somewhat to return to \$135,190 in 2016. Lastly, the prices in British Columbia will not change much until 2005, staying at approximately \$165,000, but should then resume an upward trend that would take them to just below the \$200,000 level in 2016.

It is stressed that these projections are not compatible with the national projections. This can be explained in two ways. First of all, the dependent variable in the national equation is the price weighted by the transactions, which, for reasons discussed in section 3.2.1, is not comparable to a provincial price average. But above all, the parameters of the provincial models differ from those of the Canadian model. They nevertheless allow regional trends to be identified and indicate in which regions of the country the downward pressures from the demographic changes will be the strongest. Clearly, the regions most at risk are the Atlantic Provinces and Saskatchewan, which will be the first to experience a population decline. In Quebec and in Manitoba, income growth should be enough to compensate the demographic pressures. Lastly, in

the three provinces with strong demographics, the income effect should dominate that of the demographics to continue to push real prices upwards.

Finally, it is important to recall that the projections are based on a stable growth in real income. Historically, economic fluctuations have always been observed. The model forecasts quite a strong price reaction to these fluctuations. Similarly, the interest rates cause quite a marked reaction in the real price. It is therefore necessary to expect the real housing price to continue to undergo marked fluctuations that will result in the price deviating from the projections. Random economic conditions will determine at what times and in what locations they occur.

8. CONCLUSION

Demographic changes constitute one of the most important forces shaping the evolution of the housing market. Since the rate of young household formation has slowed down, the demand for new housing is weaker than at the time when the baby boomers were just beginning their working life. At the same time, the aging of the baby-boom generation increases the number of dwellings for sale. We studied whether this would be sufficient to trigger a pronounced downward trend in residential real estate prices.

The problem was approached by recalling that the price is determined by supply and demand conditions and that the supply adjusts when the housing price is abnormally high. The price movements therefore tend to be dissipated over the longer term when the housing stock has been able to adjust. Then two types of changes that have affected the real housing price in Canada over the past 40 years were documented. First of all, the prices experienced two periods of large increases, namely, during the periods of 1973-75 and 1985-89, and two episodes of sharp decreases, namely, 1980-82 and 1990-92. Afterwards, the average real housing sales price experienced quite a pronounced upward trend. This upward trend seems to be the result of a qualitative housing improvement because some price indices that correct for quality improvement do not show an underlying increase.

To understand the factors likely to explain such price fluctuations, the demographic and economic evolution were studied, focussing on real income and residential mortgage interest rates. These factors' contribution was evaluated in two ways. First of all, the existing literature was summarized to establish, if possible, a consensus on the importance of demographics in determining real prices. This overview led in fact to the observation of the absence of consensus on a critical point. It is not known whether the housing demand increases or decreases with age beyond 40 years. It is consequently impossible to establish whether the aging of the baby-boom generation will cause the housing demand to decrease.

In spite of the lack of consensus, it should be noted that one solitary scientific study was unearthed, that by Mankiw and Weil (1989), which concludes that demographics could make the real estate market collapse. The other studies systematically conclude either that there will be no effect or, instead, that it will be temporary and of little importance, or yet again that it will be counterbalanced by the increase in real income. Only two studies, namely that by Laycock (1979) and that by Engelhardt and Poterba (1991), studied the impact of demographics on Canadian historical data. Both conclude that the effect on the housing price is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the fluctuations in real income and interest rates were important.

The scientific conclusions are not repeated in the popular press and general public literature. The Foot and Stoffmann (1996) contention is, on the contrary, that population aging can cause real estate prices to collapse. When the baby boomers want to sell their dwellings all at the same time, the next generation will be too small in numbers to buy them. This will not allow for maintaining the prices, which will have to decrease to balance the market. This contention was widely echoed in magazines and newspapers but met a cool, even negative reception from housing market analysts. The latter, and especially Clayton, recalled the importance of economic factors in determining prices.

To clarify the respective contribution of these two types of influences, we estimated, using Canadian data, a structural model of the housing market that proved to be stable over the 1956-1997 period. The model contains a demand equation and a housing stock adjustment equation. This latter equation shows that two variables are important in new housing construction activity, namely the housing price and the GDP growth per capita. It was also shown that the real price is co-integrated with real per capita income, which implies that the price trend is common to that of income. Furthermore, the price equation clarifies the

contribution of the demographic and economic shocks to the historical fluctuations of the real housing price.

The model shows that of the various possible demographic measurements, only the growth in the population aged 25-54 has a statistically significant impact on the real housing price. The passage of the baby-boom generation raised the real price by 25% between 1965 and 1975, the level at which it stayed until 1989. It then decreased 20% between 1989 and 1997 when a smaller generation followed. The demographic impact was therefore considerable. The economic fluctuations, and in particular the 1980-82 recession and the economic decline of the '90s in the meantime had an even greater influence. In fact, the acceleration in real income growth from 1963 to the end of the '70s was such that the real housing price in 1979 surpassed by 36% the value it would have had if economic growth had been evenly distributed across all of the years. However, the poor Canadian economic performance reduced the real price by 31% between 1989 and 1997.

Finally, the model was used to simulate the price evolution based on various demographic growth scenarios projected by Statistics Canada and two real income growth hypotheses. The projections show that the real housing price is not likely to decrease in Canada over the course of the coming years. The greatest part of the downward demographic pressures occurred during the '90s. What remains to be absorbed will occur mostly between 2002 and 2005 when the growth of the population aged 25-54 will slow more rapidly. However, the upward trend resulting from the increase in real income will in all plausibility dominate the demographic impact, especially after 2005. On the other hand, we recalled that if a correction is made for the probable quality bias, the contention of the underlying real price decrease becomes plausible in the weak economic growth scenario.

The structure of the provincial models was similar to that of the Canadian model. However, certain important coefficients vary from one province to another. It was especially stressed that the effect

of income on price seemed greater in Ontario and particularly weak in the Atlantic Provinces. Furthermore, Manitoba stands out because the price is quasi non-stationary, which implies a very slow and important price reaction dynamic. The simulations reveal that in the Atlantic Provinces and Saskatchewan, it is probable that prices will decline. This will occur because the population aged 25-54 will begin to decline earlier than in the other provinces and the reduction will be sharper. However, by 2016, the model forecasts moderate decreases that will barely surpass 10% as compared with current prices. In all of the other provinces, a real price which is higher than at present is projected. The price growth will be especially large in the provinces with more vital demographic growth, namely Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. Ontario, which will experience more sustained demographic growth than the other provinces, should benefit from the strongest price increase.

We conclude that even if it is true that demographics will tend to reduce real estate prices, its impact will probably be dominant only in the Atlantic region and Saskatchewan. In the other regions, the real price should have a tendency to rise. To avoid a property price decline, the Atlantic region and Saskatchewan will have to experience more rapid real income growth per capita or other decreases in interest rates.

Before coming to a definitive conclusion, there remain some important aspects to study. First of all, this study did not allow for directly clarifying whether aging increases or decreases the housing demand. This study, having associated the demand changes with population changes in the group aged 25-54, indicates that the size variation in age groups over 55 would have no effect on the demand. Indirectly, this can be interpreted as a sign that the housing demand is stable after age 55. However, it would be useful if the age effect on the housing demand could be better defined, especially in the over-40 age segment. Secondly, Canadian data still suffer from the absence of constant quality price indices. The average MLS transaction prices then assume great importance provided that the quality bias they contain is accurately identified.

Lastly, it would be useful to pursue the work on the relation between the population growth rate and the rate of new housing construction activity. The absence of co-integration between the number of dwellings and the population was observed, which was interpreted as a result of lasting shocks on the household headship rate. This raises the question of the endogenous or exogenous long-term character of this headship rate. If it is exogenous, it then becomes possible to further constrain the relation between the variations in population growth rate and the rate of construction. This would allow for a better understanding of the housing market's adjustment mechanisms, and thus, of long-term price determination.

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ENDNOTES

- 1 Markets are complete when transactions are possible for all the goods and services. In the case of the housing market, the two main sources of incomplete markets are the absence of a long-term single-dwelling rental market and the mortgage credit development delays that were observed until the end of the 60's.
- 2 For example, municipal taxes are proportionate to the assessment roll, which itself is based on the building's market value. However, not all of the expenses are in proportion to the value. For example, certain taxes are fixed amounts per dwelling while the electricity bill contains a daily charge separate from consumption.
- 3 This expression is obtained by differentiating equation 1 in relation to the inflation rate B under the hypotheses that $di/d\pi = d(\Delta P/P)/d\pi = 1$.
- 4 For a Canadian estimate of the different household characteristics that influence the housing demand, we can refer to Steele (1979).
- 5 If productivity per hectare increases through more intensive use of fertilizers, the price of land will decrease even if the real price of food does not go down. This would occur because agricultural production would make less intensive use of the land.
- 6 The gradual price adjustment hypothesis implies that future variations in the housing price are in part predictable. This opens the possibility of making real estate transactions for reaping an abnormal profit. Only high transaction costs could prevent such transactions from being abnormally profitable.
- 7 In equation 4, $C_i(W_t, P_t)$ can also be seen as a partial adjustment towards the desired housing stock, or $C_i(W_t, P_t) = \alpha[L^1 - L^0]$. When long-term equilibrium is reached, the housing activity only just allows replacing the physical depreciation in the housing.
- 8 Cansim No. D20588
- 9 In theory, two types of causalities occur. When housing demand varies, changes in housing prices have repercussions on the derived inputs demand. The causality then moves from the housing price to that of the resources. When, on the other hand, resource prices experience exogenous changes, for example after hurricane Andrew, it is the building cost that influences the housing price.
- 10 While the Laspeyres index chooses constant quantities to calculate price change, the Paasche index uses current quantities instead. The Fisher index is the geometric mean of the two.
- 11 Laycock, W., "Housing Prices of the Seventies: Perspectives and Analysis", Study No. 78.05, Economic Research Directorate, Anti-Inflation Board, 1978, p. 4.
- 12 We used the Statistics Canada data to find out the estimated number of dwellings in each province.
- 13 For example, assume that the average profit margin is initially situated at 25% of the sales price. To produce a 20% reduction in the sales price in relation to building costs, the profit margin must decrease to 5% of the sales price, or an 80% drop in profits. If the margin were initially 20%, the profits would have to disappear completely in order for the real price to drop 20% in relation to the costs.

- 14 The estimated equation is $NHPI = -69.47(7.43) + 1.296(0.99)*CCI + 0.549(.092)*CCI(-1) - 0.479(.070)*TREND$, where the values in parentheses are the estimated standard deviations of the coefficients. The trend therefore has great statistical significance. Since the sum of the coefficients associated with CCI and CCI(-1) is higher than one, this implies that there is greater volatility in the sales price than in the building cost. Therefore the profits react strongly to short-term changes in the sales price.
- 15 The correlations between the MLS, NHPI, NBSA and CCI series calculated for the 1972-1997 period do not differ from those calculated for the 1972-1985 period.
- 16 If demand remains relatively constant for the majority of working life and declines only at retirement, it will then be influenced primarily by the size of the working age population. In practice, however, the weight of senior citizens in the total adult population has historically been fairly light so that the population aged 25 and over has evolved similarly to the population aged 25 to 64.
- 17 See for example, Lewis, R. (1987), *The Long-term Housing Outlook: Household Growth in Canada and the Provinces, 1991-2016*, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Ottawa.
- 18 Inter alia, see Levin, E.J. and R.E. Wright (1997), "The impact of speculation on house prices in the United Kingdom", *Economic Modelling* 14, 567-585.
- 19 As previously stressed, the Construction Costs Index is positively correlated with housing activity, which suggests that it reacts more to the housing demand than to changes in the supply factors. The possibility of using the land component of the New Housing Price Index was studied. In this case too, the correlation with housing activity was positive, posing the same problem as the Construction Costs Index.
- 20 It is believed that high real price in Quebec can be explained by the relatively large number of multiple-unit residential buildings (duplex and triplex) in the Montreal region. Unfortunately, the Canadian Real Estate Association data does not allow verifying or rejecting this interpretation.
- 21 This weakness is moreover highlighted by Lanoie (1997).
- 22 Foot gave several interviews to journalists to promote his book. Essentially uncritical, these texts only present the author's arguments. See for example, the texts by Auger (1996), Ducas (1996), Giroux (1996) and Lortie (1996).
- 23 Laycock, W., *Housing Prices of the Seventies: Perspectives and Analysis*, Study No. 78.05, Economic Research Directorate, Anti-Inflation Board, Ottawa, 1978.
- 24 Laycock, W., op. cit., p. 48-49.
- 25 By establishing that an increase of one percentage point in the inflation rate accelerates the growth rate of housing prices by one percentage point, Haycock assumes that the real housing price is insensitive to the level of the prices.
- 26 Mankiw and Weil, op. cit., p. 248.
- 27 For tenant households, the census indicates the monthly rent but does not provide the value of the dwelling occupied. They circumvent the difficulty by assuming that the value of the dwelling is equal to 100 times the monthly rent.

- 28 Mankiw et Weil, op. cit., p. 239.
- 29 Woodward, S. (1991), Economists' prejudices: Why the Mankiw-Weil story is not credible, *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 21, 531-537.
- 30 Such a result is not surprising. The effect of mortgage interest deductibility in the United States is that it lowers the real housing services costs for households with lower equity. It is therefore before age forty that mortgage interest deductibility favours residential ownership. When Canadian households are in a position to pay off their mortgage, usually in their forties, the cost disadvantage with the United States disappears and they are capable of meeting the housing consumption profile observed in the United States.
- 31 In its simplest form, Hamilton's argument can be summarized as follows. At given supply conditions, a highly populated generation raises the competition for housing, which causes the housing price to rise. The purpose of the rise in price is to balance the market by reducing the real quantity of housing each household consumes. Yet, we observed an increased consumption by the highly populated generation, which contradicts the effect the price increase should have caused.
- 32 Co-integration is also important when non-stationary variables are regressed. In fact, when the variables are co-integrated, the least-squares estimators converge asymptotically and the spurious correlations cannot emerge.
- 33 Holland, A. S. (1991), "The Baby Boom and the Housing Market: Another look at the evidence", *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 21, 565-571.
- 34 Mankiw, N. G. et D. N. Weil (1992), The baby boom, the baby bust and the housing market: A reply to our critics, *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 21, 573-579.
- 35 His study does not enable clarification of the meaning of the relation's causality. Hence, it might very well be that it is the rise in the housing price that causes the building costs to increase at the local level.
- 36 Swan raises furthermore, that the MW variable requires a correction. The real housing value is obtained by taking the value of the dwelling as estimated by the household at the time it is surveyed. This value necessarily includes the structures and the land. On the other hand, to obtain a real value, MW then divide by the housing activity deflator, which excludes the price of the land. In an appendix, Swan develops a mechanism that corrects a major part of this problem. He stresses, however, that this correction has very little impact on the results.
- 37 The authors of this document observed that the correlation between housing starts and the change in the real housing activity cost is 0.50 in Canada. The changes in material prices in Canada therefore seem to react above all to the changes in housing demand.
- 38 Pitkin, J.R. and W. Myers (1994), "The Specification of Demographic Effects on Housing Demand: Avoiding the Age-Cohort Fallacy", *Journal of Housing Economics* 3, p. 248. The italicized emphasis is found in the original document.
- 39 According to their 1980 sample, less than one person in four in the group aged 40-44 had not completed high school education, while more than half the people over age 65 were in this group.

- 40 It is important to grasp that this is not just a matter of a gradual adjustment of the housing stock towards equilibrium. In their model, it is only the price itself that adjusts gradually towards equilibrium.
- 41 This is in fact an equation similar to equation 4 in section 2.2.
- 42 DiPasquale and Wheaton do, however, point out that the time required for selling is a very important variable in the equation. Its strength is such that it cannot be explained only by the variations in the financing cost. In all plausibility, it also captures some conjunctural elements. This gives weight to the fact that as the price adjusts slowly, it is not an adequate variable for measuring the effect on housing starts. It is mentioned that in an earlier article (DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1992), they had estimated a significant effect for the vacancy rate on the building of new rental housing. The vacancy rate at that point played a role similar to that held by the selling time.
- 43 DiPasquale, D. and W.C. Wheaton (1994), "Housing Market Dynamics and the Future of Housing Prices", *Journal of Urban Economics* 35, 24.
- 44 In a vectoral system, the error correction representation contains all of the lagged-difference endogenous variables, as well as a stable linear combination of the level of the variables. The co-integration relation is what produces this stable combination which we call error correction.
- 45 They point out that since the price changes can be forecasted by their equation, this leads to believing that the efficient market hypothesis cannot be applied to housing.
- 46 Fair, R.C. and K.M. Dominguez (1991), "Effects of the Changing U.S. Age Distribution on Macroeconomics Equations", *American Economic Review* 81(5), note 13, p. 1286.
- 47 Disequilibrium is the term employed to designate the residual of the co-integration relation. In their case, this residual is measured by standardizing in relation to the real price, therefore by calculating $\log(p) - 0.14 \times \log(y)$, where p is the real housing price and y is real income. In an error correction model, this disequilibrium is likely to influence the change in the price. The coefficient measuring the impact of the disequilibrium on the price change constitutes one measurement of the speed at which the price returns to its equilibrium value.
- 48 Holly and Jones do not suggest explanations for this observation. We allow ourselves to suggest that this is compatible with a situation in which, when there is a demand surplus, the adjustment usually consists of ceasing building without actually destroying the existing stock. On the other hand, in the case of surplus demand, the rate of housing activity can be accelerated when the disequilibrium is very great.
- 49 This cross-Canada data is found in CANSIM matrix 4079, while the provincial estimates are in matrices 4080 to 4089 for the ten provinces.
- 50 More specifically, it is possible to find some formulations in which construction is linked to growth in the adult population, which links the housing stock to the adult population. However, those that produce this result are incomplete specifications in which the real housing price is omitted from the housing starts equation. When a correctly specified model is considered, the demographic variables are not significant in the housing starts equation.

- 51 See Granger and Newbold (1974).
- 52 Granger and Newbold (1974) showed that the spurious correlation occurs between non-stationary independent series. When the stochastic shocks are common, the two series are dependent, thus eliminating the problem.
- 53 The intuitive reason for which the lagged dependent variable eliminates the problem of fictitious correlation is that the first-difference model becomes a simple rewriting of the level model.
- 54 We verified moreover, still with the ADF test, that the logarithmic change of the real price is stationary.
- 55 The Johansen plausibility ratio test performed with a lag to capture the short-term dynamics has a calculated value of 15.85 as opposed to a critical value of 15.41 at 5%. The hypothesis of absence of co-integration relation is rejected. The estimated co-integration relation is $P_t - 1.058 \times Y_t - 8.166$. The ADF test applied to this relation confirms that it is a stationary series.
- 56 The calculated value is -1.142 while the MacKinnon critical value is -2.935. On the other hand, the variation of the housing stock rate of change is stationary.
- 57 The standardized co-integration relation compared with the stock change is $\Delta S_t - 1.123 \times \Delta Y_t - 0.006$.
- 58 Equation 7 is thus overidentified while equation 8 is only barely identified.
- 59 See Greene (1990), p. 629 for a discussion of autocorrelation in the variable instrument models and p. 632 for a presentation of the advantages of the three-step least squares estimator.
- 60 The marginal value of the joint hypotheses test is fairly close to the level of 5%, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis and it is legitimate to ask whether we are perhaps making a mistake in excluding certain variables. It is the nullity of TUC in the ΔS equation that makes rejecting the test more difficult. In fact, if we did not impose the nullity of β_4 at the same time as the other hypotheses, the χ^2 would only be 9.046 and the test's marginal value would only barely reach 0.34. On the other hand, if we keep TUC in the equation and exclude the other variables, the estimate period is extended by 5 years to start in 1958. With this longer sample, β_4 therefore has a marginal significance level of only 0.25. We can therefore remove it from the final specification.
- 61 The scenario selected consists of assuming that the rate of growth of real income per capita and that of the population are 1%, while the mortgage interest rate is 7.5%. These values are not important because the percentage deviations in relation to the scenario remain identical regardless of what values are chosen. What is important, however, is that the income and population growth rates are constant.
- 62 The reader is invited to refer to Figure 15 to visualize the housing activity level changes in this province. The seemingly erratic movements in the housing stock variation made us suspect possible data errors. However, an audit did not enable such errors to be detected.
- 63 The impact of a permanent 1% increase in interest rates is a long-term 2.46% reduction in the real housing price.

- 64 Canada. Statistics Canada (1994), *Population projections for Canada, provinces and territories, 1993-2016*, 91-520, DISTC, Ottawa.
- 65 The set of projections is also contained in a spreadsheet attached to the report. This spreadsheet is designed so that a change of assumptions allows for modifying the model's projected values. The analyst can thus alter his or her assumptions so as to study the sensitivity of the projections.
- 66 The provincial population growth data are contained in the file appended to the report.

APPENDIX 1

HOUSING PRICE AND STOCK ADJUSTMENT TO A DEMOGRAPHIC SHOCK

The total differential of (6) is:

$$H_{Ni}dN_{it} + H_XdX_t + H_PdP_t + H_UdU_t = C_WdW_t + C_PdP_t - (1-\delta)dS_{t-1} \quad (A1)$$

By grouping the terms and isolating dP_t to the left, we obtain:

$$dP_t = [H_{Ni}dN_{it} + H_XdX_t + H_UdU_t - C_WdW_t - (1-\delta)dS_{t-1}]/(C_P - H_P) \quad (A2)$$

Since C_P is positive when H_P is negative, the partial effects of the variables on the real price are, generally speaking, without ambiguity. The instantaneous effect on the price of a change in the size of demographic group i is obtained by assuming that only dN_{it} is not null, which gives:

$$dP_t/dN_{it} = H_{Ni}/(C_P - H_P) > 0 \quad (A3)$$

For its part, the housing stock reaction is obtained by differentiating (5') as compared to N_{it} . By the chain differentiation rule we then have:

$$dS_t/dN_{it} = (dS_t/dP_t) \times (dP_t/dN_{it}) = C_P \times H_{Ni}/(C_P - H_P) > 0 \quad (A4)$$

Hence, the housing stock in period t will be higher. The impact on the price at date $t+1$ is given by:

$$dP_{t+1}/dN_{it} = (dP_{t+1}/dN_{it+1}) \times (dN_{it+1}/dN_{it}) + (dP_{t+1}/dS_t) \times (dS_t/dN_{it}) \quad (A5)$$

Equation A5 has two terms. The first indicates the impact on the price by the part of the population increase that is still present in the following period. The second term is the effect on the price of the growth in the housing stock. For simplification, we assume that the growth in N_{it+1} is permanent, i.e., $dN_{it+1}/dN_{it} = 1$. The effect on P_{t+1} can then be written as follows.

$$dP_{t+1}/dN_{it} = H_{Ni}/(C_P - H_P) - [(1-\delta)C_P/(C_P - H_P)] \times H_{Ni}/(C_P - H_P) \quad (A6)$$

By factorizing $H_{Ni}/(C_P - H_P)$ we obtain:

$$dP_{t+1}/dN_{it} = [H_{Ni}/(C_P - H_P)] \times [1 - (1-\delta)C_P/(C_P - H_P)] \quad (A7)$$

Hence, the effect on the price at date $t+1$ is weaker than at date t . As for the effect on S_{t+1} , it is given by:

$$dS_{t+1}/dN_{it} = (dS_{t+1}/dS_t) \times (dS_t/dN_{it}) + (dS_{t+1}/dP_{t+1}) \times (dP_{t+1}/dN_{it}) \quad (A8)$$

The first part of this equation indicates the fraction of the capital stock built during period t that is still in place in period $t+1$, while the second part of the equation represents the capital that is built at date $t+1$ because the real price at this date is high. By substituting the appropriate values in the different elements of this equation, we find:

$$dS_{t+1}/dN_{it} = C_P \times H_{Ni}/(C_P - H_P)[1 + (1-\delta)(1 - C_P/(C_P - H_P))] > dS_t/dN_{it} \quad (A9)$$

Hence, the housing stock at date $t+2$ is higher than in period $t+1$. We stress that the housing stock adjustment speed is represented by C_p . If it assumes a high value, the stock reacts more strongly to the change in the housing price, as we see in equations A4 and A9. The more rapid effect of the housing stock adjustment is to limit the price increase, both at the time of impact as shown by equation A3 and during the later periods as we see in equation A7.



APPENDIX 2

**PROJECTIONS FOR THE
1998-2016 PERIOD**

Table 7:

Real Price Projections

YEARS	LOW-WEAK	LOW-AVERAGE	LOW-STRONG	AVERAGE-WEAK	AVERAGE-AVERAGE	AVERAGE-STRONG
1997	113,593	113,593	113,593	113,593	113,593	113,593
1998	112,333	113,194	113,873	112,939	113,804	114,487
1999	111,262	112,763	113,955	112,912	114,435	115,645
2000	110,922	112,893	114,468	113,947	115,972	117,590
2001	109,626	112,490	114,915	114,223	117,207	119,733
2002	107,067	110,539	113,550	113,295	116,969	120,154
2003	105,680	109,581	113,006	113,655	117,851	121,534
2004	105,324	109,525	113,238	115,166	119,760	123,820
2005	105,739	110,141	114,043	117,560	122,454	126,793
2006	105,966	111,025	115,406	119,770	125,488	130,440
2007	106,547	112,082	116,794	122,389	128,747	134,160
2008	107,196	113,058	117,976	125,088	131,928	137,667
2009	107,768	113,836	118,858	127,688	134,878	140,828
2010	108,464	114,651	119,703	130,420	137,859	143,934
2011	109,557	115,802	120,834	133,618	141,235	147,372
2012	110,157	116,403	121,368	136,201	143,923	150,063
2013	110,784	116,999	121,873	138,793	146,579	152,684
2014	111,987	118,152	122,919	142,092	149,914	155,963
2015	113,843	119,938	124,582	146,229	154,058	160,023
2016	115,627	121,636	126,145	150,290	158,101	163,962

APPENDIX 3
DATA SOURCES

Price and quantity of housing sold through the Multiple Listing Service: *Canadian Real Estate Association*, special compilation.

New Housing Price Index: CANSIM, series P10248 for 1981-1997. This series was joined with the earlier data available from Statistics Canada for 1971-1981.

Residential Building Construction Price Index: CANSIM, series D20588

NHA home prices: *Housing Statistics*, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, many issues.

Housing stock: Estimated year-end number of single- and multiple-unit dwellings, CANSIM, numbers D845803 (Canada), D845804 (Nfld.), D845807 (PEI), D845810 (NS), D845813 (NB), D845816 (Que.), D845819 (Ont.), D845822 (Man.), D845825 (Nfld.), D845828 (Alta.), D845831 (BC)

Home prices according to the National Balance Sheet Accounts: Estimated value of residential buildings, CANSIM, series D18882 divided by the estimated number of units D845803.

Canadian Real Gross Domestic Product: annual average from the CANSIM series D20463.

Provincial Real Gross Domestic Product: Conference Board of Canada for 1961-1995. For 1996-97, these series were joined with the real GDP estimates to the cost of the factors for the provinces, CANSIM series I340415 (Nfld), I340530 (PEI), I340585 (NS), I340640 (NB), I340695 (Que.), I340750 (Ont.), I345475 (Man.), I345530 (Sask.), I345585 (Alta.), I345640 (BC).

Consumer Price Index: CANSIM, series P700000.

Five-year mortgage interest rate: CANSIM, series B14051.

Population of Canada and the provinces by age group, 1956-1970: Canada, Statistics Canada (1973), Population 1921-1971. *Revised annual population estimates by gender and age, Canada and provinces*, 91-512, [MIC], Ottawa.

[Population of Canada and the provinces by age group, 1971-1997]: CANSIM, matrices 6367 to 6377. (To connect the historical series on population, we estimated the 1971 population by applying to the 1970 population a rate of growth equal to the average growth rate observed in 1970 and 1972.)

[Population projections for Canada and the provinces by age group for different scenarios]: Canada, Statistics Canada (1994), *Population projections for Canada, provinces and territories, 1993-2016*, 91-520, DISTC, Ottawa.

APPENDIX 4

GUIDE TO USING THE PROJECTION FILES

The eight real price and housing stock projection files that accompany this document have been formatted in Microsoft Excel. These files were programmed so that the projection scenarios can be updated easily by modifying the value of the three exogenous variables that condition the model's behaviour: the five-year mortgage interest rate, the population growth between ages 25 and 54 and the growth in real income per capita. These variables are always placed in the same

location on the sheets in the different files. Hence, the information on the interest rate is located in cell [E8], that on the real GDP in cell [E7] and that on population growth for the period from 1998 to 2016 in cells [I15..I33]. When any of this data is modified in the different scenarios, the model is automatically re-estimated. Furthermore, the figures displayed at the bottom of the first page of each file adjust to the changes in the scenario.

Programming: Mario Fortin and André Leclerc

1998-2016		1. GDP growth per adult =		1.00000		Price Equation		Forecast		Legend	
2. Five-year mortgage loan interest rate =		7.50								PI: MLS price divided by the consumer price index	
3. Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)										RI: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages	
										YI: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over	
										N(25.54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54	
										SI: housing stock	
1996	876765										
1997	88328	11.3060	0.07500	16884	0.00701	13.68627	0.01082	11.13060	13.68627	0.01	0.733009
1998	899719	11.15829	0.07500	17053	0.00659	13.69709	0.01274	11.15629	13.69709	0.01	0.733009
1999	90166	11.15863	0.07500	17223	0.00430	13.70984	0.01319	11.15863	13.70984	0.01	0.733009
2000	90284	11.15865	0.07500	17396	0.00320	13.72302	0.01324	11.15865	13.72302	0.01	0.733009
2001	89897	935430	0.07500	17570	-0.00545	13.73627	0.01250	11.14168	13.73627	0.01	0.733009
2002	87065	945760	0.07500	17745	-0.00454	13.74876	0.01088	11.14168	13.74876	0.01	0.733009
2003	65879	955254	0.07500	17923	-0.00663	13.75974	0.00999	11.1342	13.75974	0.01	0.733009
2004	65323	11.09558	0.07500	18102	-0.00685	13.76973	0.00946	11.09558	13.76973	0.01	0.733009
2005	65105	973235	0.07500	18283	-0.00695	13.77920	0.00919	11.08709	13.77920	0.01	0.733009
2006	64812	981866	0.07500	18466	-0.00796	13.78838	0.00883	11.08375	13.78838	0.01	0.733009
2007	64636	990303	0.07500	18650	-0.00842	13.79721	0.00856	11.07925	13.79721	0.01	0.733009
2008	64455	996827	0.07500	18837	-0.00912	13.80577	0.00827	11.07653	13.80577	0.01	0.733009
2009	64081	1006370	0.07500	19025	-0.01056	13.81404	0.00782	11.07372	13.81404	0.01	0.733009
2010	63741	1013852	0.07500	19216	-0.01180	13.82186	0.00741	11.06791	13.82186	0.01	0.733009
2011	63623	1021150	0.07500	19408	-0.01387	13.82927	0.00717	11.06274	13.82927	0.01	0.733009
2012	63133	1027943	0.07500	19602	-0.01486	13.83644	0.00695	11.05300	13.83644	0.01	0.733009
2013	62760	1034328	0.07500	19798	-0.01456	13.84307	0.00619	11.04708	13.84307	0.01	0.733009
2014	62781	1040647	0.07500	19996	-0.01408	13.84926	0.00601	11.04741	13.84926	0.01	0.733009
2015	63047	1047113	0.07500	20196	-0.01537	13.85535	0.00619	11.05163	13.85535	0.01	0.733009
2016	62967	1053420	0.07500	20398	-0.01537	13.86155	0.00601	11.05037	13.86155	0.01	0.733009

Table D-2
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Atlantic Provinces

Comparison of Results





Table D-3
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Atlantic Provinces

Atlantic Provinces

1995-2016

Medium Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Year	Forecasts					Price Equation					Housing Stock Valuation Equation				
	Yr	Pr	Yr	Pr	Yr	Yr	Yr	Yr	Yr	Yr	Yr	Yr	Yr	Yr	Yr
1996															
1997	68227	88326	11	13060							13	68627	11	13060	0.733009
1998	70121	89801	11	15801							13	69709	11	15801	0.733009
1999	70357	911874	11	16133							13	70993	11	16133	0.733009
2000	70262	924186	11	15999							13	72326	11	15999	0.733009
2001	69309	936028	11	14632							13	73667	11	14632	0.733009
2002	67435	946627	11	11892							13	74940	11	11892	0.733009
2003	66286	956422	11	10174							13	76066	11	10174	0.733009
2004	65759	965830	11	09375							13	77095	11	09375	0.733009
2005	65567	975076	11	09083							13	78074	11	09083	0.733009
2006	65359	984121	11	08766							13	79027	11	08766	0.733009
2007	65242	993019	11	08566							13	79950	11	08566	0.733009
2008	65105	1001740	11	08375							13	80851	11	08375	0.733009
2009	64771	1010112	11	07862							13	81725	11	07862	0.733009
2010	64770	1018153	11	07395							13	82557	11	07395	0.733009
2011	64383	1026034	11	07260							13	83350	11	07260	0.733009
2012	63926	1033439	11	06548							13	84121	11	06548	0.733009
2013	63584	1040461	11	06012							13	84840	11	06012	0.733009
2014	63569	1047441	11	06098							13	85517	11	06098	0.733009
2015	63934	1054596	11	06561							13	86186	11	06561	0.733009
2016	63886	1061596	11	06485							13	86866	11	06485	0.733009

Legend

- Pr: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Yr: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yr: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
SL: housing stock

Table D-4
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Atlantic Provinces

Atlantic Provinces
1998-2016

Price-Strong Provinces: Weak Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Legend
P: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
R: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Y: GDP rate for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
S: housing stock

Year	Price Equation					Housing Stock Variation Equation				
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
1996	878765	878765	11.13060	11.13060	0.07500	16884	0.00701	13.68627	11.13060	0.01082
1997	68227	898326	11.17034	11.17034	0.07500	17053	0.00999	13.69709	11.17034	0.01348
1998	70993	900385	11.18097	11.18097	0.07500	17223	0.00782	13.71058	11.18097	0.01435
1999	71752	913398	11.18326	11.18326	0.07500	17396	0.00711	13.72493	11.18326	0.01480
2000	71916	926834	11.18326	11.18326	0.07500	17570	0.00416	13.73953	11.18326	0.01404
2001	71123	939934	11.17216	11.17216	0.07500	17745	-0.00089	13.75357	11.17216	0.01280
2002	69284	951852	11.14596	11.14596	0.07500	17923	-0.00192	13.76617	11.14596	0.01164
2003	68144	962996	11.12938	11.12938	0.07500	18102	-0.00203	13.77780	11.12938	0.01111
2004	67613	973759	11.12155	11.12155	0.07500	18283	-0.00201	13.78892	11.12155	0.01053
2005	67416	984360	11.11864	11.11864	0.07500	18466	-0.00253	13.79975	11.11864	0.01028
2006	67234	994781	11.11593	11.11593	0.07500	18650	-0.00283	13.81028	11.11593	0.00999
2007	67126	1005063	11.11433	11.11433	0.07500	18837	-0.00344	13.82056	11.11433	0.00954
2008	66975	1015156	11.11207	11.11207	0.07500	19025	-0.00472	13.83055	11.11207	0.00911
2009	66819	1024883	11.10674	11.10674	0.07500	19216	-0.00555	13.84009	11.10674	0.00885
2010	66299	1034262	11.10193	11.10193	0.07500	19408	-0.00571	13.84920	11.10193	0.00830
2011	66187	1043456	11.10024	11.10024	0.07500	19602	-0.00761	13.85805	11.10024	0.00785
2012	65704	1052150	11.09292	11.09292	0.07500	19798	-0.00844	13.86635	11.09292	0.00772
2013	65344	1060439	11.08741	11.08741	0.07500	19996	-0.00805	13.87419	11.08741	0.00780
2014	65381	1068662	11.08798	11.08798	0.07500	20196	-0.00747	13.88192	11.08798	0.00760
2015	65662	1077029	11.09227	11.09227	0.07500	20398	-0.00660	13.88972	11.09227	0.00760
2016	65601	1085241	11.09135	11.09135	0.07500	20598	-0.00660	13.89731	11.09135	0.00760

Table D-6
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Atlantic Provinces

Atlantic Provinces

1998-2016

Housing Stock, Medium Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

1- GDP growth per adult = 1.73100

2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50

3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Legend
 Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
 Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
 Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
 N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
 St: housing stock

Year	Price Equation					Housing Stock Variation Equation				
	Le Pt	Le Pt	Le Pt	Le Pt	Le Pt	Ver Le St	Ver Le St	Ver Le St	Ver Le St	Ver Le St
1998	878765	11 13060	11 13060	11 13060	11 13060	13 68627	0.01082	11 13060	13 68627	0.01731
1997	888326	11 16057	11 16057	11 16057	11 16057	13 69709	0.01304	11 16057	13 69709	0.01731
1996	899987	11 16763	11 16763	11 16763	11 16763	13 71014	0.01378	11 16763	13 71014	0.01731
1995	912476	11 17056	11 17056	11 17056	11 17056	13 72392	0.01412	11 17056	13 72392	0.01731
2000	923451	11 18136	11 18136	11 18136	11 18136	13 73804	0.01369	11 18136	13 73804	0.01731
2001	935399	11 18446	11 18446	11 18446	11 18446	13 75173	0.01246	11 18446	13 75173	0.01731
2002	949966	11 18715	11 18715	11 18715	11 18715	13 76416	0.01172	11 18715	13 76416	0.01731
2003	961162	11 12573	11 12573	11 12573	11 12573	13 77590	0.01142	11 12573	13 77590	0.01731
2004	972205	11 12573	11 12573	11 12573	11 12573	13 78732	0.01136	11 12573	13 78732	0.01731
2005	983316	11 12573	11 12573	11 12573	11 12573	13 79869	0.01126	11 12573	13 79869	0.01731
2006	994451	11 12452	11 12452	11 12452	11 12452	13 80995	0.01121	11 12452	13 80995	0.01731
2007	1005659	11 12684	11 12684	11 12684	11 12684	13 82115	0.01112	11 12684	13 82115	0.01731
2008	1016905	11 12875	11 12875	11 12875	11 12875	13 83227	0.01086	11 12875	13 83227	0.01731
2009	1028011	11 12755	11 12755	11 12755	11 12755	13 84314	0.01082	11 12755	13 84314	0.01731
2010	1039664	11 12674	11 12674	11 12674	11 12674	13 85376	0.01055	11 12674	13 85376	0.01731
2011	1050007	11 12917	11 12917	11 12917	11 12917	13 86431	0.01017	11 12917	13 86431	0.01731
2012	1060739	11 12575	11 12575	11 12575	11 12575	13 87446	0.00986	11 12575	13 87446	0.01731
2013	1071273	11 12403	11 12403	11 12403	11 12403	13 88436	0.00992	11 12403	13 88436	0.01731
2014	1081954	11 12846	11 12846	11 12846	11 12846	13 89428	0.01015	11 12846	13 89428	0.01731
2015	1092987	11 13061	11 13061	11 13061	11 13061	13 90443	0.01009	11 13061	13 90443	0.01731
2016	1104066	11 13929	11 13929	11 13929	11 13929	13 91453	0.01009	11 13929	13 91453	0.01731

Table D-7
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Atlantic Provinces

Atlantic Provinces

1998-2018

Medium-Strong Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

1. GDP growth per adult = 1.73100

2. Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50

3. Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			Ver. Yr.			Age 11		
	Yr	Ln P	Ln P-1	Yr	Ln P	Ln P-1	Yr	Ln P	Ln P-1	Yr	Ln P	Ln P-1	Yr	Ln P	Ln P-1
1996	68227	878765	11 13060	16884	11 13060	0.0700	0.00701	13 68627	13 68627	0.01062	11 13060	13 68627	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
1997	71175	900571	11 17290	17176	11 17290	0.0700	0.00999	13 69709	13 69709	0.01369	11 17290	13 69709	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
1998	72205	914001	11 18727	17474	11 18727	0.0700	0.00782	13 71078	13 71078	0.01480	11 18727	13 71078	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
1999	72680	928104	11 19383	17776	11 19383	0.0700	0.00711	13 72559	13 72559	0.01531	11 19383	13 72559	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2000	72250	943123	11 18720	18084	11 18720	0.0700	0.00416	13 74090	13 74090	0.01499	11 18720	13 74090	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2001	70850	955210	11 16550	18397	11 16550	0.0700	-0.00089	13 75589	13 75589	0.01380	11 16550	13 75589	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2002	69799	967769	11 15337	18715	11 15337	0.0700	-0.00192	13 76969	13 76969	0.01306	11 15337	13 76969	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2003	69559	980196	11 14993	19039	11 14993	0.0700	-0.00203	13 78275	13 78275	0.01275	11 14993	13 78275	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2004	69655	992678	11 15131	19369	11 15131	0.0700	-0.00201	13 79550	13 79550	0.01266	11 15131	13 79550	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2005	69758	1005223	11 15279	19704	11 15279	0.0700	-0.00253	13 80816	13 80816	0.01258	11 15279	13 80816	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2006	69934	1017858	11 15530	20045	11 15530	0.0700	-0.00283	13 82072	13 82072	0.01249	11 15530	13 82072	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2007	70057	1030525	11 15706	20392	11 15706	0.0700	-0.00344	13 83321	13 83321	0.01237	11 15706	13 83321	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2008	69960	1043044	11 15568	20745	11 15568	0.0700	-0.00472	13 84558	13 84558	0.01208	11 15568	13 84558	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2009	69853	1055427	11 15472	21104	11 15472	0.0700	-0.00555	13 85765	13 85765	0.01180	11 15472	13 85765	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2010	70039	1067836	11 15680	21469	11 15680	0.0700	-0.00571	13 86946	13 86946	0.01169	11 15680	13 86946	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2011	69786	1079944	11 15319	21841	11 15319	0.0700	-0.00761	13 88115	13 88115	0.01127	11 15319	13 88115	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2012	69656	1091842	11 15133	22219	11 15133	0.0700	-0.00844	13 89242	13 89242	0.01096	11 15133	13 89242	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2013	69445	1103874	11 15547	22604	11 15547	0.0700	-0.00805	13 90338	13 90338	0.01066	11 15547	13 90338	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2014	69945	1116256	11 16327	22995	11 16327	0.0700	-0.00747	13 91434	13 91434	0.01115	11 16327	13 91434	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2015	70493	1128677	11 16579	23393	11 16579	0.0700	-0.00860	13 92549	13 92549	0.01107	11 16579	13 92549	0.01731	0.733009	0.733009
2016	70671														

Legend
 Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
 Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
 Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
 N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
 St: housing stock

Table D-8
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Quebec

Programming: Mario Fortin and André Leclerc

Quebec
1998-2016

Weak/Weak Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Years	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation		
	Pt	St	St-1	Ln Pt	Ln St-1	Rt	Var Ln St	Ln Pt	Var Ln St
1996		2992625							
1997	74754	3020928	11 22196		14 91166		0.00941	11 22196	14 91166
1998	82219	3059620	11 31714	9 92071	14 92107	0.00342	0.01273	11 31714	14 92107
1999	87780	3105391	11 38259	9 93066	14 93380	0.00312	0.01485	11 38259	14 93380
2000	91919	3156049	11 42867	9 94061	14 94865	0.00332	0.01618	11 42867	14 94865
2001	94322	3209324	11 45447	9 95056	14 96483	0.00109	0.01674	11 45447	14 96483
2002	95716	3263900	11 46914	9 96051	14 98157	-0.00019	0.01686	11 46914	14 98157
2003	96872	3319140	11 47908	9 97046	14 99843	-0.00045	0.01658	11 47908	14 99843
2004	97358	3374627	11 48615	9 98041	15 01522	-0.00061	0.01637	11 48615	15 01522
2005	98101	3430331	11 49376	9 99036	15 03180	0.00008	0.01594	11 49376	15 03180
2006	98202	3485438	11 49478	10 00031	15 04817	-0.00176	0.01545	11 49478	15 04817
2007	98137	3539689	11 49412	10 01026	15 06410	-0.00266	0.01488	11 49412	15 06410
2008	97837	3592748	11 49106	10 02021	15 07955	-0.00409	0.01428	11 49106	15 07955
2009	97404	3644407	11 48662	10 03017	15 09443	-0.00551	0.01369	11 48662	15 09443
2010	96995	3694653	11 48241	10 04012	15 10870	-0.00659	0.01323	11 48241	15 10870
2011	96907	3743859	11 48151	10 05007	15 12240	-0.00682	0.01265	11 48151	15 12240
2012	96424	3791503	11 47651	10 06002	15 13563	-0.00698	0.01217	11 47651	15 13563
2013	96214	3837915	11 47433	10 06997	15 14827	-0.00686	0.01188	11 47433	15 14827
2014	96521	3883766	11 47752	10 07992	15 16044	-0.00666	0.01179	11 47752	15 16044
2015	97416	3929819	11 48675	10 08987	15 17232	-0.00707	0.01172	11 48675	15 17232
2016	98370	3976138	11 49649	10 09982	15 18410	-0.00677	0.01172	11 49649	15 18410


Legend

- Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
St: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Rt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25, 54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-9
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Quebec

Comparison of Results

Housing Prices According to Scenario



Housing Stock According to Scenario




Table D-10
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Quebec

Quebec
1998-2016

Weak/Medium Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

1. GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2. Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3. Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Years	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation			
	Pt	St	Ln Pt	Ln St	Pt	Ln Pt	Ln St	Var N(25,54)t	Ln St	Ln St-1	Var Ln St	Var Yt
1996	2992625								14 91166			
1997	74754	3020928	11 22196	14 91166	20146	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	14 91166	14 91166	0.00941	0.01
1998	82517	3059978	11 32075	14 92107	20347	14 92107	14 92107	0.00472	14 92107	14 92107	0.01284	0.01
1999	88315	3106355	11 38867	14 93392	20551	14 93392	14 93392	0.00445	14 93392	14 93392	0.01504	0.01
2000	92633	3157787	11 43640	14 94896	20756	14 94896	14 94896	0.00468	14 94896	14 94896	0.01642	0.01
2001	95389	3212204	11 46571	14 96538	20964	14 96538	14 96538	0.00334	14 96538	14 96538	0.01709	0.01
2002	97029	3268174	11 48276	14 98247	21174	14 98247	14 98247	0.00212	14 98247	14 98247	0.01727	0.01
2003	98152	3324979	11 49427	14 99974	21385	14 99974	14 99974	0.00190	14 99974	14 99974	0.01723	0.01
2004	98948	3382141	11 50235	15 01697	21599	15 01697	15 01697	0.00178	15 01697	15 01697	0.01705	0.01
2005	99758	3439582	11 51051	15 03402	21815	15 03402	15 03402	0.00249	15 03402	15 03402	0.01684	0.01
2006	100133	3496731	11 51425	15 05086	22033	15 05086	15 05086	0.00196	15 05086	15 05086	0.01648	0.01
2007	100251	3553229	11 51543	15 06734	22254	15 06734	15 06734	0.00073	15 06734	15 06734	0.01603	0.01
2008	100069	3608671	11 51362	15 08337	22476	15 08337	15 08337	-0.00061	15 08337	15 08337	0.01548	0.01
2009	99713	3662801	11 51005	15 09885	22701	15 09885	15 09885	-0.00194	15 09885	15 09885	0.01489	0.01
2010	99355	3715573	11 50645	15 11374	22928	15 11374	15 11374	-0.00293	15 11374	15 11374	0.01430	0.01
2011	99299	3767326	11 50589	15 12804	23157	15 12804	15 12804	-0.00290	15 12804	15 12804	0.01383	0.01
2012	98843	3817538	11 50128	15 14188	23389	15 14188	15 14188	-0.00513	15 14188	15 14188	0.01324	0.01
2013	98652	3866524	11 49935	15 15512	23623	15 15512	15 15512	-0.00549	15 15512	15 15512	0.01275	0.01
2014	98969	3914924	11 50256	15 16787	23859	15 16787	15 16787	-0.00471	15 16787	15 16787	0.01244	0.01
2015	98857	3963470	11 51149	15 18031	24098	15 18031	15 18031	-0.00315	15 18031	15 18031	0.01232	0.01
2016	100797	4012214	11 52086	15 19263	24339	15 19263	15 19263	-0.00284	15 19263	15 19263	0.01222	0.01

Table D-11
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Quebec

Quebec
1998-2016

Weak/Strong Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			Ver. in	Age in
	Y	Y	Y	Ln P _{t-1}	Ln P _{t-2}	Ln P _{t-3}	Ln S _{t-1}	Ln S _{t-2}	Ln S _{t-3}		
1996	74754	2992625		11 22196			14 91166	14 92107		0.00941	11 22196
1997	82563	3060035	20146	11 32132	11 22196	0.00492	14 92107	14 93394	0.01286	11 32132	14 92107
1998	88388	3106494	20551	11 38950	11 32132	0.00462	14 93394	14 94901	0.01507	11 38950	14 93394
1999	92710	3158009	20756	11 43723	11 38950	0.00478	14 94901	14 96545	0.01645	11 43723	14 94901
2000	95692	3212753	20964	11 46889	11 43723	0.00429	14 96545	14 98264	0.01719	11 46889	14 96545
2001	97489	3269218	21174	11 48750	11 46889	0.00308	14 98264	15 00006	0.01742	11 48750	14 98264
2002	98724	3326631	21385	11 50009	11 48750	0.00289	15 00006	15 01747	0.01741	11 50009	15 00006
2003	99596	3384483	21599	11 50888	11 50009	0.00279	15 01747	15 03471	0.01704	11 50888	15 01747
2004	100450	3442665	21815	11 51751	11 50888	0.00352	15 03471	15 05176	0.01674	11 51751	15 03471
2005	101031	3500774	22033	11 52318	11 51751	0.00320	15 05176	15 06849	0.01633	11 52318	15 05176
2006	101297	3558397	22254	11 52581	11 52318	0.00247	15 06849	15 08482	0.01580	11 52581	15 06849
2007	101932	3615084	22476	11 52505	11 52581	0.00119	15 08482	15 10063	0.01522	11 52505	15 08482
2008	102624	3670539	22701	11 52220	11 52505	-0.00009	15 10063	15 11585	0.01465	11 52220	15 10063
2009	103601	3724693	22928	11 51915	11 52220	-0.00102	15 11585	15 13050	0.01417	11 51915	15 11585
2010	104601	3777860	23157	11 51892	11 51915	-0.00096	15 13050	15 14467	0.01358	11 51892	15 13050
2011	105711	3829513	23389	11 51464	11 51892	-0.00309	15 14467	15 15825	0.01309	11 51464	15 14467
2012	106800	3879955	23623	11 51292	11 51464	-0.00341	15 15825	15 17133	0.01277	11 51292	15 15825
2013	107932	3929801	23859	11 51615	11 51292	-0.00264	15 17133	15 18410	0.01263	11 51615	15 17133
2014	109032	3979757	24098	11 52490	11 51615	-0.00111	15 18410	15 19673	0.01251	11 52490	15 18410
2015	102129	4029867	24339	11 53400	11 52490	-0.00081	15 19673	15 20924	0.01251	11 53400	15 19673
2016											

Legend

Pt: M.L.S. price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-12
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Quebec

Quebec
1996-2016

Medium Real Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

1- GDP growth per adult = 1.8780
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Year	Price Equation					Housing Stock Variation Equation					Variation					Variation				
	Ln P _t	Ln P _{t-1}	Ln P _{t-2}	Ln P _{t-3}	Ln P _{t-4}	Ln S _t	Ln S _{t-1}	Ln S _{t-2}	Ln S _{t-3}	Ln S _{t-4}	Ln V _t	Ln V _{t-1}	Ln V _{t-2}	Ln V _{t-3}	Ln V _{t-4}	Ln V _t	Ln V _{t-1}	Ln V _{t-2}	Ln V _{t-3}	Ln V _{t-4}
1996	2992825	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
1997	74754	3020928	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
1998	82726	3060666	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
1999	89222	3108906	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2000	94620	3163601	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2001	98481	3222637	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2002	101450	3284770	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2003	104054	3349409	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2004	106430	3416151	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2005	108905	3484968	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2006	110681	3555024	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2007	112265	3626035	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2008	113558	3697624	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2009	114669	3769540	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2010	115777	3841728	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2011	117242	3914534	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2012	118201	3987369	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2013	119467	4060538	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2014	121361	4134711	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2015	123998	4210679	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878
2016	126725	4286502	11 22196	11 22196	11 22196	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	14 91166	0.00160	0.00342	0.00312	0.00312	0.00312	0.00941	0.01308	0.01563	0.01787	0.01878

Table D-13
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Quebec

1993-2011

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.87870
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Forecasts	Price Equation																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Table D-14
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Quebec

Quebec
1998-2016

Medium/Strong Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.87870
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25.54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation				AR(1)
	Yt	Pt	St	N(25.54)t	Yt	Pt	St	N(25.54)t	Yt	Pt	St	N(25.54)t	
1996													
1997	74754	2992625	3020928		20146	11.22196	14.91166	0.00160	0.00941	11.22196	14.91166	0.018787	0.784649
1998	83072	3061101	3110009		20524	11.32747	14.92107	0.00492	0.01321	11.32747	14.92107	0.018787	0.784649
1999	89840	3110009	3165566		20910	11.40579	14.93429	0.00462	0.01585	11.40579	14.93429	0.018787	0.784649
2000	95434	3165566	3226079		21303	11.46619	14.95014	0.00478	0.01771	11.46619	14.95014	0.018787	0.784649
2001	99911	3226079	3290120		21703	11.51204	14.96784	0.00429	0.01894	11.51204	14.96784	0.018787	0.784649
2002	103329	3290120	3356969		22111	11.54568	14.98678	0.00308	0.01966	11.54568	14.98678	0.018787	0.784649
2003	106263	3356969	3426128		22526	11.57368	15.00643	0.00289	0.02011	11.57368	15.00643	0.018787	0.784649
2004	108876	3426128	3497498		22949	11.59797	15.02655	0.00279	0.02039	11.59797	15.02655	0.018787	0.784649
2005	111523	3497498	3570666		23381	11.62199	15.04694	0.00352	0.02062	11.62199	15.04694	0.018787	0.784649
2006	113870	3570666	3645200		23820	11.64281	15.06756	0.00320	0.02070	11.64281	15.06756	0.018787	0.784649
2007	115879	3645200	3720612		24267	11.66030	15.08826	0.00247	0.02066	11.66030	15.08826	0.018787	0.784649
2008	117485	3720612	3796569		24723	11.67406	15.10992	0.00119	0.02048	11.67406	15.10992	0.018787	0.784649
2009	118823	3796569	3872984		25188	11.68539	15.12940	-0.00009	0.02021	11.68539	15.12940	0.018787	0.784649
2010	120109	3872984	3950084		25661	11.69616	15.14961	-0.00102	0.01992	11.69616	15.14961	0.018787	0.784649
2011	121711	3950084	4027343		26143	11.70940	15.16953	-0.00096	0.01972	11.70940	15.16953	0.018787	0.784649
2012	122795	4027343	4105016		26634	11.71827	15.18925	-0.00309	0.01937	11.71827	15.18925	0.018787	0.784649
2013	124168	4105016	4183720		27135	11.72939	15.20862	-0.00341	0.01910	11.72939	15.20862	0.018787	0.784649
2014	126141	4183720	4264186		27644	11.74516	15.22772	-0.00264	0.01899	11.74516	15.22772	0.018787	0.784649
2015	128820	4264186	4346451		28164	11.76617	15.24671	-0.00111	0.01905	11.76617	15.24671	0.018787	0.784649
2016	131568	4346451			28693	11.78728	15.26576	-0.00081	0.01911	11.78728	15.26576	0.018787	0.784649

Table D-15
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Ontario

Programming: Mario Fortin and André Leclerc

Ontario
1998-2016

Week/Week Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1 00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Year	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation				Year			
	Pt	Ln Pt-1	Ln Pt	Pt	Ln Pt-1	Ln Pt	Yt	Ln Yt	Var Hous. 5Yr	Ln St-1	Ln St	Ln St-1	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln St-1	Ln St
1996																
1997	120766		11 70161		11 70161		24708	10 12483	0 01554	15 23725	15 23725	0 01308	11 70161	15 23725	15 23725	0 01
1998	131682		11 78814		11 78814		24955	10 13478	0 01470	15 25033	15 25033	0 01570	11 78814	15 25033	15 25033	0 01
1999	140677		11 85422		11 85422		25205	10 14473	0 01376	15 26603	15 26603	0 01748	11 85422	15 26603	15 26603	0 01
2000	148313		11 90708		11 90708		25457	10 15468	0 01409	15 28351	15 28351	0 01869	11 90708	15 28351	15 28351	0 01
2001	153863		11 94395		11 94395		25711	10 16463	0 01063	15 30220	15 30220	0 01920	11 94395	15 30220	15 30220	0 01
2002	157481		11 96706		11 96706		25968	10 17458	0 00573	15 32141	15 32141	0 01913	11 96706	15 32141	15 32141	0 01
2003	161022		11 98930		11 98930		26228	10 18453	0 00630	15 34054	15 34054	0 01904	11 98930	15 34054	15 34054	0 01
2004	164568		12 01108		12 01108		26490	10 19449	0 00693	15 35958	15 35958	0 01880	12 01108	15 35958	15 35958	0 01
2005	168107		12 03236		12 03236		26755	10 20444	0 00742	15 37850	15 37850	0 01880	12 03236	15 37850	15 37850	0 01
2006	171119		12 05011		12 05011		27023	10 21439	0 00589	15 39730	15 39730	0 01854	12 05011	15 39730	15 39730	0 01
2007	174178		12 06783		12 06783		27293	10 22434	0 00579	15 41584	15 41584	0 01829	12 06783	15 41584	15 41584	0 01
2008	177239		12 08526		12 08526		27566	10 23429	0 00544	15 43414	15 43414	0 01804	12 08526	15 43414	15 43414	0 01
2009	180217		12 10192		12 10192		27842	10 24424	0 00467	15 45218	15 45218	0 01778	12 10192	15 45218	15 45218	0 01
2010	183282		12 11878		12 11878		28120	10 25419	0 00428	15 46995	15 46995	0 01753	12 11878	15 46995	15 46995	0 01
2011	186545		12 13643		12 13643		28401	10 26414	0 00421	15 48749	15 48749	0 01733	12 13643	15 48749	15 48749	0 01
2012	189541		12 15236		12 15236		28685	10 27409	0 00266	15 50462	15 50462	0 01707	12 15236	15 50462	15 50462	0 01
2013	192551		12 16812		12 16812		28972	10 28404	0 00167	15 52189	15 52189	0 01682	12 16812	15 52189	15 52189	0 01
2014	195802		12 18486		12 18486		29262	10 29399	0 00129	15 53871	15 53871	0 01662	12 18486	15 53871	15 53871	0 01
2015	199467		12 20340		12 20340		29554	10 30394	0 00154	15 55534	15 55534	0 01651	12 20340	15 55534	15 55534	0 01
2016	203088		12 22140		12 22140		29850	10 31394	0 00062	15 57184	15 57184	0 01638	12 22140	15 57184	15 57184	0 01


Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25.54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-16
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Ontario

Comparison of Results

Housing Prices According to Scenario



Housing Stock According to Scenario




Table D-18
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Ontario

Ontario
1998-2018

Weak/Strong Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Years	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation							
	Pt	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Pt	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Pt	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Ln Pt-2	Ln Pt-3	Ln Pt-4	Ln Pt-5	Ln Pt-6	Ln Pt-7	Ln Pt-8
1996																
1997	120766	4144328	4144328	120766	11.70161	11.70161	24708	0.01554	15.23725	15.23725	0.01308	11.70161	15.23725	0.01		
1998	132281	4198891	4198891	132281	11.79269	11.79269	24955	0.01754	15.25033	15.25033	0.01588	11.79269	15.25033	0.01		
1999	141723	4266118	4266118	141723	11.86163	11.86163	25205	0.01645	15.26621	15.26621	0.01778	11.86163	15.26621	0.01		
2000	149664	4326035	4326035	149664	11.91615	11.91615	25457	0.01667	15.28399	15.28399	0.01904	11.91615	15.28399	0.01		
2001	156209	4384952	4384952	156209	11.95895	11.95895	25711	0.01628	15.30303	15.30303	0.01977	11.95895	15.30303	0.01		
2002	160508	4404954	4404954	160508	11.98810	11.98810	25968	0.01149	15.32280	15.32280	0.01984	11.98810	15.32280	0.01		
2003	164523	4497069	4497069	164523	12.01080	12.01080	26228	0.01206	15.34264	15.34264	0.01981	12.01080	15.34264	0.01		
2004	168361	4790557	4790557	168361	12.03386	12.03386	26490	0.01265	15.36245	15.36245	0.01971	12.03386	15.36245	0.01		
2005	172050	4885179	4885179	172050	12.05554	12.05554	26755	0.01308	15.38216	15.38216	0.01956	12.05554	15.38216	0.01		
2006	175775	4980914	4980914	175775	12.07696	12.07696	27023	0.01389	15.40172	15.40172	0.01941	12.07696	15.40172	0.01		
2007	179264	5077431	5077431	179264	12.09662	12.09662	27293	0.01368	15.42112	15.42112	0.01919	12.09662	15.42112	0.01		
2008	182564	5174461	5174461	182564	12.11486	12.11486	27566	0.01328	15.44032	15.44032	0.01893	12.11486	15.44032	0.01		
2009	185646	5271711	5271711	185646	12.13160	12.13160	27842	0.01248	15.45925	15.45925	0.01862	12.13160	15.45925	0.01		
2010	188709	5369131	5369131	188709	12.14796	12.14796	28120	0.01201	15.47787	15.47787	0.01831	12.14796	15.47787	0.01		
2011	191904	5466845	5466845	191904	12.16475	12.16475	28401	0.01187	15.49618	15.49618	0.01804	12.16475	15.49618	0.01		
2012	194808	5564483	5564483	194808	12.17977	12.17977	28685	0.01035	15.51421	15.51421	0.01770	12.17977	15.51421	0.01		
2013	197710	5662023	5662023	197710	12.19456	12.19456	28972	0.00936	15.53191	15.53191	0.01738	12.19456	15.53191	0.01		
2014	200637	5759710	5759710	200637	12.21025	12.21025	29262	0.00892	15.54929	15.54929	0.01711	12.21025	15.54929	0.01		
2015	204337	5857959	5857959	204337	12.22753	12.22753	29554	0.00900	15.56640	15.56640	0.01691	12.22753	15.56640	0.01		
2016	207813	5956700	5956700	207813	12.24439	12.24439	29850	0.00906	15.58331	15.58331	0.01672	12.24439	15.58331	0.01		

Legend

- Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Ln Pt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population of 15 years of age and over
N(25.54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-19
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Ontario

Ontario
1988-2016

Medium-Term Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

1. GDP growth per adult = 1.60790
2. Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3. Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Year	Forecasts	Price Equation			Yt	Ln Yt	Var (N25, 54)	Ln St-1	Ln St-2	Ln St-3	Housing Stock Velocity Equation			Var Yt	Ln St-4	Var Yt
1996	4144328	11	70161	11	70161	25708	0.01554	15.23725	15.23725	15.23725	0.01308	11.70161	15.23725	0.016079	15.23725	0.016079
1997	4198891	11	79711	11	79711	25105	0.01540	15.25033	15.25033	15.25033	0.01824	11.79711	15.25033	0.016079	15.25033	0.016079
1998	4267654	11	87818	11	87818	25509	0.01376	15.26657	15.26657	15.26657	0.02063	11.87818	15.26657	0.016079	15.26657	0.016079
1999	4348148	11	94990	11	94990	25919	0.01306	15.28526	15.28526	15.28526	0.02381	11.94990	15.28526	0.016079	15.28526	0.016079
2000	4438786	11	97918	11	97918	26336	0.01063	15.30589	15.30589	15.30589	0.02623	12.07999	15.30589	0.016079	15.30589	0.016079
2001	1640601	12	95357	12	95357	26759	0.00573	15.32781	15.32781	15.32781	0.02863	12.05357	15.32781	0.016079	15.32781	0.016079
2002	4637164	12	94990	12	94990	27190	0.00630	15.35045	15.35045	15.35045	0.03239	12.09876	15.35045	0.016079	15.35045	0.016079
2003	4647027	12	90799	12	90799	27627	0.00693	15.37374	15.37374	15.37374	0.02940	12.14344	15.37374	0.016079	15.37374	0.016079
2004	4750402	12	95357	12	95357	28071	0.00742	15.39764	15.39764	15.39764	0.02443	12.18723	15.39764	0.016079	15.39764	0.016079
2005	4865295	12	14344	12	14344	28522	0.00589	15.42007	15.42007	15.42007	0.02506	12.26573	15.42007	0.016079	15.42007	0.016079
2006	4985640	12	18723	12	18723	28981	0.00544	15.44685	15.44685	15.44685	0.02477	12.30351	15.44685	0.016079	15.44685	0.016079
2007	5110692	12	22687	12	22687	29447	0.00544	15.47191	15.47191	15.47191	0.02544	12.35373	15.47191	0.016079	15.47191	0.016079
2008	5240395	12	26573	12	26573	29920	0.00467	15.49720	15.49720	15.49720	0.02544	12.39351	15.49720	0.016079	15.49720	0.016079
2009	5374621	12	30351	12	30351	30401	0.00428	15.52264	15.52264	15.52264	0.02568	12.44107	15.52264	0.016079	15.52264	0.016079
2010	5555895	12	33973	12	33973	30890	0.00421	15.54821	15.54821	15.54821	0.02568	12.48437	15.54821	0.016079	15.54821	0.016079
2011	5803039	12	37537	12	37537	31382	0.00389	15.57389	15.57389	15.57389	0.02568	12.53089	15.57389	0.016079	15.57389	0.016079
2012	5954092	12	41107	12	41107	31892	0.00371	15.59959	15.59959	15.59959	0.02568	12.57689	15.59959	0.016079	15.59959	0.016079
2013	6108957	12	44637	12	44637	32404	0.00360	15.62527	15.62527	15.62527	0.02568	12.62527	15.62527	0.016079	15.62527	0.016079
2014	6262088	12	47689	12	47689	32925	0.00319	15.65094	15.65094	15.65094	0.02573	12.67689	15.65094	0.016079	15.65094	0.016079
2015	6431211	12	50985	12	50985	33455	0.00222	15.67689	15.67689	15.67689	0.02573	12.72689	15.67689	0.016079	15.67689	0.016079
2016	6598902	12	54412	12	54412	33925	0.00154	15.70241	15.70241	15.70241	0.02573	12.77412	15.70241	0.016079	15.70241	0.016079
2017	6799931	12	57741	12	57741	34455	0.00062	15.72689	15.72689	15.72689	0.02573	12.82689	15.72689	0.016079	15.72689	0.016079

Table D-20
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Ontario

Ontario
1988-2016

Medium/Medium Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.60790
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Year	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation			
	Yr	Ln Yr	Ln Pt	Ln St	Yr	Ln Yr	Ln Pt	Ln St	Yr	Ln Yr	Ln Pt	Ln St
1996	4144328				24708				15 23725			
1997	120766	11 70161	11 70161	11 70161	25105	10 1308335	0.01554	15 23725	0.01554	15 23725	11 70161	15 23725
1998	133343	11 80068	11 80068	11 80068	25509	10 1467846	0.01693	15 25033	0.01693	15 25033	11 80068	15 25033
1999	144951	11 88415	11 88415	11 88415	25919	10 1627357	0.01598	15 26672	0.01598	15 26672	11 88415	15 26672
2000	155966	11 95739	11 95739	11 95739	26336	10 1786868	0.01628	15 28564	0.01628	15 28564	11 95739	15 28564
2001	165853	12 01886	12 01886	12 01886	26759	10 1946379	0.01434	15 30656	0.01434	15 30656	12 01886	15 30656
2002	173974	12 06866	12 06866	12 06866	27190	10 2105889	0.00949	15 32889	0.00949	15 32889	12 06866	15 32889
2003	182251	12 11314	12 11314	12 11314	27627	10 2265401	0.01004	15 35201	0.01004	15 35201	12 11314	15 35201
2004	190695	12 15843	12 15843	12 15843	28071	10 2424912	0.01065	15 37581	0.01065	15 37581	12 15843	15 37581
2005	207753	12 20232	12 20232	12 20232	28522	10 2584423	0.01109	15 40021	0.01109	15 40021	12 20232	15 40021
2006	216243	12 24411	12 24411	12 24411	28981	10 2743934	0.01101	15 42513	0.01101	15 42513	12 24411	15 42513
2007	224682	12 28416	12 28416	12 28416	29447	10 2903445	0.01088	15 45044	0.01088	15 45044	12 28416	15 45044
2008	232978	12 32244	12 32244	12 32244	29920	10 3062956	0.01052	15 47607	0.01052	15 47607	12 32244	15 47607
2009	241362	12 35870	12 35870	12 35870	30401	10 3222467	0.00973	15 50192	0.00973	15 50192	12 35870	15 50192
2010	250001	12 39405	12 39405	12 39405	30890	10 3381978	0.00930	15 52789	0.00930	15 52789	12 39405	15 52789
2011	258322	12 42922	12 42922	12 42922	31387	10 3541489	0.00918	15 55395	0.00918	15 55395	12 42922	15 55395
2012	266703	12 46196	12 46196	12 46196	31892	10 3701000	0.00765	15 58007	0.00765	15 58007	12 46196	15 58007
2013	275460	12 49389	12 49389	12 49389	32404	10 3860511	0.00667	15 60616	0.00667	15 60616	12 49389	15 60616
2014	284850	12 52620	12 52620	12 52620	32925	10 4020022	0.00625	15 63219	0.00625	15 63219	12 52620	15 63219
2015	294294	12 55972	12 55972	12 55972	33455	10 4179533	0.00642	15 65817	0.00642	15 65817	12 55972	15 65817
2016							0.00549	15 68416	0.00549	15 68416	12 59233	15 68416

Legend

- PL: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25.54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-21
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Ontario

1995-2016

Legend
Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and older
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.60790
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Forecasts	Price Equation																				
1996	4144328	4198891	4268448	4350233	4442453	4543504	4650797	4764069	4883111	5007687	5137746	5272885	5412742	5556920	5705262	5857806	6014062	6173917	6337559	6505383	6677270
1997	120766	133473	145158	156212	166540	175012	183555	192188	200870	209760	218496	227092	235486	243909	252556	260871	269233	277960	287289	296679	306129
1998	11.70161	11.80165	11.88558	11.95897	12.02299	12.07261	12.12027	12.16623	12.21041	12.25372	12.29452	12.33311	12.36941	12.40455	12.43939	12.47178	12.50333	12.53523	12.56824	12.60041	12.63255
1999	0.01554	0.01754	0.01645	0.01667	0.01628	0.01149	0.01206	0.01265	0.01308	0.01389	0.01368	0.01328	0.01248	0.01201	0.01187	0.01035	0.00936	0.00892	0.00900	0.00806	0.01554
2000	15.23725	15.23725	15.25033	15.26676	15.28574	15.30672	15.32921	15.35255	15.37661	15.40129	15.42648	15.45213	15.47809	15.50427	15.53055	15.55690	15.58329	15.60961	15.63584	15.66200	15.68814
2001	0.01308	0.01643	0.01898	0.02098	0.02249	0.02334	0.02406	0.02468	0.02519	0.02584	0.02596	0.02618	0.02629	0.02634	0.02639	0.02633	0.02623	0.02616	0.02614	0.02608	0.01308
2002	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2003	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2004	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2005	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2006	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2007	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2008	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2009	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2010	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2011	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2012	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2013	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2014	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2015	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079
2016	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079	0.016079

Table D-22
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Manitoba

Programming: Mario Fortin and Andre Leclerc

Manitoba
1998-2016

Weak/Week Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation					AR(1)			
	Pt	St	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Rt	Yt	Ln Yt	Var H25, 54%	Ln St-1	Ln St	Var Ln St		Ln Pt	Ln St-1	Var Yt
1996		439148													
1997	62744	442175		11 04682		21523	12 99259	0 00815	12 99259	12 99259	0 00687	11 04682	12 99259	0 01	0 693326
1998	70312	446519		11 16070		21738	12 99946	0 00569	12 99946	13 00924	0 00978	11 16070	12 99946	0 01	0 693326
1999	78276	452151		11 26800		21956	13 00924	0 00537	13 00924	13 02177	0 01254	11 26800	13 00924	0 01	0 693326
2000	86617	459033		11 36925		22175	13 02177	0 00568	13 02177	13 03688	0 01511	11 36925	13 02177	0 01	0 693326
2001	94378	466961		11 45506		22397	13 03688	0 00323	13 03688	13 05400	0 01712	11 45506	13 03688	0 01	0 693326
2002	100370	475572		11 51662		22621	13 05400	-0 00208	13 05400	13 07227	0 01827	11 51662	13 05400	0 01	0 693326
2003	105969	484775		11 57091		22847	13 07227	-0 00177	13 07227	13 09144	0 01917	11 57091	13 07227	0 01	0 693326
2004	111159	494483		11 61871		23076	13 09144	-0 00114	13 09144	13 11127	0 01983	11 61871	13 09144	0 01	0 693326
2005	115468	504544		11 65675		23306	13 11127	-0 00161	13 11127	13 13141	0 02014	11 65675	13 11127	0 01	0 693326
2006	118910	514817		11 68612		23539	13 13141	-0 00180	13 13141	13 15157	0 02016	11 68612	13 13141	0 01	0 693326
2007	121325	525144		11 70623		23775	13 15157	-0 00234	13 15157	13 17143	0 01986	11 70623	13 15157	0 01	0 693326
2008	122818	535384		11 71846		24013	13 17143	-0 00263	13 17143	13 19074	0 01931	11 71846	13 17143	0 01	0 693326
2009	123144	545362		11 72111		24253	13 19074	-0 00375	13 19074	13 20920	0 01846	11 72111	13 19074	0 01	0 693326
2010	122697	554957		11 71747		24495	13 20920	-0 00408	13 20920	13 22665	0 01744	11 71747	13 20920	0 01	0 693326
2011	121753	564093		11 70975		24740	13 22665	-0 00399	13 22665	13 24297	0 01633	11 70975	13 22665	0 01	0 693326
2012	120004	572639		11 69528		24988	13 24297	-0 00510	13 24297	13 25801	0 01504	11 69528	13 24297	0 01	0 693326
2013	117628	580490		11 67528		25237	13 25801	-0 00618	13 25801	13 27163	0 01362	11 67528	13 25801	0 01	0 693326
2014	115217	587638		11 65458		25490	13 27163	-0 00600	13 27163	13 28387	0 01224	11 65458	13 27163	0 01	0 693326
2015	112764	594080		11 63305		25745	13 28387	-0 00617	13 28387	13 29477	0 01090	11 63305	13 28387	0 01	0 693326
2016	110345	599824		11 61136		26002	13 29477	-0 00640	13 29477	13 30439	0 00962	11 61136	13 29477	0 01	0 693326


Legend

- Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25-54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-23
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Manitoba

Comparison of Results

Housing Prices According to Scenario



Housing Stock According to Scenario




Table D-24
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Manitoba

Manitoba
1998-2016

Weak/Medium Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			Var Yt	AR(1)
	Pt	St	Yt	Ln Pt-1	Ln Pt	Rt	Ln St-1	Ln St	Ln Pt		
1996		439148						12 99259			
1997	62744	442175	21523	11 04682	11 04682	0.07500	0.00687	12 99259	11 04682	12 99259	0.01
1998	70533	446568	21738	11 16384	11 16384	0.07500	0.00988	12 99946	11 16384	12 99946	0.01 0.69333
1999	78756	452294	21956	11 27411	11 27411	0.07500	0.01274	13 00935	11 27411	13 00935	0.01 0.69333
2000	87391	459314	22175	11 37814	11 37814	0.07500	0.01540	13 02209	11 37814	13 02209	0.01 0.69333
2001	95860	467451	22397	11 46855	11 46855	0.07500	0.01756	13 03749	11 46855	13 03749	0.01 0.69333
2002	102171	476342	22621	11 53440	11 53440	0.07500	0.01884	13 05505	11 53440	13 05505	0.01 0.69333
2003	108288	485888	22847	11 59255	11 59255	0.07500	0.01984	13 07389	11 59255	13 07389	0.01 0.69333
2004	113973	495995	23076	11 64372	11 64372	0.07500	0.02059	13 09373	11 64372	13 09373	0.01 0.69333
2005	118732	506503	23306	11 68462	11 68462	0.07500	0.02096	13 11432	11 68462	13 11432	0.01 0.69333
2006	122806	517299	23539	11 71836	11 71836	0.07500	0.02109	13 13528	11 71836	13 13528	0.01 0.69333
2007	125769	528214	23775	11 74220	11 74220	0.07500	0.02088	13 15638	11 74220	13 15638	0.01 0.69333
2008	127713	539096	24013	11 75754	11 75754	0.07500	0.02039	13 17726	11 75754	13 17726	0.01 0.69333
2009	128371	549754	24253	11 76268	11 76268	0.07500	0.01958	13 19765	11 76268	13 19765	0.01 0.69333
2010	128139	560055	24495	11 76087	11 76087	0.07500	0.01857	13 21723	11 76087	13 21723	0.01 0.69333
2011	127300	569907	24740	11 75430	11 75430	0.07500	0.01744	13 23579	11 75430	13 23579	0.01 0.69333
2012	125548	579166	24988	11 74044	11 74044	0.07500	0.01611	13 25323	11 74044	13 25323	0.01 0.69333
2013	123076	587710	25237	11 72056	11 72056	0.07500	0.01465	13 26934	11 72056	13 26934	0.01 0.69333
2014	120499	595522	25490	11 69940	11 69940	0.07500	0.01320	13 28399	11 69940	13 28399	0.01 0.69333
2015	117825	602584	25745	11 67696	11 67696	0.07500	0.01179	13 29719	11 67696	13 29719	0.01 0.69333
2016	115139	608695	26002	11 65390	11 65390	0.07500	0.01042	13 30898	11 65390	13 30898	0.01 0.69333

Table D-25
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Manitoba

1998-2016		Legend	
		PT: MLS price divided by the consumer price index	
		RT: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages	
		Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over	
		N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54	
		St: housing stock	
1. GDP growth per adult =	1.00000		
2. Five-year mortgage loan interest rate =	7.50		
3. Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)			
Forecasts	Price Equation		
1996	439148	12.99259	
1997	62744	12.99946	
1998	70122	13.00914	0.00687
1999	77821	13.02148	0.00968
2000	85808	13.03627	0.01234
2001	93601	13.05314	0.01479
2002	99691	13.07122	0.01686
2003	105436	13.09026	0.01808
2004	110838	13.11004	0.01904
2005	115469	13.13024	0.01978
2006	119685	13.15068	0.02044
2007	122929	13.17104	0.02036
2008	125244	13.19105	0.02041
2009	128354	13.21040	0.02046
2010	126641	13.22888	0.02046
2011	126368	13.24640	0.02046
2012	125199	13.26274	0.02046
2013	123310	13.27777	0.02046
2014	121225	13.29148	0.02046
2015	118965	13.30388	0.02046
2016	116642	13.31499	0.02046

Table D-26
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Manitoba

Manitoba
1998-2016

Medium/Weak Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.96020
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			Housing Stock			Value		
	Y	P	St	Ln P _t	Ln P _{t-1}	P _t	Y _t	Ln Y _t	Ln Y _{t-1}	Ln St _t	Ln St _{t-1}	Ln St _t	Ln St _{t-1}	Ln St _t	Ln St _{t-1}
1996															
1997	62744	439148		11.04682		0.07500	21523	9.98628976		12.99259		12.99259		0.00687	11.04682
1998	70717	442175		11.16645	11.04682	0.07500	21945	9.98628976	0.00815	12.99946	12.99946	12.99946	12.99946	0.01007	11.16645
1999	79600	452609		11.28477	11.16645	0.07500	22375	10.0157021	0.00537	13.00953	13.00953	13.00953	13.00953	0.01326	11.28477
2000	89483	460086		11.40180	11.28477	0.07500	22814	10.0351145	0.00568	13.02278	13.02278	13.02278	13.02278	0.01638	11.40180
2001	99466	468941		11.50758	11.40180	0.07500	23261	10.0545268	0.00323	13.03917	13.03917	13.03917	13.03917	0.01906	11.50758
2002	108299	478374		11.59265	11.50758	0.07500	23717	10.0739392	-0.00208	13.05823	13.05823	13.05823	13.05823	0.02286	11.59265
2003	117404	489848		11.67338	11.59265	0.07500	24182	10.0933515	-0.00177	13.07919	13.07919	13.07919	13.07919	0.02541	11.67338
2004	126744	501828		11.74993	11.67338	0.07500	24656	10.1127639	-0.00114	13.10185	13.10185	13.10185	13.10185	0.02872	11.74993
2005	135723	514702		11.81837	11.74993	0.07500	25139	10.1321763	-0.00161	13.12601	13.12601	13.12601	13.12601	0.03253	11.81837
2006	144236	528363		11.89321	11.81837	0.07500	25632	10.1515886	-0.00180	13.15134	13.15134	13.15134	13.15134	0.03620	11.89321
2007	151945	542673		11.93128	11.89321	0.07500	26134	10.1710001	-0.00234	13.17754	13.17754	13.17754	13.17754	0.04026	11.93128
2008	158806	557501		11.97544	11.93128	0.07500	26647	10.1904133	-0.00263	13.20426	13.20426	13.20426	13.20426	0.04496	11.97544
2009	164310	572665		12.00951	11.97544	0.07500	27169	10.2098257	-0.00375	13.23122	13.23122	13.23122	13.23122	0.04986	12.00951
2010	168784	588028		12.03637	12.00951	0.07500	27701	10.229238	-0.00408	13.25806	13.25806	13.25806	13.25806	0.05453	12.03637
2011	172452	603483		12.05788	12.03637	0.07500	28244	10.2486504	-0.00399	13.28453	13.28453	13.28453	13.28453	0.05915	12.05788
2012	174742	618854		12.07107	12.05788	0.07500	28798	10.2680627	-0.00510	13.31047	13.31047	13.31047	13.31047	0.06414	12.07107
2013	175771	633878		12.07694	12.07107	0.07500	29363	10.2874751	-0.00618	13.33563	13.33563	13.33563	13.33563	0.06902	12.07694
2014	176337	648790		12.08015	12.07694	0.07500	29938	10.3068874	-0.00600	13.35977	13.35977	13.35977	13.35977	0.07377	12.08015
2015	176398	663219		12.08050	12.08015	0.07500	30525	10.3262998	-0.00617	13.38286	13.38286	13.38286	13.38286	0.07859	12.08050
2016	176061	677206		12.07859	12.08050	0.07500	31123	10.3457122	-0.00640	13.40456	13.40456	13.40456	13.40456	0.08287	12.07859

Table D-27
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Manitoba

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Table D-28
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Manitoba

Manitoba
1996-2016

Medium-Strong Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.96020
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 of Statistics Canada (strong growth)


Legend
Pt: M.L.S. price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation			
	Pt	St	Rt	Yt	Gr Yt	Gr N(25,54)	Ln St-1	Ln St	Ver Ln St	Ln Pt	Ln St-1	Ver Yt
1996	439148			21523			12.99259	12.99259	0.00815	11.04682	12.99259	0.019602
1997	62744	442175	0.07500	21945	9.99629	0.00477	12.99946	12.99946	0.00477	11.16374	12.99946	0.019602
1998	70527	446606	0.07500	22375	10.0157	0.00432	13.00943	13.00943	0.00432	11.27894	13.00943	0.019602
1999	79137	452477	0.07500	22814	10.03511	0.00332	13.02249	13.02249	0.00332	11.39242	13.02249	0.019602
2000	88648	459808	0.07500	23261	10.05453	-0.00189	13.03856	13.03856	-0.00189	11.49930	13.03856	0.019602
2001	98647	468537	0.07500	23717	10.07394	-0.00152	13.05737	13.05737	-0.00152	11.58586	13.05737	0.019602
2002	107566	478368	0.07500	24182	10.09335	-0.00074	13.07814	13.07814	-0.00074	11.66833	13.07814	0.019602
2003	116813	489270	0.07500	24656	10.11276	-0.00092	13.10067	13.10067	-0.00092	11.74704	13.10067	0.019602
2004	126379	501213	0.07500	25139	10.13218	-0.00017	13.12479	13.12479	-0.00017	11.81837	13.12479	0.019602
2005	135723	514101	0.07500	25632	10.15159	0.00015	13.15018	13.15018	0.00015	11.88571	13.15018	0.019602
2006	145176	527895	0.07500	26134	10.171	-0.00029	13.17665	13.17665	-0.00029	11.94441	13.17665	0.019602
2007	153954	542463	0.07500	26647	10.19041	-0.00124	13.20388	13.20388	-0.00124	12.00722	13.20388	0.019602
2008	161943	557676	0.07500	27169	10.20983	-0.00138	13.23153	13.23153	-0.00138	12.02766	13.23153	0.019602
2009	168593	573348	0.07500	27701	10.22924	-0.00108	13.25925	13.25925	-0.00108	12.03524	13.25925	0.019602
2010	174209	589344	0.07500	28244	10.24885	-0.00079	13.28677	13.28677	-0.00079	12.06801	13.28677	0.019602
2011	178990	605551	0.07500	28798	10.26806	-0.00284	13.31389	13.31389	-0.00284	12.11345	13.31389	0.019602
2012	182308	621789	0.07500	29363	10.28748	-0.00268	13.34036	13.34036	-0.00268	12.12412	13.34036	0.019602
2013	184263	637885	0.07500	29938	10.30689	-0.00280	13.36591	13.36591	-0.00280	12.13098	13.36591	0.019602
2014	185532	653750	0.07500	30525	10.3263	-0.00292	13.39048	13.39048	-0.00292	12.13403	13.39048	0.019602
2015	186098	669289	0.07500	31123	10.34571		13.41397	13.41397		12.13409	13.41397	0.019602
2016	186109	684425	0.07500									0.019602

Table D-30
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Saskatchewan

Comparison of Results

Housing Prices According to Scenario



Housing Stock According to Scenario




Table D-31
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Saskatchewan

Saskatchewan
1998-2016

Medium Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Year	Forecasts			Price Equations			Housing Stock Variation Equation									
	Pt	Yt	St	Ln Pt-1	Ln Yt	Ln St-1	Ln Pt	Ln Yt	Ln St-1	Ln Pt	Ln Yt	Ln St-1	Ln Pt	Ln Yt	Ln St-1	Ln Pt
1996																
1997	396044															
1998	61696	398421		11 02997	11 11376	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997	11 02997
1999	67088	402853		11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376	11 11376
2000	71209	408355		11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338	11 17338
2001	74095	414506		11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310	11 21310
2002	75480	420909		11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162	11 23162
2003	74742	427033		11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180	11 22180
2004	73943	432855		11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105	11 21105
2005	73125	436364		11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992	11 19992
2006	72164	443517		11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669	11 18669
2007	71185	448305		11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303	11 17303
2008	70077	452686		11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735	11 15735
2009	68773	456599		11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857	11 13857
2010	67260	459974		11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632	11 11632
2011	65773	462815		11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397	11 09397
2012	64780	465275		11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875	11 07875
2013	63736	467338		11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250	11 06250
2014	62904	469076		11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937	11 04937
2015	62475	470626		11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252	11 04252
2016	62463	472131		11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234	11 04234
	62383	473569		11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104	11 04104

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Yt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
St: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-32
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Saskatchewan

Saskatchewan
1998-2016

Weak/Strong Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Year	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation			
	Y	R	Ln Pt	Ln St	Y	Ln Y	Var Yp25, 5y	Ln St-1	Ln St	Var Ln St	Ln Pt	Ln St-1
1996												
1997	61696	396044	11.02997	12.88928	25413	10.15297	0.00770	12.88928	12.88928	0.00598	11.02997	12.88928
1998	65546	402438	11.09051	12.89526	25667	10.16292	-0.00118	12.89526	12.89526	0.01003	11.09051	12.89526
1999	68354	407208	11.13246	12.90530	25924	10.17287	-0.00125	12.90530	12.90530	0.01178	11.13246	12.90530
2000	70192	412386	11.15900	12.91708	26183	10.17287	-0.00145	12.91708	12.91708	0.01263	11.15900	12.91708
2001	71043	417697	11.17104	12.92971	26445	10.18282	-0.00226	12.92971	12.92971	0.01280	11.17104	12.92971
2002	70149	422880	11.15838	12.94251	26709	10.19277	-0.00627	12.94251	12.94251	0.01186	11.15838	12.94251
2003	69410	427372	11.14779	12.95437	26976	10.20272	-0.00579	12.95437	12.95437	0.01104	11.14779	12.95437
2004	68803	431808	11.13900	12.96541	27246	10.21267	-0.00536	12.96541	12.96541	0.01032	11.13900	12.96541
2005	68143	435970	11.12937	12.97574	27519	10.22262	-0.00554	12.97574	12.97574	0.00959	11.12937	12.97574
2006	67634	439901	11.12187	12.98533	27794	10.23257	-0.00520	12.98533	12.98533	0.00898	11.12187	12.98533
2007	67020	443570	11.11274	12.99430	28072	10.24252	-0.00569	12.99430	12.99430	0.00831	11.11274	12.99430
2008	66181	446911	11.10014	13.00261	28352	10.25247	-0.00680	13.00261	13.00261	0.00750	11.10014	13.00261
2009	65091	449846	11.08355	13.01011	28636	10.26242	-0.00837	13.01011	13.01011	0.00655	11.08355	13.01011
2010	63991	452371	11.06650	13.01666	28922	10.27237	-0.00951	13.01666	13.01666	0.00580	11.06650	13.01666
2011	63368	454638	11.05671	13.02226	29212	10.28232	-0.00905	13.02226	13.02226	0.00500	11.05671	13.02226
2012	62676	456627	11.04573	13.02726	29504	10.29227	-0.01019	13.02726	13.02726	0.00436	11.04573	13.02726
2013	62183	458405	11.03784	13.03162	29799	10.30222	-0.01051	13.03162	13.03162	0.00389	11.03784	13.03162
2014	62055	460094	11.03578	13.03551	30097	10.31217	-0.01008	13.03551	13.03551	0.00368	11.03578	13.03551
2015	62291	461818	11.03957	13.03919	30398	10.32212	-0.00933	13.03919	13.03919	0.00374	11.03957	13.03919
2016	62452	463549	11.04215	13.04293	30702	10.33207	-0.00983	13.04293	13.04293	0.00374	11.04215	13.04293

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

1990-2016

	Price Equation	Forecast
1996	396044	
1997	398421	61866
1998	402851	67393
1999	408530	72283
2000	415122	76313
2001	422527	78946
2002	429439	79529
2003	436666	80109
2004	443934	80674
2005	451196	81049
2006	458394	81196
2007	465473	81134
2008	472351	80759
2009	478631	80034
2010	485188	79233
2011	491257	78937
2012	497094	78489
2013	502748	78221
2014	508349	78401
2015	514036	79066
2016	519770	79595

	Price Equation	Forecast
1996	12.8928	
1997	12.8928	0.00770
1998	12.8928	0.00353
1999	12.9032	0.00372
2000	12.9032	0.00381
2001	12.9032	0.00220
2002	12.9537	0.00193
2003	12.9537	-0.00162
2004	12.9702	-0.00138
2005	12.9862	-0.00168
2006	13.0043	-0.00226
2007	13.0166	-0.00303
2008	13.0348	-0.00432
2009	13.0508	-0.00607
2010	13.0648	-0.00744
2011	13.07931	-0.00732
2012	13.09229	-0.00860
2013	13.10472	-0.00951
2014	13.11653	-0.00938
2015	13.12784	-0.00863
2016	13.13892	-0.00972

	Price Equation	Forecast
1996	12.8928	
1997	12.8928	0.00598
1998	12.8928	0.01106
1999	12.9032	0.01400
2000	12.9032	0.01601
2001	12.9537	0.01704
2002	12.9537	0.01687
2003	12.9702	0.01669
2004	12.9862	0.01651
2005	13.0043	0.01623
2006	13.0166	0.01583
2007	13.0348	0.01533
2008	13.0508	0.01467
2009	13.0648	0.01383
2010	13.07931	0.01298
2011	13.09229	0.01243
2012	13.10472	0.01181
2013	13.11653	0.01131
2014	13.12784	0.01108
2015	13.13892	0.01113
2016	13.15005	0.01109

	Price Equation	Forecast
1996	12.8928	
1997	12.8928	0.00598
1998	12.8928	0.01106
1999	12.9032	0.01400
2000	12.9032	0.01601
2001	12.9537	0.01704
2002	12.9537	0.01687
2003	12.9702	0.01669
2004	12.9862	0.01651
2005	13.0043	0.01623
2006	13.0166	0.01583
2007	13.0348	0.01533
2008	13.0508	0.01467
2009	13.0648	0.01383
2010	13.07931	0.01298
2011	13.09229	0.01243
2012	13.10472	0.01181
2013	13.11653	0.01131
2014	13.12784	0.01108
2015	13.13892	0.01113
2016	13.15005	0.01109

	Price Equation	Forecast
1996	12.8928	
1997	12.8928	0.00598
1998	12.8928	0.01106
1999	12.9032	0.01400
2000	12.9032	0.01601
2001	12.9537	0.01704
2002	12.9537	0.01687
2003	12.9702	0.01669
2004	12.9862	0.01651
2005	13.0043	0.01623
2006	13.0166	0.01583
2007	13.0348	0.01533
2008	13.0508	0.01467
2009	13.0648	0.01383
2010	13.07931	0.01298
2011	13.09229	0.01243
2012	13.10472	0.01181

Table D-34
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Saskatchewan

Saskatchewan

1998-2016

Medium-Medium Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

1- GDP growth per adult = 2.65190

2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50

3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25.54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation		
	Pt	St	Yt	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Rt	Ln St	Ln St-1	Ln Pt
1996		396044							
1997	61696	398421	25413	11.02997		0.07500	12.88928		11.02997
1998	67578	402899	26087	11.12103	11.02997	0.07500	12.89526	12.88928	11.12103
1999	72633	408665	26779	11.19318	11.12103	0.07500	12.90644	12.89526	11.19318
2000	76799	415373	27489	11.24895	11.19318	0.07500	12.92065	12.90644	11.24895
2001	79689	422676	28218	11.28564	11.24895	0.07500	12.93693	12.92065	11.28564
2002	80422	430065	28966	11.29504	11.28564	0.07500	12.95436	12.93693	11.29504
2003	81125	437528	29734	11.30375	11.29504	0.07500	12.97169	12.95436	11.30375
2004	81777	445032	30523	11.31175	11.30375	0.07500	12.98890	12.97169	11.31175
2005	82200	452581	31332	11.31691	11.31175	0.07500	13.00595	12.98890	11.31691
2006	82508	460086	32163	11.32065	11.31691	0.07500	13.02272	13.00595	11.32065
2007	82555	467500	33016	11.32122	11.32065	0.07500	13.03917	13.02272	11.32122
2008	82247	474730	33892	11.31748	11.32122	0.07500	13.05515	13.03917	11.31748
2009	81558	481675	34790	11.30908	11.31748	0.07500	13.07050	13.05515	11.30908
2010	80773	486302	35713	11.29940	11.30908	0.07500	13.08502	13.07050	11.29940
2011	80481	494741	36660	11.29578	11.29940	0.07500	13.09869	13.08502	11.29578
2012	80029	500946	37632	11.29014	11.29578	0.07500	13.11179	13.09869	11.29014
2013	79756	506965	38630	11.28673	11.29014	0.07500	13.12425	13.11179	11.28673
2014	79923	512923	39655	11.28882	11.28673	0.07500	13.13620	13.12425	11.28882
2015	80572	518959	40706	11.29691	11.28882	0.07500	13.14788	13.13620	11.29691
2016	81090	525032	41766	11.30331	11.29691	0.07500	13.15958	13.14788	11.30331

Table D-35
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Saskatchewan

Saskatchewan
1998-2016

Medium/Strong Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

1- GDP growth per adult = 2.65190

2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50

3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Years	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation									
	Pt	St	Yt	Ln Pt	Ln St	Ln Yt	Var N(25,54)t	Ln St	Ln St	Ln Pt	Var Yt	Var Yt	Var Yt	Var Yt	Var Yt	AR(1)
1996		396044						12.88928	12.88928							
1997	61696	398421	25413	11.02997			0.00770	12.88928	12.89526	0.00598	1.02997	12.88928	0.026519			
1998	68025	402485	26087	11.09778			-0.00118	12.89526	12.90341	0.01015	11.09778	12.89526	0.026519			
1999	69722	407517	26779	11.09778			-0.00125	12.90341	12.91784	0.01243	11.15226	12.90341	0.026519			
2000	72755	413249	27489	11.15226			-0.00145	12.91784	12.93180	0.01397	11.19485	12.91784	0.026519			
2001	74986	419450	28218	11.19485			-0.00226	12.93180	12.94670	0.01490	11.22506	12.93180	0.026519			
2002	75480	425681	28966	11.22506			-0.00627	12.94670	12.96145	0.01475	11.23162	12.94670	0.026519			
2003	76152	431986	29734	11.23162			-0.00579	12.96145	12.97615	0.01470	11.24049	12.96145	0.026519			
2004	76944	438396	30523	11.24049			-0.00536	12.97615	12.99088	0.01473	11.25083	12.97615	0.026519			
2005	77620	444879	31332	11.25083			-0.00554	12.99088	13.00556	0.01468	11.25958	12.99088	0.026519			
2006	78392	451461	32163	11.25958			-0.00520	13.00556	13.02024	0.01469	11.26948	13.00556	0.026519			
2007	78953	458086	33016	11.26948			-0.00569	13.02024	13.03481	0.01457	11.27661	13.02024	0.026519			
2008	79146	464658	33892	11.27661			-0.00680	13.03481	13.04906	0.01425	11.27905	13.03481	0.026519			
2009	78929	471069	34790	11.27905			-0.00837	13.04906	13.06276	0.01370	11.27630	13.04906	0.026519			
2010	78585	477283	35713	11.27630			-0.00951	13.06276	13.07587	0.01310	11.27193	13.06276	0.026519			
2011	78727	483431	36660	11.27193			-0.00905	13.07587	13.08866	0.01280	11.27374	13.07587	0.026519			
2012	78698	489464	37632	11.27374			-0.01019	13.08866	13.10107	0.01240	11.27337	13.08866	0.026519			
2013	78842	495432	38630	11.27520			-0.01051	13.10107	13.11319	0.01212	11.27520	13.10107	0.026519			
2014	79386	501446	39655	11.28208			-0.01008	13.11319	13.12525	0.01207	11.28208	13.11319	0.026519			
2015	80350	507623	40706	11.29414			-0.00933	13.12525	13.13749	0.01224	11.29414	13.12525	0.026519			
2016	81179	513924	41786	11.30442			-0.00983	13.13749	13.14983	0.01234	11.30442	13.13749	0.026519			

Table D-36
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Alberta

Programming: Mario Fortin and Andre Leclerc

Alberta
1998-2016

Weak/Weak Scenario: Weak Demographic Growth and Weak Economic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

1995-2018

Weak/Week Scenario: Weak Demographic Growth and Weak Economic Growth

1- GDP growth per adult = 1 00000

2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7 50

3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Legend
Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock


Year	Pt	Rt	Yt	Ln Yt	Var N(25, 54)	Ln St-1	Ln St	Housing Stock Variation Equation				Var Yt	AR(1)
								Ln St-1	Ln St	Var Ln St	Ln Pt		
1996	1010893												
1997	91734	101281	1142665	1054877	0.02040	1382634	1382634	1382634	1382634	0.01997	1142665	1382634	0.01
1998	110253	1059807	1161053	1058857	0.01176	1384631	1384631	1384631	1384631	0.02729	1161053	1384631	0.01
1999	126396	1095505	1174718	1055872	0.01070	1386673	1386673	1386673	1386673	0.03313	1174718	1387360	0.01
2000	139838	1137173	1184824	1056667	0.01100	1388369	1388369	1388369	1388369	0.03733	1184824	1390673	0.01
2001	149540	1183149	1191532	1057862	0.00945	1390406	1390406	1390406	1390406	0.03963	1191532	1394406	0.01
2002	154648	1231390	1194890	1058857	0.00521	1392365	1392365	1392365	1392365	0.03996	1194890	1398369	0.01
2003	157350	1280823	1196623	1059852	0.00505	1394301	1394301	1394301	1394301	0.03936	1196623	1402365	0.01
2004	158319	1330604	1197236	1060847	0.00535	1396331	1396331	1396331	1396331	0.03813	1197236	1406301	0.01
2005	157835	1379937	1196931	1061842	0.00520	1398369	1398369	1398369	1398369	0.03641	1196931	1410114	0.01
2006	156120	1428059	1195838	1062837	0.00442	1400406	1400406	1400406	1400406	0.03428	1195838	1413755	0.01
2007	153740	1474451	1194302	1063832	0.00393	1402436	1402436	1402436	1402436	0.03197	1194302	1417183	0.01
2008	150784	1518609	1192361	1064827	0.00277	1404466	1404466	1404466	1404466	0.02951	1192361	1420380	0.01
2009	147508	1560160	1190164	1065822	0.00214	1406496	1406496	1406496	1406496	0.02699	1190164	1423331	0.01
2010	144257	1598949	1187935	1066817	0.00140	1408526	1408526	1408526	1408526	0.02455	1187935	1426301	0.01
2011	141362	1635078	1185908	1067812	-0.00028	1410556	1410556	1410556	1410556	0.02234	1185908	1429355	0.01
2012	138691	1668584	1184000	1068806	-0.00034	1412586	1412586	1412586	1412586	0.02029	1184000	1432400	0.01
2013	136317	1699631	1182274	1069803	-0.00150	1414616	1414616	1414616	1414616	0.01843	1182274	1435492	0.01
2014	134738	1728745	1181109	1070798	-0.00267	1416646	1416646	1416646	1416646	0.01698	1181109	1437449	0.01
2015	133770	1756392	1180388	1071793	-0.00240	1418676	1418676	1418676	1418676	0.01587	1180388	1439592	0.01
2016	133103	1782805	1179888	1072788	-0.00300	1420706	1420706	1420706	1420706	0.01493	1179888	1442691	0.01

Legend
Pt: M.L.S. price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-37
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Alberta

Comparison of Results

Housing Prices According to Scenario



Housing Stock According to Scenario




Table D-38
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Alberta

Alberta
1998-2016

West/Medium Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Legend
Pt: M.L.S price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation				AR(1)
	Yt	Nt	St	Rt	Ln Pt-1	Ln Pt	Ln Yt	Ln St-1	Var Ln St	Ln Pt	Ln St-1	Var Yt	
1996			1010693										
1997	91734		1031281		11.42665	11.42665	37753	13.82634	0.02040	11.42665	13.82634	0.01997	0.01
1998	110586		1060001	0.07500	11.61355	11.61355	38131	13.84631	0.01303	11.61355	13.84631	0.02747	0.01
1999	127069		1096051	0.07500	11.75249	11.75249	38512	13.87378	0.01199	11.75249	13.87378	0.03344	0.01
2000	140815		1138198	0.07500	11.85520	11.85520	38897	13.90722	0.01236	11.85520	13.90722	0.03773	0.01
2001	151057		1184898	0.07500	11.92541	11.92541	39286	13.94496	0.01160	11.92541	13.94496	0.04021	0.01
2002	156573		1234063	0.07500	11.96128	11.96128	39679	13.98517	0.00740	11.96128	13.98517	0.04066	0.01
2003	159554		1284575	0.07500	11.98014	11.98014	40076	14.02582	0.00727	11.98014	14.02582	0.04012	0.01
2004	160679		1335543	0.07500	11.98716	11.98716	40476	14.06594	0.00759	11.98716	14.06594	0.03891	0.01
2005	160251		1386130	0.07500	11.98450	11.98450	40881	14.10485	0.00745	11.98450	14.10485	0.03718	0.01
2006	158818		1435702	0.07500	11.97552	11.97552	41290	14.14203	0.00750	11.97552	14.14203	0.03514	0.01
2007	156585		1483675	0.07500	11.96136	11.96136	41703	14.17716	0.00704	11.96136	14.17716	0.03287	0.01
2008	153675		1529488	0.07500	11.94260	11.94260	42120	14.21003	0.00593	11.94260	14.21003	0.03041	0.01
2009	150373		1572721	0.07500	11.92088	11.92088	42541	14.24044	0.00462	11.92088	14.24044	0.02787	0.01
2010	147047		1613178	0.07500	11.89851	11.89851	42966	14.26832	0.00353	11.89851	14.26832	0.02540	0.01
2011	144049		1650927	0.07500	11.87791	11.87791	43396	14.29372	0.00296	11.87791	14.29372	0.02313	0.01
2012	141262		1685984	0.07500	11.85837	11.85837	43830	14.31685	0.00185	11.85837	14.31685	0.02102	0.01
2013	138770		1718499	0.07500	11.84057	11.84057	44268	14.33787	0.00074	11.84057	14.33787	0.01910	0.01
2014	137069		1748981	0.07500	11.82624	11.82624	44711	14.35696	0.00102	11.82624	14.35696	0.01758	0.01
2015	135974		1777885	0.07500	11.82022	11.82022	45158	14.37454	0.00106	11.82022	14.37454	0.01639	0.01
2016	135190		1805445	0.07500	11.81444	11.81444	45610	14.39093	0.00043	11.81444	14.39093	0.01538	0.01

Table D-39
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Alberta

Alberta
1998-2016

Weak/Strong Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Legend

Pt: M.L.S. price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25.54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation				Year	Pt
	Pt	St	La	La Pt	La Pt	La Pt	La Pt	La Pt	La Pt	La Pt	La Pt	La Pt		
1996	1010893													
1997	91734	1031281	11 42665	11 42665	11 42665	11 42665	11 42665	11 42665	11 42665	11 42665	11 42665	11 42665	0.01	0.445106
1998	111794	1060700	11 62441	11 62441	11 62441	11 62441	11 62441	11 62441	11 62441	11 62441	11 62441	11 62441	0.01	0.445106
1999	129544	1098029	11 77178	11 77178	11 77178	11 77178	11 77178	11 77178	11 77178	11 77178	11 77178	11 77178	0.01	0.445106
2000	144432	1141925	11 88056	11 88056	11 88056	11 88056	11 88056	11 88056	11 88056	11 88056	11 88056	11 88056	0.01	0.445106
2001	155818	1190862	11 95644	11 95644	11 95644	11 95644	11 95644	11 95644	11 95644	11 95644	11 95644	11 95644	0.01	0.445106
2002	162067	1242622	11 99577	11 99577	11 99577	11 99577	11 99577	11 99577	11 99577	11 99577	11 99577	11 99577	0.01	0.445106
2003	165435	1295969	12 01634	12 01634	12 01634	12 01634	12 01634	12 01634	12 01634	12 01634	12 01634	12 01634	0.01	0.445106
2004	166741	1349941	12 02419	12 02419	12 02419	12 02419	12 02419	12 02419	12 02419	12 02419	12 02419	12 02419	0.01	0.445106
2005	166315	1403631	12 02164	12 02164	12 02164	12 02164	12 02164	12 02164	12 02164	12 02164	12 02164	12 02164	0.01	0.445106
2006	164930	1456430	12 01328	12 01328	12 01328	12 01328	12 01328	12 01328	12 01328	12 01328	12 01328	12 01328	0.01	0.445106
2007	162579	1507662	11 99892	11 99892	11 99892	11 99892	11 99892	11 99892	11 99892	11 99892	11 99892	11 99892	0.01	0.445106
2008	159404	1556669	11 97920	11 97920	11 97920	11 97920	11 97920	11 97920	11 97920	11 97920	11 97920	11 97920	0.01	0.445106
2009	157444	1602948	11 95597	11 95597	11 95597	11 95597	11 95597	11 95597	11 95597	11 95597	11 95597	11 95597	0.01	0.445106
2010	152037	1646258	11 93188	11 93188	11 93188	11 93188	11 93188	11 93188	11 93188	11 93188	11 93188	11 93188	0.01	0.445106
2011	148656	1686630	11 90939	11 90939	11 90939	11 90939	11 90939	11 90939	11 90939	11 90939	11 90939	11 90939	0.01	0.445106
2012	145497	1724065	11 88791	11 88791	11 88791	11 88791	11 88791	11 88791	11 88791	11 88791	11 88791	11 88791	0.01	0.445106
2013	142654	1758674	11 86818	11 86818	11 86818	11 86818	11 86818	11 86818	11 86818	11 86818	11 86818	11 86818	0.01	0.445106
2014	140640	1791004	11 85396	11 85396	11 85396	11 85396	11 85396	11 85396	11 85396	11 85396	11 85396	11 85396	0.01	0.445106
2015	139325	1821558	11 84457	11 84457	11 84457	11 84457	11 84457	11 84457	11 84457	11 84457	11 84457	11 84457	0.01	0.445106
2016	138346	1850584	11 83751	11 83751	11 83751	11 83751	11 83751	11 83751	11 83751	11 83751	11 83751	11 83751	0.01	0.445106

Table D-40
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Alberta

Alberta
1995-2016

Source: Statistics Canada, *Medium Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth*

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 2.21230
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Year	Forecasts					Price Equation					Housing Stock Variation Equation					Ratio				
	Yr	Pr	St	St	St	Ln Pr	Ln St	Ln St	Ln St	Ln St	Ln Pr	Ln St	Ln St	Ln St	Ln St	Yr	Pr	St	St	St
1996	1010893					11.42665	11.62126	11.42665	11.62126	11.42665	11.42665	11.42665	11.42665	11.42665	11.42665	0.01997	13.82634	13.82634	13.82634	0.022123
1997	91734					11.62126	11.62126	11.62126	11.62126	11.62126	11.62126	11.62126	11.62126	11.62126	11.62126	0.02808	13.84631	13.84631	13.84631	0.022123
1998	111443					11.77660	11.77660	11.77660	11.77660	11.77660	11.77660	11.77660	11.77660	11.77660	11.77660	0.03508	13.87439	13.87439	13.87439	0.022123
1999	130170					11.90197	11.90197	11.90197	11.90197	11.90197	11.90197	11.90197	11.90197	11.90197	11.90197	0.04071	13.90947	13.90947	13.90947	0.022123
2000	147557					11.99710	11.99710	11.99710	11.99710	11.99710	11.99710	11.99710	11.99710	11.99710	11.99710	0.04459	13.95018	13.95018	13.95018	0.022123
2001	162284					12.06095	12.06095	12.06095	12.06095	12.06095	12.06095	12.06095	12.06095	12.06095	12.06095	0.04657	13.99478	13.99478	13.99478	0.022123
2002	172983					12.10953	12.10953	12.10953	12.10953	12.10953	12.10953	12.10953	12.10953	12.10953	12.10953	0.04759	14.04134	14.04134	14.04134	0.022123
2003	181594					12.14699	12.14699	12.14699	12.14699	12.14699	12.14699	12.14699	12.14699	12.14699	12.14699	0.04794	14.08894	14.08894	14.08894	0.022123
2004	185525					12.17463	12.17463	12.17463	12.17463	12.17463	12.17463	12.17463	12.17463	12.17463	12.17463	0.04850	14.13887	14.13887	14.13887	0.022123
2005	193809					12.19329	12.19329	12.19329	12.19329	12.19329	12.19329	12.19329	12.19329	12.19329	12.19329	0.04890	14.18455	14.18455	14.18455	0.022123
2006	197459					12.20607	12.20607	12.20607	12.20607	12.20607	12.20607	12.20607	12.20607	12.20607	12.20607	0.04959	14.23145	14.23145	14.23145	0.022123
2007	200000					12.21318	12.21318	12.21318	12.21318	12.21318	12.21318	12.21318	12.21318	12.21318	12.21318	0.04979	14.27724	14.27724	14.27724	0.022123
2008	201427					12.21603	12.21603	12.21603	12.21603	12.21603	12.21603	12.21603	12.21603	12.21603	12.21603	0.04988	14.32163	14.32163	14.32163	0.022123
2009	202002					12.21685	12.21685	12.21685	12.21685	12.21685	12.21685	12.21685	12.21685	12.21685	12.21685	0.04990	14.36440	14.36440	14.36440	0.022123
2010	202167					12.21804	12.21804	12.21804	12.21804	12.21804	12.21804	12.21804	12.21804	12.21804	12.21804	0.05016	14.40552	14.40552	14.40552	0.022123
2011	202407					12.21887	12.21887	12.21887	12.21887	12.21887	12.21887	12.21887	12.21887	12.21887	12.21887	0.05066	14.44505	14.44505	14.44505	0.022123
2012	202576					12.22011	12.22011	12.22011	12.22011	12.22011	12.22011	12.22011	12.22011	12.22011	12.22011	0.05126	14.48305	14.48305	14.48305	0.022123
2013	202825					12.22567	12.22567	12.22567	12.22567	12.22567	12.22567	12.22567	12.22567	12.22567	12.22567	0.05240	14.51960	14.51960	14.51960	0.022123
2014	203958					12.23457	12.23457	12.23457	12.23457	12.23457	12.23457	12.23457	12.23457	12.23457	12.23457	0.05350	14.55503	14.55503	14.55503	0.022123
2015	205781					12.24470	12.24470	12.24470	12.24470	12.24470	12.24470	12.24470	12.24470	12.24470	12.24470	0.05458	14.58957	14.58957	14.58957	0.022123
2016	207877															0.05500	14.62334	14.62334	14.62334	0.022123

Table D-41
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Alberta

1998-2016

1. GDP growth per adult = 2.21230
2. Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3. Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate for 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecast	Price Equation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05
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Table D-42
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Alberta

Alberta
1998-2016

Medium/Strong Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 2.21230
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			Housing Stock			Var Yt	AR(1)
	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln Yt-1	Ln P _t	Ln P _{t-1}	Ln P _{t-2}	Var Ln St	Ln St	Ln St-1	Ln St-2	Ln St-3	Ln St-4		
1996	1010893			11.42665				13.82634						
1997	91734			11.42665				13.84631					0.01907	13.82634
1998	113001			11.63515				13.87523					0.02892	13.84631
1999	133412			11.63515				13.87523					0.03654	13.87523
2000	152405			11.93430				13.91177					0.04258	13.91177
2001	169097			12.04139				13.95435					0.04692	13.95435
2002	181282			12.64797				14.00128					0.04915	14.00128
2003	190925			12.10761				14.05042					0.05027	14.05042
2004	198554			12.10761				14.10069					0.05061	14.10069
2005	204221			12.19881				14.15130					0.05081	14.15130
2006	208601			12.22696				14.20158					0.05081	14.20158
2007	211498			12.26197				14.25112					0.04839	14.25112
2008	212942			12.26197				14.29951					0.04668	14.29951
2009	213280			12.26197				14.34638					0.04321	14.34638
2010	213071			12.26197				14.39146					0.04142	14.39146
2011	212852			12.26197				14.43467					0.03968	14.43467
2012	212518			12.26197				14.47609					0.03800	14.47609
2013	212254			12.26197				14.51575					0.03666	14.51575
2014	212892			12.26197				14.55375					0.03559	14.55375
2015	214326			12.27525				14.59041					0.03466	14.59041
2016	216085			12.28334				14.62600					0.03466	14.62600

Legend

- Pt: M.L.S. price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-43
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
British Columbia

British Columbia
1998-2016

Worst-Case Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Year	Price Equation					Housing Stock Variation Equation				
	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt
1996	1451388					14 18803				
1997	162003	11 99537	12 00633	11 99537	12 00633	14 22010	0.03207	11 99537	14 18803	0.01
1998	163788	1537853	12 01071	12 00633	12 01071	14 24199	0.02169	12 00633	14 22010	0.01
1999	164507	1563806	12 01699	12 01071	12 01699	14 26263	0.02064	12 01071	14 24199	0.01
2000	165543	1594956	12 01335	12 01699	12 01335	14 28236	0.01972	12 01699	14 26263	0.01
2001	166112	1624591	12 01135	12 01335	12 01135	14 30077	0.01841	12 01335	14 28236	0.01
2002	166188	1651383	11 98411	12 01135	11 98411	14 31712	0.01636	11 98411	14 30077	0.01
2003	157604	1676057	11 96784	11 98411	11 96784	14 33195	0.01483	11 96784	14 31712	0.01
2004	156892	1699402	11 96331	11 96784	11 96331	14 34579	0.01383	11 96331	14 33195	0.01
2005	157160	1721732	11 96315	11 96331	11 96315	14 35884	0.01305	11 96315	14 34579	0.01
2006	158524	1743206	11 96502	11 96315	11 96502	14 37124	0.01240	11 96502	14 35884	0.01
2007	160105	1764302	11 97366	11 96502	11 97366	14 38327	0.01173	11 97366	14 37124	0.01
2008	161948	1805780	11 98358	11 97366	11 98358	14 39500	0.01151	11 98358	14 38327	0.01
2009	164175	1826444	11 99503	11 98358	11 99503	14 40650	0.01138	11 99503	14 39500	0.01
2010	165929	1847328	12 02532	11 99503	12 02532	14 41788	0.01126	12 02532	14 40650	0.01
2011	168279	1866248	12 03930	12 02532	12 03930	14 42925	0.01137	12 03930	14 41788	0.01
2012	171301	1889061	12 05118	12 03930	12 05118	14 44051	0.01126	12 05118	14 42925	0.01
2013	174621	1910305	12 07037	12 05118	12 07037	14 45159	0.01108	12 07037	14 44051	0.01
2014	178655	1932243	12 09321	12 07037	12 09321	14 46277	0.01118	12 09321	14 45159	0.01
2015	182858	1954898	12 11647	12 09321	12 11647	14 47419	0.01142	12 11647	14 46277	0.01
2016						14 48585	0.01166		14 47419	0.01

Table D-44
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
British Columbia

Comparison of Results





Table D-45
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
British Columbia

[illegible]

Table D-46
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
British Columbia

British Columbia

1988-2018

Weak/Strong Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

1- GDP growth per adult =

1.00000

2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate =

7.50

3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Legend

Pt: M.L.S. price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25:54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			Var Yt			AM(t)
	Pt	St	N	Ln Pt	Ln St	Ln N	Ln Pt	Ln St	Ln N	Ln Pt	Ln St	Var Yt	
1996		1451388						14.18803					
1997	162003	1498687		11.99537				14.22010	0.03207	11.99537	14.18803	0.01	0.02134
1998	168901	1533627		12.03707				14.24315	0.02305	12.03707	14.22010	0.01	0.02134
1999	174059	1568845		12.06715				14.26585	0.02270	12.06715	14.24315	0.01	0.02134
2000	179073	1604547		12.09555				14.28835	0.02250	12.09555	14.26585	0.01	0.02134
2001	183435	1640486		12.11962				14.31050	0.02214	12.11962	14.28835	0.01	0.02134
2002	182601	1674870		12.11506				14.33125	0.02074	12.11506	14.31050	0.01	0.02134
2003	182677	1708021		12.11548				14.35085	0.01960	12.11548	14.33125	0.01	0.02134
2004	183852	1740344		12.12189				14.36959	0.01875	12.12189	14.35085	0.01	0.02134
2005	185000	1771839		12.12811				14.38753	0.01793	12.12811	14.36959	0.01	0.02134
2006	187791	1803114		12.12811				14.40503	0.01750	12.12811	14.38753	0.01	0.02134
2007	191091	1834352		12.16051				14.42220	0.01718	12.16051	14.40503	0.01	0.02134
2008	194048	1865420		12.17586				14.43900	0.01679	12.17586	14.42220	0.01	0.02134
2009	198822	1896249		12.19005				14.45539	0.01639	12.19005	14.43900	0.01	0.02134
2010	199616	1926847		12.20415				14.47140	0.01601	12.20415	14.45539	0.01	0.02134
2011	202654	1957302		12.21926				14.48708	0.01568	12.21926	14.47140	0.01	0.02134
2012	204954	1987342		12.23054				14.50231	0.01523	12.23054	14.48708	0.01	0.02134
2013	206738	2016786		12.23921				14.51702	0.01471	12.23921	14.50231	0.01	0.02134
2014	209707	2046107		12.25377				14.53145	0.01443	12.25377	14.51702	0.01	0.02134
2015	213427	2075553		12.27105				14.54573	0.01428	12.27105	14.53145	0.01	0.02134
2016	217139	2105070		12.28829				14.55986	0.01413	12.28829	14.54573	0.01	0.02134

Table D-47
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
British Columbia

British Columbia
1998-2016

Medium Weak Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.58730
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			Ver. Wt.			Ver. Wt.		
	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt	Yt	Ln Yt	Ln Pt
1996	1451388			22447	0.02326	14.18803	11.99537	14.22010	14.18803	0.03207	11.99537	14.18803	0.015873		
1997	1498687			22803	0.03466	14.22010	12.01237	14.24228	14.22010	0.02218	12.01237	14.22010	0.015873		
1998	164780			23165	0.01698	14.24228	12.02751	14.26361	14.24228	0.02133	12.02751	14.24228	0.015873		
1999	167294			23533	0.06816	14.26361	12.04820	14.28452	14.26361	0.02091	12.04820	14.26361	0.015873		
2000	170791			23906	0.08191	14.28452	12.05977	14.30471	14.28452	0.02018	12.05977	14.28452	0.015873		
2001	172778			24266	0.09765	14.30471	12.07154	14.32446	14.30471	0.01768	12.07154	14.30471	0.015873		
2002	171413			24671	0.11540	14.32446	12.05183	14.34134	14.32446	0.01740	12.05183	14.32446	0.015873		
2003	172199			25063	0.12915	14.34134	12.05640	14.35888	14.34134	0.01737	12.05640	14.34134	0.015873		
2004	175221			25461	0.14490	14.35888	12.07380	14.37628	14.35888	0.01740	12.07380	14.35888	0.015873		
2005	179208			25865	0.16065	14.37628	12.12128	14.39365	14.37628	0.01761	12.12128	14.37628	0.015873		
2006	183741			26276	0.17640	14.39365	12.15327	14.41126	14.39365	0.01768	12.15327	14.39365	0.015873		
2007	189714			26693	0.19214	14.41126	12.18662	14.42914	14.41126	0.01819	12.18662	14.42914	0.015873		
2008	196146			27116	0.20789	14.42914	12.22143	14.44733	14.42914	0.01856	12.22143	14.44733	0.015873		
2009	203095			27547	0.22364	14.44733	12.25830	14.46590	14.44733	0.01902	12.25830	14.46590	0.015873		
2010	210723			27984	0.03304	14.46590	12.29793	14.48492	14.46590	0.01934	12.29793	14.48492	0.015873		
2011	219242			28420	0.03304	14.48492	12.33465	14.50426	14.48492	0.01955	12.33465	14.50426	0.015873		
2012	227441			28879	0.03304	14.50426	12.36896	14.52381	14.50426	0.02002	12.36896	14.52381	0.015873		
2013	235362			29338	0.03304	14.52381	12.41030	14.54382	14.52381	0.02058	12.41030	14.54382	0.015873		
2014	245315			29804	0.03304	14.54382	12.45496	14.56440	14.54382	0.02112	12.45496	14.56440	0.015873		
2015	256521			30277	0.03304	14.56440	12.49974	14.58552	14.56440	0.02112	12.49974	14.58552	0.015873		
2016	268267														

Table D-48
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
British Columbia

British Columbia

1998-2016

Medium-Demographic Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.58730
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			Ver. Yr.			AQ(1)
	Pt	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Pt	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Ver. Yr.	Ln St.	Ln St-1	Ver. Yr.	Ln St.	Ln St-1	
1996				1451388	11.99537	11.99537		14.18803	14.18803		14.18803	14.18803	
1997	162003	14.96687	14.96687	12.02192	12.02192	12.02192	0.03207	14.22010	14.22010	0.03207	14.22010	14.22010	0.015873
1998	166361	15.32856	15.32856	12.04447	12.04447	12.04447	0.02254	14.24264	14.24264	0.02254	14.24264	14.24264	0.015873
1999	170157	15.68870	15.68870	12.06831	12.06831	12.06831	0.02195	14.26459	14.26459	0.02195	14.26459	14.26459	0.015873
2000	174701	16.01259	16.01259	12.09318	12.09318	12.09318	0.02171	14.28630	14.28630	0.02171	14.28630	14.28630	0.015873
2001	178650	16.35726	16.35726	12.11812	12.11812	12.11812	0.02134	14.30764	14.30764	0.02134	14.30764	14.30764	0.015873
2002	182746	16.69121	16.69121	12.14372	12.14372	12.14372	0.02017	14.32781	14.32781	0.02017	14.32781	14.32781	0.015873
2003	187028	17.01916	17.01916	12.16889	12.16889	12.16889	0.01946	14.34727	14.34727	0.01946	14.34727	14.34727	0.015873
2004	184775	17.34916	17.34916	12.19475	12.19475	12.19475	0.01920	14.36647	14.36647	0.01920	14.36647	14.36647	0.015873
2005	189626	17.69385	17.69385	12.22049	12.22049	12.22049	0.01911	14.38558	14.38558	0.01911	14.38558	14.38558	0.015873
2006	196072	18.02845	18.02845	12.24649	12.24649	12.24649	0.01930	14.40488	14.40488	0.01930	14.40488	14.40488	0.015873
2007	203717	18.35943	18.35943	12.27249	12.27249	12.27249	0.01986	14.42454	14.42454	0.01986	14.42454	14.42454	0.015873
2008	211500	18.68770	18.68770	12.30045	12.30045	12.30045	0.01999	14.44453	14.44453	0.01999	14.44453	14.44453	0.015873
2009	219795	19.01425	19.01425	12.32846	12.32846	12.32846	0.02031	14.46484	14.46484	0.02031	14.46484	14.46484	0.015873
2010	228538	19.34175	19.34175	12.35946	12.35946	12.35946	0.02064	14.48548	14.48548	0.02064	14.48548	14.48548	0.015873
2011	236068	19.67011	19.67011	12.39031	12.39031	12.39031	0.02103	14.50651	14.50651	0.02103	14.50651	14.50651	0.015873
2012	247153	20.00591	20.00591	12.41776	12.41776	12.41776	0.02126	14.52777	14.52777	0.02126	14.52777	14.52777	0.015873
2013	258678	20.34849	20.34849	12.45246	12.45246	12.45246	0.02138	14.54915	14.54915	0.02138	14.54915	14.54915	0.015873
2014	268597	20.69407	20.69407	12.49349	12.49349	12.49349	0.02173	14.57088	14.57088	0.02173	14.57088	14.57088	0.015873
2015	278566	21.04277	21.04277	12.53741	12.53741	12.53741	0.02217	14.59306	14.59306	0.02217	14.59306	14.59306	0.015873
2016	291032	22.29829	22.29829	12.58119	12.58119	12.58119	0.02258	14.61564	14.61564	0.02258	14.61564	14.61564	0.015873

Table D-49
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
British Columbia

Programming: Mario Fortin and Andre Leclerc

1998-2016

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.58730
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Legend

Pt: M.L.S. price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Forecasts																					
Price Equation																					
	1451385	1496687	1534079	1570382	1609030	1646960	1685517	1724128	1763275	1803011	1843992	1886433	1930215	1975276	2021623	2069346	2118149	2167821	2218851	2271476	2325699
	162003	169924	177008	184751	192536	199539	206331	213149	219954	226889	233773	240828	248112	255612	263212	270936	278784	286756	294869	303149	318559
	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500
	11 99537	12 04311	12 08395	12 12676	12 16804	12 18278	12 20404	12 23238	12 26127	12 29935	12 34012	12 37889	12 41645	12 45376	12 49186	12 52588	12 55700	12 59369	12 63281	12 67156	12 71083
	22447	22803	23165	23533	23906	24286	24671	25063	25461	25865	26276	26693	27116	27547	27984	28428	28879	29338	29804	30277	30777
	10 03466	10 05041	10 06616	10 08191	10 09765	10 11340	10 12915	10 14490	10 16065	10 17640	10 19214	10 20789	10 22364	10 23939	10 25514	10 27089	10 28663	10 30238	10 31813		
	0.02326	0.02439	0.02281	0.02257	0.02179	0.01644	0.01603	0.01594	0.01594	0.01552	0.01527	0.01429	0.01338	0.01261	0.01201	0.01058	0.00920	0.00892	0.00892	0.00819	
	14 18803	14 22010	14 24344	14 26683	14 29052	14 31444	14 33758	14 36023	14 38268	14 40497	14 42744	14 45020	14 47314	14 49622	14 51941	14 54274	14 56605	14 58923	14 61250	14 63594	14 65953
	11 99537	12 04311	12 08395	12 12676	12 16804	12 18278	12 20404	12 23238	12 26127	12 29935	12 34012	12 37889	12 41645	12 45376	12 49186	12 52588	12 55700	12 59369	12 63281	12 67156	12 71083
	0.03207	0.02334	0.02339	0.02369	0.02392	0.02314	0.02265	0.02245	0.02229	0.02247	0.02275	0.02294	0.02308	0.02319	0.02333	0.02331	0.02318	0.02327	0.02344	0.02359	
	14 18803	14 22010	14 24344	14 26683	14 29052	14 31444	14 33758	14 36023	14 38268	14 40497	14 42744	14 45020	14 47314	14 49622	14 51941	14 54274	14 56605	14 58923	14 61250	14 63594	14 65953
	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873	0.015873

Table D-50
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Canada

Programming: Mario Fortin and André Leclerc

Canada
1998-2016

Weak/Week Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1 000000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7 50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Legend


PI: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
RI: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
YI: GDP rate for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25-54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
SI: housing stock

Year	Forecasts			Price Equation			Housing Stock Variation Equation			AR(1)		
	PI	RI	YI	Ln PI	Ln RI	Ln YI	Ln SI	Ln PI	Ln SI	Var YI	Var YI	AR(1)
1996	113593	11358769	26970	11 64038	11 64038	10 21243	16 24550	0 01310	11 64038	16 24550	0 01	0 587951
1997	112333	11653820	27240	11 62923	11 62923	10 21243	16 25860	0 01255	11 62923	16 25860	0 01	0 587951
1998	111262	11793018	27512	11 61964	11 61964	10 22238	16 27114	0 01187	11 61964	16 27114	0 01	0 587951
1999	10922	11927931	27787	11 61658	11 61658	10 23233	16 28302	0 01138	11 61658	16 28302	0 01	0 587951
2000	108626	12053349	28065	11 60483	11 60483	10 24228	16 29439	0 01046	11 60483	16 29439	0 01	0 587951
2001	107067	12162871	28346	11 59121	11 59121	10 25223	16 30485	0 00905	11 59121	16 30485	0 01	0 587951
2002	105680	12261963	28629	11 56817	11 56817	10 26218	16 31390	0 00811	11 56817	16 31390	0 01	0 587951
2003	105324	12355706	28915	11 56480	11 56480	10 27213	16 32201	0 00762	11 56480	16 32201	0 01	0 587951
2004	105739	12447957	29205	11 56873	11 56873	10 28208	16 32963	0 00744	11 56873	16 32963	0 01	0 587951
2005	105966	12537768	29497	11 57088	11 57088	10 29203	16 33707	0 00719	11 57088	16 33707	0 01	0 587951
2006	108547	12626942	29792	11 57634	11 57634	10 30198	16 34426	0 00709	11 57634	16 34426	0 01	0 587951
2007	107196	12715816	30090	11 58241	11 58241	10 31193	16 35134	0 00701	11 58241	16 35134	0 01	0 587951
2008	107768	12804004	30390	11 58774	11 58774	10 32188	16 35836	0 00691	11 58774	16 35836	0 01	0 587951
2009	108464	12892138	30694	11 59418	11 59418	10 33183	16 36527	0 00686	11 59418	16 36527	0 01	0 587951
2010	109557	12982184	31001	11 60420	11 60420	10 34179	16 37213	0 00696	11 60420	16 37213	0 01	0 587951
2011	110157	13071615	31311	11 60967	11 60967	10 35174	16 37909	0 00687	11 60967	16 37909	0 01	0 587951
2012	110784	13160580	31624	11 61534	11 61534	10 36169	16 38595	0 00678	11 61534	16 38595	0 01	0 587951
2013	111987	13251955	31941	11 62613	11 62613	10 37164	16 39274	0 00692	11 62613	16 39274	0 01	0 587951
2014	113843	13348856	32260	11 64258	11 64258	10 38159	16 40694	0 00729	11 64258	16 40694	0 01	0 587951
2015	115627	13450660	32583	11 65812	11 65812	10 39154	16 41454	0 00760	11 65812	16 41454	0 01	0 587951
2016												

Table D-51
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Canada

Comparison of Results

Housing Prices According to Scenario



Housing Stock According to Scenario




Table D-52
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Canada

Canada
1998-2016

Weak/Medium Scenario: Weak Economic Growth and Medium Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)

Year	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation			
	Yt	Yt-1	Yt-2	Yt-3	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Ln Pt-2	Ln Pt-3	Var Ln St	Ln St	Ln St-1	Var Yt
1996	113583	11358769			11.64038				0.01310	11.64038	16.24550	0.01000
1997	113194	11508497			11.63686	11.64038			0.01287	11.63686	16.25860	0.01000
1998	112763	11657548			11.63304	11.63686	11.64038		0.01242	11.63304	16.27146	0.01000
1999	112893	11946605			11.63419	11.63304	11.63686	11.64038	0.01207	11.63419	16.28388	0.01000
2000	112490	12084397			11.63062	11.63419	11.63304	11.63686	0.01147	11.63062	16.29596	0.01000
2001	110539	12209060			11.61313	11.63062	11.63419	11.63304	0.01026	11.61313	16.30743	0.01000
2002	109581	12325065			11.60442	11.61313	11.63062	11.63419	0.00946	11.60442	16.31769	0.01000
2003	109525	12436689			11.60391	11.60442	11.61313	11.63062	0.00902	11.60391	16.32715	0.01000
2004	110141	12547728			11.60952	11.60391	11.60442	11.61313	0.00884	11.60952	16.33616	0.01000
2005	11025	12657728			11.61751	11.60952	11.60391	11.60442	0.00877	11.61751	16.34500	0.01000
2006	112082	12769172			11.62698	11.61751	11.60952	11.60391	0.00877	11.62698	16.35378	0.01000
2007	113058	12881046			11.63566	11.62698	11.61751	11.60952	0.00877	11.63566	16.36254	0.01000
2008	113836	12992370			11.64252	11.63566	11.62698	11.61751	0.00877	11.64252	16.37127	0.01000
2009	114651	13103325			11.64965	11.64252	11.63566	11.62698	0.00861	11.64965	16.37987	0.01000
2010	115802	13215525			11.65964	11.64965	11.64252	11.63566	0.00850	11.65964	16.38838	0.01000
2011	116403	13326281			11.66481	11.65964	11.64965	11.64252	0.00853	11.66481	16.39690	0.01000
2012	116989	13435614			11.66992	11.66481	11.65964	11.64965	0.00835	11.66992	16.40525	0.01000
2013	118152	13546248			11.67972	11.66992	11.66481	11.65964	0.00817	11.67972	16.41342	0.01000
2014	119938	13661163			11.69473	11.67972	11.66992	11.66481	0.00845	11.69473	16.42162	0.01000
2015	121636	13779742			11.70879	11.69473	11.67972	11.66992	0.00864	11.70879	16.43007	0.01000
2016												0.587951

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25-54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-53
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Canada

1988-2016

1- GDP growth per adult = 1.00000

2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50

3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Legend

PI: MLS price divided by the consumer price index

RI: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages

YI: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over

N(25-54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54

St. housing stock

Forecasts Price Equation

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
11358769	113593	113873	11660473	1164038	1164284	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356	1164356
26970	27240	27512	27787	28065	28346	28629	28915	29205	29497	29792	30090	30390	30694	31001	31311	31624	31941	32260	32583	32907	33231
0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500	0.07500
11.64038	11.64284	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356	11.64356
16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550
0.01229	0.01371	0.01278	0.01290	0.01226	0.00836	0.00843	0.00874	0.00898	0.00940	0.00906	0.00832	0.00733	0.00667	0.00654	0.00498	0.00415	0.00427	0.00471	0.00416	0.00416	0.00416
16.24550	16.25860	16.27172	16.28457	16.29719	16.30949	16.32078	16.33139	16.34160	16.35165	16.36174	16.37186	16.38193	16.39185	16.40160	16.41129	16.42072	16.42988	16.43897	16.44820	16.45752	16.46680
0.01310	0.01312	0.01285	0.01262	0.01230	0.01129	0.01060	0.01022	0.01005	0.01009	0.01012	0.01007	0.00992	0.00975	0.00969	0.00943	0.00916	0.00909	0.00923	0.00932	0.00932	0.00932
16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550
0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Table D-54
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Canada

Canada
1998-2016

Medium/Weak Scenario: Medium Economic Growth and Weak Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.64720
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 1 from Statistics Canada (weak growth)

Years	Forecasts				Price Equation				Housing Stock Variation Equation										AR(1)
	Yr	Ln Pt	Ln Pt-1	Ln Pt-2	Yr	Ln Yr	Ln Yr-1	Ln Yr-2	Ln St	Ln St-1	Ln St-2	Ln St-3	Ln St-4	Ln St-5	Ln St-6	Ln St-7	Ln St-8	Ln St-9	
1996	11358769																		
1997	113593	116038	1164038	1164038	26970	10.21882	10.21882	10.21882	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	0.587951
1998	112939	11658277	1163460	1163460	27414	10.23516	10.23516	10.23516	16.25860	16.25860	16.25860	16.25860	16.25860	16.25860	16.25860	16.25860	16.25860	16.25860	0.587951
1999	112912	11807541	1163436	1163436	27866	10.25149	10.25149	10.25149	16.27153	16.27153	16.27153	16.27153	16.27153	16.27153	16.27153	16.27153	16.27153	16.27153	0.587951
2000	113947	11959041	1164349	1164349	28325	10.26783	10.26783	10.26783	16.28425	16.28425	16.28425	16.28425	16.28425	16.28425	16.28425	16.28425	16.28425	16.28425	0.587951
2001	114223	12108201	1164590	1164590	28791	10.28417	10.28417	10.28417	16.29700	16.29700	16.29700	16.29700	16.29700	16.29700	16.29700	16.29700	16.29700	16.29700	0.587951
2002	113295	12248954	1163775	1163775	29266	10.30051	10.30051	10.30051	16.30939	16.30939	16.30939	16.30939	16.30939	16.30939	16.30939	16.30939	16.30939	16.30939	0.587951
2003	113655	12386913	1164093	1164093	29748	10.31685	10.31685	10.31685	16.32095	16.32095	16.32095	16.32095	16.32095	16.32095	16.32095	16.32095	16.32095	16.32095	0.587951
2004	115166	12527172	1165413	1165413	30238	10.33318	10.33318	10.33318	16.33215	16.33215	16.33215	16.33215	16.33215	16.33215	16.33215	16.33215	16.33215	16.33215	0.587951
2005	117560	12673504	1167471	1167471	30736	10.34952	10.34952	10.34952	16.34341	16.34341	16.34341	16.34341	16.34341	16.34341	16.34341	16.34341	16.34341	16.34341	0.587951
2006	119770	12824735	1169333	1169333	31242	10.36586	10.36586	10.36586	16.35502	16.35502	16.35502	16.35502	16.35502	16.35502	16.35502	16.35502	16.35502	16.35502	0.587951
2007	122389	12982430	1171496	1171496	31757	10.38220	10.38220	10.38220	16.36689	16.36689	16.36689	16.36689	16.36689	16.36689	16.36689	16.36689	16.36689	16.36689	0.587951
2008	125088	13146634	1173677	1173677	32280	10.39853	10.39853	10.39853	16.37911	16.37911	16.37911	16.37911	16.37911	16.37911	16.37911	16.37911	16.37911	16.37911	0.587951
2009	127688	13318619	1175735	1175735	32811	10.41487	10.41487	10.41487	16.39168	16.39168	16.39168	16.39168	16.39168	16.39168	16.39168	16.39168	16.39168	16.39168	0.587951
2010	130420	13492705	1177852	1177852	33352	10.43121	10.43121	10.43121	16.40452	16.40452	16.40452	16.40452	16.40452	16.40452	16.40452	16.40452	16.40452	16.40452	0.587951
2011	133618	13676633	1180274	1180274	33901	10.44755	10.44755	10.44755	16.41766	16.41766	16.41766	16.41766	16.41766	16.41766	16.41766	16.41766	16.41766	16.41766	0.587951
2012	136201	13865445	1182189	1182189	34460	10.46389	10.46389	10.46389	16.43120	16.43120	16.43120	16.43120	16.43120	16.43120	16.43120	16.43120	16.43120	16.43120	0.587951
2013	138793	14058983	1184074	1184074	35027	10.48022	10.48022	10.48022	16.44491	16.44491	16.44491	16.44491	16.44491	16.44491	16.44491	16.44491	16.44491	16.44491	0.587951
2014	142092	14260045	1186423	1186423	35604	10.49656	10.49656	10.49656	16.45877	16.45877	16.45877	16.45877	16.45877	16.45877	16.45877	16.45877	16.45877	16.45877	0.587951
2015	146229	14471805	1189293	1189293	36191	10.51290	10.51290	10.51290	16.47297	16.47297	16.47297	16.47297	16.47297	16.47297	16.47297	16.47297	16.47297	16.47297	0.587951
2016	150290	14693479	1192032	1192032	36787				16.48771	16.48771	16.48771	16.48771	16.48771	16.48771	16.48771	16.48771	16.48771	16.48771	0.587951

Legend

Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yr: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25,54): number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Table D-55
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Canada

1998-2016																									
1. GDP growth per adult =																									
2. Five-year mortgage loan interest rate =																									
3. Demographic projections = scenario 2 from Statistics Canada (medium growth)																									
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Table D-56
Housing Stock and Price Forecasts
Canada

Canada
1998-2016

Strong Economic, Medium Economic Growth and Strong Demographic Growth

- 1- GDP growth per adult = 1.64720
2- Five-year mortgage loan interest rate = 7.50
3- Demographic projections = scenario 3 from Statistics Canada (strong growth)

Legend
Pt: MLS price divided by the consumer price index
Rt: interest rate on 5-year residential mortgages
Yt: GDP ratio for the population 15 years of age and over
N(25, 54)t: number of persons between the ages of 25 and 54
St: housing stock

Year	Forecasts										Price Equation										Housing Stock Variation Equation										AR(1)
	Pt	Rt	Yt	N(25, 54)t	St	La	La Pt	La Rt	La Yt	La N(25, 54)t	La St	La Pt	La Rt	La Yt	La N(25, 54)t	La St	La Pt	La Rt	La Yt	La N(25, 54)t	La St	La Pt	La Rt	La Yt	La N(25, 54)t	La St	La Pt	La Rt	La Yt	La N(25, 54)t	
1996	11358769																														
1997	113593	11508497	11.64038		26970	10.21882						0.01229	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	16.24550	0.01310	11.64038	16.24550	0.01310	11.64038	16.24550	0.01310	11.64038	16.24550	0.01310	11.64038	16.24550	0.01310	11.64038	16.24550
1998	114487	11664933	11.64822	11.64038	27414	10.21882						0.01371	16.25860	16.27210	16.27210	16.27210	0.01350	11.64822	16.25860	0.01350	11.64822	16.25860	0.01350	11.64822	16.25860	0.01350	11.64822	16.25860	0.01350	11.64822	16.25860
1999	115645	11825820	11.65828	11.64822	27866	10.23516						0.01278	16.27210	16.28580	16.28580	16.28580	0.01370	11.65828	16.27210	0.01370	11.65828	16.27210	0.01370	11.65828	16.27210	0.01370	11.65828	16.27210	0.01370	11.65828	16.27210
2000	117590	11992498	11.67496	11.65828	28325	10.25149						0.01290	16.28580	16.29979	16.29979	16.29979	0.01400	11.67496	16.28580	0.01400	11.67496	16.28580	0.01400	11.67496	16.28580	0.01400	11.67496	16.28580	0.01400	11.67496	16.28580
2001	119733	12164497	11.69302	11.67496	28791	10.26783						0.01226	16.29979	16.31403	16.31403	16.31403	0.01424	11.69302	16.29979	0.01424	11.69302	16.29979	0.01424	11.69302	16.29979	0.01424	11.69302	16.29979	0.01424	11.69302	16.29979
2002	120154	12333594	11.69653	11.69302	29266	10.28417						0.00836	16.31403	16.32784	16.32784	16.32784	0.01381	11.69653	16.31403	0.01381	11.69653	16.31403	0.01381	11.69653	16.31403	0.01381	11.69653	16.31403	0.01381	11.69653	16.31403
2003	121534	12503579	11.70795	11.69653	29748	10.30051						0.00843	16.32784	16.34153	16.34153	16.34153	0.01369	11.70795	16.32784	0.01369	11.70795	16.32784	0.01369	11.70795	16.32784	0.01369	11.70795	16.32784	0.01369	11.70795	16.32784
2004	123820	12678074	11.72658	11.70795	30238	10.31685						0.00874	16.34153	16.35538	16.35538	16.35538	0.01386	11.72658	16.34153	0.01386	11.72658	16.34153	0.01386	11.72658	16.34153	0.01386	11.72658	16.34153	0.01386	11.72658	16.34153
2005	126793	12859697	11.75031	11.72658	30736	10.33318						0.00898	16.35538	16.36961	16.36961	16.36961	0.01422	11.75031	16.35538	0.01422	11.75031	16.35538	0.01422	11.75031	16.35538	0.01422	11.75031	16.35538	0.01422	11.75031	16.35538
2006	130440	13050901	11.77867	11.75031	31242	10.34952						0.00940	16.36961	16.38437	16.38437	16.38437	0.01476	11.77867	16.36961	0.01476	11.77867	16.36961	0.01476	11.77867	16.36961	0.01476	11.77867	16.36961	0.01476	11.77867	16.36961
2007	134160	13251519	11.80679	11.77867	31757	10.36586						0.00906	16.38437	16.39962	16.39962	16.39962	0.01525	11.80679	16.38437	0.01525	11.80679	16.38437	0.01525	11.80679	16.38437	0.01525	11.80679	16.38437	0.01525	11.80679	16.38437
2008	137667	13460246	11.83259	11.80679	32280	10.38220						0.00832	16.39962	16.41525	16.41525	16.41525	0.01563	11.83259	16.39962	0.01563	11.83259	16.39962	0.01563	11.83259	16.39962	0.01563	11.83259	16.39962	0.01563	11.83259	16.39962
2009	140828	13675335	11.85530	11.83259	32811	10.39853						0.00733	16.41525	16.43110	16.43110	16.43110	0.01585	11.85530	16.41525	0.01585	11.85530	16.41525	0.01585	11.85530	16.41525	0.01585	11.85530	16.41525	0.01585	11.85530	16.41525
2010	143934	13896304	11.87711	11.85530	33352	10.41487						0.00667	16.43110	16.44713	16.44713	16.44713	0.01603	11.87711	16.43110	0.01603	11.87711	16.43110	0.01603	11.87711	16.43110	0.01603	11.87711	16.43110	0.01603	11.87711	16.43110
2011	147372	14124270	11.90072	11.87711	33901	10.43121						0.00654	16.44713	16.46341	16.46341	16.46341	0.01627	11.90072	16.44713	0.01627	11.90072	16.44713	0.01627	11.90072	16.44713	0.01627	11.90072	16.44713	0.01627	11.90072	16.44713
2012	150063	14355971	11.91881	11.90072	34460	10.44755						0.00498	16.46341	16.47968	16.47968	16.47968	0.01627	11.91881	16.46341	0.01627	11.91881	16.46341	0.01627	11.91881	16.46341	0.01627	11.91881	16.46341	0.01627	11.91881	16.46341
2013	152684	14590996	11.93613	11.91881	35027	10.46389						0.00415	16.47968	16.49592	16.49592	16.49592	0.01624	11.93613	16.47968	0.01624	11.93613	16.47968	0.01624	11.93613	16.47968	0.01624	11.93613	16.47968	0.01624	11.93613	16.47968
2014	155963	14831844	11.95737	11.93613	35604	10.48022						0.00427	16.49592	16.51229	16.51229	16.51229	0.01637	11.95737	16.49592	0.01637	11.95737	16.49592	0.01637	11.95737	16.49592	0.01637	11.95737	16.49592	0.01637	11.95737	16.49592
2015	160023	15081396	11.98307	11.95737	36191	10.49656						0.00471	16.51229	16.52897	16.52897	16.52897	0.01669	11.98307	16.51229	0.01669	11.98307	16.51229	0.01669	11.98307	16.51229	0.01669	11.98307	16.51229	0.01669	11.98307	16.51229
2016	163962	15338644	12.00739	11.98307	36787	10.51290						0.00416	16.52897	16.54590	16.54590	16.54590	0.01693	12.00739	16.52897	0.01693	12.00739	16.52897	0.01693	12.00739	16.52897	0.01693	12.00739	16.52897	0.01693	12.00739	16.52897

Table D-57-1
Data on the Housing Market in Canada
1956-1997

Data on the Housing Market in Canada

Years	Consumer Price Index CPI	MLS Canada Prices MLSTOTAL	MLS Canada Prices (real) MLSTOTAL	New Home Price Index NHPI	New Home Price Index NHPIR	National Housing Act Price NHA	National Housing Act Price (real) NHAR	National Balance Sheet Accounts NBSA	National Balance Sheet Accounts NBSAR	Stock- weighted MLS Prices WEIG.MLS	Stock- weighted MLS Prices WEIG.MLSR	Construction Costs Index CONSTRUCPI
1956	21.84	11,993	54,909	NA	NA	13,548	62,028	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1957	22.54	12,781	56,699	NA	NA	14,044	62,302	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1958	23.11	13,823	59,818	NA	NA	14,267	61,740	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1959	23.38	14,208	60,761	NA	NA	14,462	61,847	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1960	23.68	14,186	59,920	NA	NA	14,273	60,287	NA	NA	15,930	67,286	NA
1961	23.92	14,127	59,068	NA	NA	14,463	60,472	6,073	25,393	16,239	67,898	NA
1962	24.18	14,303	59,144	NA	NA	14,684	60,720	6,268	25,921	16,418	67,890	NA
1963	24.60	14,420	58,618	NA	NA	15,068	61,252	6,816	26,894	16,573	67,370	NA
1964	25.05	15,064	60,136	NA	NA	15,807	63,102	7,080	28,262	16,836	67,210	NA
1965	25.68	15,917	61,974	NA	NA	16,572	64,524	7,852	29,794	17,291	67,324	NA
1966	26.63	17,536	65,863	NA	NA	18,059	67,827	8,231	30,915	18,553	69,683	NA
1967	27.58	19,111	69,306	NA	NA	18,529	67,195	8,689	31,512	19,908	72,196	NA
1968	28.69	21,272	74,140	NA	NA	18,922	65,949	9,171	31,965	21,567	75,168	NA
1969	29.99	23,234	77,468	NA	NA	20,315	67,735	9,771	32,580	22,858	76,215	NA
1970	30.99	23,376	75,427	NA	NA	19,894	64,191	10,424	33,636	23,159	74,727	NA
1971	31.88	24,581	77,117	36.10	113.25	20,528	64,402	11,486	36,035	24,264	76,122	33.30
1972	33.41	26,595	79,606	39.60	118.53	22,168	66,355	13,313	39,849	26,195	78,409	36.18
1973	35.95	32,306	89,864	48.20	134.08	24,370	67,789	15,968	44,418	30,740	85,508	42.45
1974	39.88	41,057	102,964	61.80	154.98	28,683	71,932	18,235	45,731	38,855	97,442	51.13
1975	44.16	45,878	103,894	65.90	149.24	33,289	75,386	20,073	45,457	42,782	96,883	54.86
1976	47.47	51,359	108,200	72.00	151.69	37,877	79,797	21,867	46,069	47,988	101,098	59.45
1977	51.28	53,888	105,096	74.40	145.10	41,542	81,018	23,375	45,587	50,350	98,196	61.53
1978	55.85	56,637	101,409	76.40	136.80	44,055	78,881	25,400	45,479	53,226	95,302	64.93
1979	62.485	62,485	102,504	79.20	129.92	49,024	80,422	27,756	45,533	58,413	95,824	69.50
1980	67.16	70,238	104,586	85.40	127.16	54,673	81,409	30,837	45,918	64,091	95,433	75.35
1981	75.52	79,535	105,321	95.77	126.82	63,370	83,915	33,650	44,559	74,370	98,482	84.03
1982	83.68	73,156	87,431	93.79	112.09	64,097	76,602	35,361	42,260	68,646	82,039	85.53
1983	88.54	77,361	87,372	90.69	102.42	68,881	77,795	37,318	42,148	72,194	81,537	88.05
1984	92.38	76,948	83,292	91.05	98.55	74,707	80,866	39,093	42,317	73,353	79,401	90.35
1985	96.03	81,845	85,226	92.10	95.90	80,616	83,946	41,531	43,246	78,280	81,513	92.80
1986	100.04	95,074	95,034	100.00	99.96	NA	NA	45,624	45,605	90,087	90,049	100.00
1987	104.41	111,673	106,958	113.84	109.04	NA	NA	50,320	48,195	106,679	102,175	111.08

Table D-57-2
Data on the Housing Market
1956-1997

Data on the Housing Market in Canada

Years	Consumer Price Index CPI	MLS Canada Prices MLSTOTAL	MLS Canada Prices (real)	New Home Price Index NHPI	New Home Price Index (real) NHPIR	National Housing Act Price NHA	National Housing Act Price (real) NHAR	National Balance Sheet Accounts NBSA	Balance Sheet Accounts NBSAR	Stock-weighted MLS Prices WEIG MLS	Stock-weighted MLS Prices (real) WEIG MLSR	Construction Costs Index CONSTRUCI
1988	108.61	130,724	120,363	125.56	115.61	NA	NA	54,456	50,140	122,017	112,346	120.50
1989	114.03	146,127	128,144	142.17	124.68	NA	NA	57,443	50,374	135,744	119,039	129.55
1990	109.71	139,214	116,530	144.24	120.74	NA	NA	59,255	49,600	131,714	110,252	128.78
1991	126.18	145,516	115,329	134.34	106.47	NA	NA	60,843	48,221	132,506	105,018	131.05
1992	128.08	147,933	115,505	134.31	104.87	NA	NA	62,754	48,998	131,484	102,662	131.33
1993	130.43	151,413	116,085	136.08	104.33	NA	NA	65,132	49,935	132,820	101,830	133.73
1994	130.68	157,440	120,482	136.27	104.28	NA	NA	66,971	51,250	137,339	105,100	137.05
1995	133.51	150,591	112,795	134.66	100.88	NA	NA	67,650	50,671	134,275	100,574	137.98
1996	135.59	151,436	111,685	132.10	97.42	NA	NA	68,405	50,450	135,272	99,764	138.03
1997	137.80	156,531	113,593	133.13	96.61	NA	NA	69,851	50,690	142,446	100,081	140.95

Table D-57-3
Data on the Housing Market in Canada
1956-1997

Year	Construction Costs Index (real)	Interest Rate on 5-year Mortgages SYMOR R	Annual Variation Rate of CPI INF	Housing Use Cost USERS	Number of Housing Units STOCK	Rate of Housing Units VACR	Pop. Growth										Income per Adult	
							15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and Over	25-54	25-54	25-54	25-54	25-54	25-54
	CONSTRUCPIR						PG1524	PG2534	PG3544	PG4554	PG5564	PG6574	PG2544	PG2544	PG2544	PG2544	PG2544	PG2544
1956	NA	6.23%	1.43%	7.46%	4,159,168	3.57%	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	14,118	14,118
1957	NA	8.85%	3.20%	9.71%	4,274,322	3.66%	3.49%	2.15%	2.86%	3.41%	2.04%	2.11%	2.48%	2.48%	2.48%	2.48%	13,986	13,986
1958	NA	8.80%	2.51%	7.89%	4,422,259	3.76%	2.89%	0.92%	2.41%	3.03%	1.83%	1.95%	1.62%	1.62%	1.62%	1.62%	13,967	13,967
1959	NA	6.98%	1.19%	8.72%	4,566,260	3.87%	2.08%	0.19%	2.21%	3.45%	2.68%	2.61%	1.14%	1.14%	1.14%	1.14%	14,256	14,256
1960	NA	7.18%	1.25%	10.19%	4,686,112	3.98%	2.49%	-0.14%	1.95%	2.88%	2.39%	2.18%	0.86%	0.86%	0.86%	0.86%	14,349	14,349
1961	NA	7.00%	1.02%	10.00%	4,794,776	4.04%	2.49%	-0.37%	1.74%	2.88%	2.28%	2.46%	0.65%	0.65%	0.65%	0.65%	14,546	14,546
1962	NA	6.97%	1.12%	10.21%	4,911,233	4.07%	4.30%	-0.88%	1.40%	2.19%	2.64%	2.00%	0.23%	0.23%	0.23%	0.23%	15,261	15,261
1963	NA	6.97%	1.72%	10.11%	5,025,385	4.09%	4.88%	-0.88%	1.17%	1.95%	2.54%	2.04%	0.13%	0.13%	0.13%	0.13%	15,717	15,717
1964	NA	7.02%	1.83%	9.50%	5,164,738	4.11%	5.09%	-0.14%	1.34%	1.90%	2.73%	2.01%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	0.60%	16,379	16,379
1965	NA	7.02%	2.53%	9.44%	5,308,036	4.13%	4.69%	0.51%	1.22%	2.05%	2.98%	2.00%	0.87%	0.87%	0.87%	0.87%	17,023	17,023
1966	NA	7.66%	3.67%	8.38%	5,469,090	4.17%	4.77%	1.51%	1.12%	2.12%	3.06%	2.18%	1.31%	1.31%	1.31%	1.31%	17,677	17,677
1967	NA	8.07%	3.57%	9.23%	5,618,358	4.25%	5.06%	2.23%	0.57%	2.18%	3.41%	2.30%	1.39%	1.39%	1.39%	1.39%	18,079	18,079
1968	NA	9.06%	4.05%	9.33%	5,790,182	4.34%	4.43%	2.56%	0.01%	2.11%	3.42%	2.27%	1.29%	1.29%	1.29%	1.29%	18,527	18,527
1969	NA	9.84%	4.53%	9.33%	5,991,958	4.44%	3.75%	3.06%	-0.39%	2.09%	3.41%	2.60%	1.65%	1.65%	1.65%	1.65%	19,064	19,064
1970	NA	10.45%	3.33%	9.30%	6,175,500	4.55%	3.01%	4.50%	-0.20%	1.94%	2.50%	2.61%	2.27%	2.27%	2.27%	2.27%	19,685	19,685
1971	104.47	9.43%	2.85%	9.74%	6,375,126	4.68%	1.69%	5.35%	-0.15%	1.86%	1.97%	2.56%	2.81%	2.81%	2.81%	2.81%	20,711	20,711
1972	108.28	9.21%	4.81%	10.06%	6,593,945	4.88%	2.22%	4.80%	0.12%	2.05%	1.66%	2.63%	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	2.70%	21,034	21,034
1973	118.08	9.59%	7.61%	8.39%	6,825,113	5.29%	2.67%	4.71%	0.69%	1.70%	1.80%	2.67%	2.88%	2.88%	2.88%	2.88%	21,706	21,706
1974	128.21	11.24%	10.92%	6.82%	7,066,430	5.40%	2.64%	4.47%	0.76%	1.04%	2.59%	2.77%	2.73%	2.73%	2.73%	2.73%	22,016	22,016
1975	124.27	11.43%	10.74%	3.65%	7,270,292	5.03%	2.30%	3.85%	1.17%	0.67%	2.53%	3.31%	2.81%	2.81%	2.81%	2.81%	22,576	22,576
1976	125.25	11.78%	7.49%	4.09%	7,500,633	5.13%	2.30%	3.51%	1.82%	0.20%	2.84%	3.31%	2.66%	2.66%	2.66%	2.66%	23,007	23,007
1977	119.99	10.36%	8.02%	6.28%	7,741,213	5.45%	1.18%	2.78%	2.50%	0.33%	1.98%	3.46%	3.27%	3.27%	3.27%	3.27%	23,308	23,308
1978	116.25	10.59%	8.92%	5.92%	7,967,345	5.69%	0.91%	2.72%	3.08%	-0.11%	1.99%	3.36%	3.04%	3.04%	3.04%	3.04%	22,613	22,613
1979	114.01	11.98%	10.17%	6.06%	8,186,087	5.41%	0.87%	3.25%	3.29%	0.07%	1.99%	3.36%	2.98%	2.98%	2.98%	2.98%	24,558	24,558
1980	112.20	14.32%	12.45%	7.59%	8,354,475	4.54%	0.14%	3.55%	3.74%	0.22%	2.23%	3.09%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	25,055	25,055
1981	111.27	18.15%	10.80%	9.44%	8,534,475	4.39%	0.14%	2.55%	3.74%	0.22%	2.23%	3.09%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	25,779	25,779
1982	102.21	17.89%	10.80%	6.97%	8,667,917	4.16%	-1.22%	1.95%	5.28%	0.35%	2.23%	3.09%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	25,779	25,779
1983	99.44	13.29%	5.82%	5.17%	8,845,182	4.37%	-1.83%	1.89%	4.50%	0.27%	2.34%	3.32%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	25,779	25,779
1984	97.80	13.61%	4.34%	10.39%	9,011,212	4.29%	-1.92%	1.87%	3.92%	0.59%	1.94%	3.64%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	25,779	25,779
1985	96.63	12.18%	3.95%	10.80%	9,167,257	4.10%	-1.92%	1.92%	3.73%	0.44%	1.17%	3.32%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	25,779	25,779
1986	99.96	11.22%	4.17%	10.47%	9,364,818	4.11%	-1.81%	2.08%	3.57%	1.02%	0.92%	3.32%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	2.74%	25,779	25,779
1987	106.39	11.14%	4.36%	10.18%	9,599,434	4.32%	-2.59%	2.31%	3.74%	1.89%	0.74%	3.66%	2.94%	2.94%	2.94%	2.94%	25,779	25,779

Table D-57-4
Data on the Housing Market in Canada
1956-1997

Data on the Housing Market in Canada

Year	Construction Costs Index (real)	Interest Rate on 5-year Mortgages	Annual Variation Rate of CPI	Housing Use Cost	Number of Housing Units	Vacancy Rate of Housing Units	15-24 Pop.	15-24 Growth	25-34 Pop.	25-34 Growth	35-44 Pop.	35-44 Growth	45-54 Pop.	45-54 Growth	55-64 Pop.	55-64 Growth	65 and Over Pop.	65 and Over Growth	PG2544	PG650	Income per Adult
1988	110.95	11.60%	4.02%	10.34%	9,832,612	4.39%	PG1524	-2.85%	PG2534	1.97%	PG3544	3.56%	PG4554	2.85%	PG5564	0.70%	PG650	3.04%	PG2544	2.67%	26,726
1989	113.61	12.05%	5.00%	11.02%	10,062,178	4.58%	-1.93%	-1.93%	2.27%	2.27%	4.16%	4.16%	3.54%	3.54%	0.29%	0.29%	3.26%	3.26%	3.11%	3.11%	27,017
1990	107.79	13.24%	4.76%	10.94%	10,280,902	4.70%	-1.59%	-1.59%	0.82%	0.82%	3.84%	3.84%	3.39%	3.39%	0.28%	0.28%	3.05%	3.05%	2.18%	2.18%	26,561
1991	103.86	11.16%	5.62%	9.60%	10,470,501	5.03%	-1.14%	-1.14%	-0.53%	-0.53%	2.99%	2.99%	3.92%	3.92%	0.37%	0.37%	3.02%	3.02%	1.08%	1.08%	25,682
1992	102.54	9.52%	1.51%	7.52%	10,685,540	5.22%	-0.10%	-0.10%	-0.27%	-0.27%	2.29%	2.29%	5.84%	5.84%	0.57%	0.57%	2.80%	2.80%	0.93%	0.93%	25,439
1993	102.52	8.70%	1.84%	11.02%	10,870,036	5.19%	0.05%	0.05%	-0.85%	-0.85%	2.53%	2.53%	5.33%	5.33%	0.65%	0.65%	2.67%	2.67%	0.75%	0.75%	25,556
1994	104.88	9.34%	0.19%	11.16%	11,071,816	5.24%	-0.29%	-0.29%	-1.68%	-1.68%	2.18%	2.18%	4.74%	4.74%	1.14%	1.14%	2.45%	2.45%	0.18%	0.18%	26,192
1995	103.35	9.22%	2.17%	12.73%	11,226,462	5.36%	0.16%	0.16%	-1.20%	-1.20%	2.59%	2.59%	4.59%	4.59%	1.03%	1.03%	2.48%	2.48%	0.66%	0.66%	26,440
1996	101.79	7.94%	1.56%	9.79%	11,358,769	5.27%	0.31%	0.31%	-1.35%	-1.35%	2.58%	2.58%	4.12%	4.12%	1.42%	1.42%	2.40%	2.40%	0.61%	0.61%	26,456
1997	102.29	7.07%	1.63%	9.74%	11,508,497	5.26%	0.43%	0.43%	-1.88%	-1.88%	2.27%	2.27%	3.79%	3.79%	1.76%	1.76%	2.25%	2.25%	0.24%	0.24%	26,970